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INTRODUCTIONp E banking industry in the United States presently confronts its
X eatest challenge since the Depression. This Article describes the
factors that have combined to erode the profitability and long-term via-
bility of the banking industry in its present highly regulated form. The
Article considers the restraints currently imposed on bank operations by
federal law, and it then examines the initiatives taken by a number of
states to expand the powers of state banks. In light of the present eco-
nomic vulnerability of the banking industry and the ongoing debate con-
cerning the ability of banks to use expanded powers safely, this Article
argues that state experimentation with broader bank powers can provide
a critically needed testing ground for the industry. An experimental role
for the states with regard to the desirability and safety of new bank pow-
ers would be consistent with the history of our nation's dual banking
system. Under that system, the federal and state regulatory components
have each played a creative role in helping the banking industry to adapt
to changing competitive conditions.
As explained in Part I of this Article, the banking industry's current
predicament is the result of several related developments in the financial
markets that have increased competitive pressures on banks and reduced
their profit-making opportunities. First, between 1980 and 1986, the fed-
eral government removed its regulatory controls over the interest rates
paid on bank deposits. These federal controls were lifted in response to
the high inflation and volatile market interest rates of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, which made it extremely difficult for banks to attract low-
interest deposits from the public. The removal of these federal controls
enabled banks once again to compete effectively for deposits, but banks
can no longer obtain deposits at low cost.1
Second, rapid technological advances over the past two decades in data
1. For a discussion of the former federal controls on deposit interest rates and the
impact of their removal, see infra notes 15 & 28-34 and accompanying text.
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processing and telecommunications have deprived banks of their for-
merly preeminent position as expert lenders. Banks previously served as
the leading source of commercial and consumer credit, based on their
unparalleled ability to collect and analyze information about the
creditworthiness of individuals and businesses. However, since 1970 the
information revolution has greatly reduced the cost of collecting, analyz-
ing and disseminating financial data. This cost reduction in information
management has enabled nonbanking firms in the securities, insurance,
commercial finance and consumer credit industries to compete success-
fully with banks in providing funds to the public and the business
community.2
Third, the increasingly national and international scope of the financial
markets has led to the expansion of domestic banking organizations and
the entry into the United States of many foreign banking interests. The
past decade has witnessed hundreds of interstate acquisitions of banks by
bank holding companies, as well as a tripling of foreign-owned banking
offices in the United States. This unprecedented expansion of banking
institutions in the domestic markets as well as overseas has greatly in-
creased the competitive pressures on individual banks.3
The foregoing developments have seriously eroded the profits that
banks once enjoyed in the United States under the traditional structure of
bank regulation. As a consequence of this declining profitability, nearly
six hundred banks failed during the three-year period ending on Decem-
ber 31, 1989.' Indeed it appears that the traditional regulatory structure,
with its careful separation of banking from nonbanking activities and its
geographic segmentation of banking markets, may no longer be viable in
light of current competitive realities.'
In light of the current vulnerability of the banking industry, many ob-
servers have called for an expansion of banking powers in order to pro-
2. For a discussion of the impact of technological advances and nonbank competi-
tion on the financial services industry, see infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
3. For a description of the effects of domestic bank expansion and foreign bank entry
during the 1970s and 1980s, see infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the decline in bank profitability and the increasing rate of
bank failures in recent years, see infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the apparent inadequacy of the traditional bank regulatory
structure, see infra notes 12-22, 32-34 & 62-63 and accompanying text. Professor Helen
Garten has suggested that federal banking regulators have already largely abandoned
their traditional approaches to bank regulation and are experimenting with new regula-
tory approaches that would be appropriate for nationwide banking enterprises engaged in
a wide variety of banking and nonbanking activities. See Garten, Regulatory Growing
Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in A Deregulatory Age, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 501,
528-41, 545-46 (1989). For recent statements by federal banking regulators indicating
that they are adopting new supervisory methods, see State of the Bank and Credit Union
Insurance Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) 160-72 [hereinafter 1989 House Hearings] (testimony of L.
William Seidman, Chairman of the FDIC); id. at 179-84, 188 (testimony of Robert L.
Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
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vide banks with new competitive opportunities. Skeptics, however, have
questioned whether banks can safely and effectively exercise new powers
in nontraditional areas.6 In addition, as described in Part II of this Arti-
cle, national banks and bank holding companies are substantially barred
under current federal law from engaging in securities underwriting, in-
surance underwriting and sales, and real estate investment and develop-
ment. State banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System
("state member banks") are subject to many of these federal constraints
on bank powers. However, state banks that are not members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System ("state nonmember banks") are largely exempt from
these federal limitations.
Under our nation's dual banking system, as described in Part II, Con-
gress has reserved to the states a broad discretion to determine the scope
of state bank powers. During the past decade, many states have exer-
cised this discretion by granting to state banks expanded powers in the
securities, insurance and real estate areas. These state laws continue a
long-established pattern of state regulatory innovation within the dual
banking system. Indeed, state initiatives in expanding state bank powers
stand in sharp contrast to the inability of Congress since 1982 to act on
numerous proposals to authorize new banking activities.
Part III of this Article discusses the responses of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Federal Reserve Board
("FRB")7 to the expansion of state bank powers. The FDIC is the pri-
mary federal regulator for FDIC-insured state nonmember banks,' and
the FRB has similar supervisory authority over state member banks and
bank holding companies. While neither agency has yet taken definitive
action to prohibit state bank activities in the securities, insurance or real
estate areas, both agencies have claimed a general authority to forbid or
restrict such activities. In contrast, Congress has taken no action (except
for a temporary moratorium in 1987-88) to restrain state bank powers,
despite numerous proposals by the FRB and nonbank industry groups
for preemptive legislation.
Part IV examines the limits of the statutory authority of the FDIC and
the FRB to regulate the activities of state banks. The FDIC and the
FRB have authority to impose capital adequacy requirements on state
6. For a description of the current debate over the desirability of expanded bank
powers, see infra Part I(E).
7. The official name for the Federal Reserve Board is the "Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System." 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1988).
8. As explained infra in Part IV(B)(2), state nonmember banks must obtain approval
of the FDIC under 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a) (1988), as amended by Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 206(a), 103 Stat. 195-96, in order to secure deposit insurance. Almost all state non-
member banks find it necessary to obtain FDIC insurance in order to compete for depos-
its from the public. See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1977). Unless otherwise indicated, the term "state
nonmember bank" as used herein means a state nonmember bank that has obtained
FDIC insurance.
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banks, to regulate transactions between state banks and their affiliates,
and to prevent individual state banks from engaging in unsafe or un-
sound practices. However, Part IV shows that Congress has purpose-
fully withheld from the FRB and the FDIC any general authority to
prohibit state banks from engaging in activities authorized by state law.
In particular, Part IV(C) demonstrates that the Bank Holding Company
Act ("BHC Act") 9 does not authorize the FRB to restrict the state-au-
thorized activities of either state banks owned by bank holding compa-
nies or operations subsidiaries of such banks.10
Part V considers and responds to two major critiques of the dual bank-
ing system. The first and more traditional criticism is that the dual bank-
ing system leads'to a dangerous "competition in laxity" between state
bank supervisors and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), which regulates national banks. Part V(A) demonstrates,
however, that over the past several years the average capital ratios and
earnings of state banks have been consistently higher than those of na-
tional banks. Moreover, to date no significant safety or soundness
problems have resulted from the exercise by state banks of expanded se-
curities, insurance or real estate powers. In this regard, the misuse of
liberal state powers by state-chartered thrifts in certain states (especially
California and Texas) during the 1980s is not comparable to the success-
ful experience thus far with expanded state bank powers, evidently be-
cause state banks have been subject to more stringent federal and state
regulation than that applied to thrifts. Thus, the "competition in laxity"
argument does not find substantial support in the empirical evidence with
regard to state banks.
Recently, Professors Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey have articu-
lated a second critique of the dual banking system-namely, that the sys-
tem creates only a "myth" of competition between state and federal
regulators of banks."1 Professors Butler and Macey argue that state and
federal regulators have actually collaborated to perpetuate an uncompeti-
tive industry cartel. As shown in Part V(B), Butler and Macey have min-
imized the extent of state innovation and exaggerated the degree of
federal preemption within the dual banking system. In addition, they
have overlooked evidence of a longstanding rivalry between state bank
supervisors and the OCC that has resulted in significant regulatory im-
provements. Moreover, the most workable proposal made by Butler and
9. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1988), as amended by various provisions of FIRREA,
supra note 8.
10. A bank that is owned by a bank holding company will generally be referred to
herein as a "holding company-owned bank." An "operations subsidiary" is a subsidiary
of a bank that engages in activities authorized for its parent bank at locations permitted
to its parent bank. See, eg., 12 C.F.R. § 250.141(b)-(d) & (i) (1989) (authorizing estab-
lishment of operations subsidiaries by state member banks).
11. See Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 677, 712 (1988).
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Macey calls for a complete federal preemption of state banking laws that
would result in an uncompetitive federal monopoly of regulation.
In sum, this Article contends that the dual banking system has fos-
tered a substantial degree of supervisory innovation within the banking
industry. The recent state initiatives in expanding state bank powers
should not be preempted by Congress in the absence of substantial evi-
dence indicating that the new powers pose a serious threat to the federal
deposit insurance fund. Indeed, because there is, at present, considerable
uncertainty regarding the proper scope of banking powers, state initia-
tives should provide useful practical experiments that will be of substan-
tial assistance in fashioning a new federal approach to banking
regulation.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
FOR THE BANKING INDUSTRY
Since the mid-1970s, the banking industry in this country has exper-
ienced a series of radical and wrenching changes. The most important of
these changes have been (i) rapid advances in communications and com-
puter technology, which have enabled nonbank financial companies to
offer services that compete directly with those provided by banks, (ii) a
substantial rise in the interest rates paid on deposits, due to the removal
of federal controls on interest rates and inflationary pressures during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, (iii) a significant liberalization of state laws
with respect to interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding compa-
nies, and (iv) a sharp increase in competition from foreign banks. In
combination, these developments have undermined the stability and
profitability that the banking industry enjoyed prior to 1975. In response
to these developments, an increasing number of commentators and bank
regulators have called for an expansion of bank powers in order to re-
store the competitive viability of banks. However, some other observers
have questioned whether banks have the financial and managerial re-
sources to exercise such powers safely.
A. Traditional Regulation of the Banking Industry
Before the mid-1970s, the domestic banking industry was significantly
insulated by federal regulation from both external and internal competi-
tion. For example, federal law generally separated commercial banking
from securities underwriting and dealing, 2 prohibited bank holding
companies from engaging in unrelated nonbanking activities, 3 and
barred banking organizations from establishing banking offices across
12. For a description of the separation of commercial banking from securities under-
writing and dealing under the Glass-Steagall Act, see infra notes 122-42 and accompany-
ing text.
13. For a discussion of the restrictions placed on the nonbanking activities of bank
holding companies under Section 4 of the BHC Act, see infra notes 443-47 and accompa-
nying text.
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state lines. 4 In addition, commercial banks, like thrift institutions, were
able to collect low-cost deposits due to the combined effect of federal
deposit insurance and federal controls that restricted the interest rates
paid on deposits.' 5 Banks used these deposits, in accordance with their
traditional role as financial intermediaries, 16 primarily to make commer-
cial loans to businesses and consumer loans to individuals. For example,
in 1972 commercial banks originated eighty-two percent of the short and
intermediate-term credit provided to domestic nonfinancial corporations,
and in 1977 banks made sixty percent of all domestic automobile loans.17
The federal banking laws that separated banking from commerce and
restricted the geographic expansion of banking organizations did not
have the articulated purpose of protecting the banking industry from ex-
ternal and internal competition. Instead, these laws had the dual objec-
14. The McFadden Act of 1927 ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)), prohibits a national bank from establishing branches
across state lines and allows a national bank to open branches within its home state only
to the extent that competing state banks are expressly authorized to branch by state statu-
tory law. The McFadden Act's restrictions on branching are applicable to state member
banks under 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988). Section 3(d) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)
(1988), popularly known as the "Douglas Amendment," prohibits a bank holding com-
pany from acquiring a bank outside of the state in which the holding company's principal
operations are located, unless such an acquisition is specifically authorized by the statu-
tory law of the acquired bank's home state.
15. For a discussion of the competitive benefits provided to banks by federal deposit
insurance, see G. Benston, R. Eisenbeis, P. Horvitz, E. Kane & G. Kaufman, Perspec-
tives on Safe & Sound Banking: Past, Present and Future 137 (1986) [hereinafter Safe
Banking Perspectives]. For description of the federal controls on interest rates under for-
mer Regulation Q, see R. Litan, What Should Banks Do? 26, 32-34 (1987); S. Rep. No.
368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 236,
238-40.
16. Banks are said to be financial "intermediaries" because they collect large pools of
liquid funds in the form of deposits and lend out those funds based upon their assessment
of borrowers' creditworthiness. Thus, banks are able to satisfy both the desire of individ-
ual depositors to invest in short-term, liquid obligations and the need of borrowers to
obtain longer-term, less liquid credit. Because banks act as secure depositories and cen-
tralize the process of assessing credit risk and extending loans, they perform a valuable
and cost-efficient service in acting as specialized intermediaries between depositors and
borrowers. However, banks remain chronically vulnerable to the inherent mismatch be-
tween their more liquid, shorter-term deposit liabilities and their less liquid, longer-term
loan assets. One of the primary purposes of federal deposit insurance has been to provide
greater stability to the banking system, and to discourage depositor runs on banks, by
assuring depositors that their insured deposits will be paid notwithstanding a liquidity
crisis involving one or more banks. See R. Litan, supra note 15, at 8-12; Fischel, Rosen-
field & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va. L. Rev.
301, 306-13 (1987).
17. See 9 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 6, at 8-9 (Mar. 19, 1990) (reprinting excerpts
from the 1991 Economic Report of the President); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,
Mandate for Change: Restructuring the Banking Industry 6-7 (1987) [hereinafter Man-
date for Change] (noting that in 1976 commercial banks originated 76 percent of the
short- and intermediate-term credit provided to domestic nonfinancial corporations), re-
printed in Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (pt. 1), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, 147,
148 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 House Hearings].
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tive of maintaining a decentralized banking industry, in order to prevent
a concentration of financial power in a few banking organizations, and of
ensuring that businesses could obtain credit from banks in an environ-
ment free from bank conflicts of interest. 8 Nevertheless, the practical
result of these legal restraints was to create a "government-enforced car-
tel in banking" that stabilized the banking system by providing both
"segmented markets" and "explicit government protection against mar-
ket competition" from nonbanking firms. 9
As Professor Helen Garten has pointed out, the traditional approach
to bank regulation was successful for many years in enabling banks to
earn high profits and avoid undue risks.2" Indeed, it was the profitability
of the traditional banking business that induced nonbanking companies
to look for ways to compete with banks by offering substitutes for bank
deposits and loans.21
B. Changes in the Financial Marketplace Since 1975 and the Growth
of Nonbank Competitors
A combination of factors has undermined the economic viability of the
regulated banking system during the past decade and a half.2 Two par-
ticularly important factors have been (i) the development of low-cost in-
formation technology, which currently enables many nonbank financial
businesses to compete directly with banks in providing financial services,
and (ii) high and volatile interest rates, which now require banks to pay
18. See, eg., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (McFadden
Act reflected congressional "concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly
control over credit and money through unlimited branching"); id. at 412-13 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (campaign for passage of the McFadden Act "was far more than just a cam-
paign to protect the local bank lobby," because it grew out of a "real fear of the effect that
a central bank with unlimited branching power could have on the financial and political
climate of the country"); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159,
172, 177 (1985) (the BHC Act in general, and the Douglas Amendment in particular,
were intended to "retain local, community-based control over banking", because "our
country traditionally has favored widely dispersed control of banking"); Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46 (1980) (BHC Act was designed "to prevent
the concentration of banking resources in the hands of a few financial giants," and to
limit the "control of banking and nonbanking enterprises by a single business entity," in
order to forestall "anticompetitive tendencies in national credit markets"); see also S.
Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5519, 5520-22 (describing purposes of BHC Act as enacted in 1956 and amended in
1970).
19. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 16, at 303; see also R. Litan, supra
note 15, at 25-33 (describing enactment and practical effect of federal regulatory re-
straints imposed on banks between 1933 and 1970); Miller, The Future of the Dual Bank-
ing System, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (1987) (same).
20. See Garten, supra note 5, at 513-21.
21. See id. at 522.
22. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 16, at 303-04; Miller, supra note
19, at 4-7; Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 1, 5-7, reprinted in 1987 House Hear-
ings, supra note 17, at 142, 146-48.
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market interest rates on deposits in order to avoid losing funds to deposit
substitutes offered by nonbank competitors.
The revolutions in data processing and telecommunications have de-
prived banks of their preeminent status as expert intermediaries for the
collection, processing, and analysis of information relating to extensions
of credit. The costs for data recording, processing and transmission have
fallen by more than ninety-five percent since 1964. This cost reduction
has enabled many nonbanking entities, including securities firms, insur-
ance companies, commercial finance companies, and consumer loan
firms, to compete with banks in providing credit to businesses and con-
sumers. For example, securities firms have used the new technology to
provide funding to businesses through the issuance of securities (such as,
corporate commercial paper and asset-backed securities), thereby replac-
ing their customers' need for more expensive bank loans.23
These developments have had a significant adverse impact on bank
lending. The percentage of domestic short-term and intermediate-term
commercial credit provided by banks declined from eighty-two percent
in 1972 to only forty-nine percent in 1989.24 This decline in the percent-
age of commercial credit provided by bank loans has been mirrored by a
substantial increase in the amount of commercial credit provided
through the issuance of securities. For example, between 1975 and 1985
the amount of outstanding commercial paper increased at a rate almost
four times as fast as the growth in bank commercial loans. Similarly,
from 1979 to 1985 the volume of securities other than commercial paper
grew at a rate more than four times as fast as the increase in bank com-
mercial loans.25
23. The foregoing paragraph is based on the following sources: R. Litan, supra note
15, at 1-2, 9-10, 33, 41; Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 5-10, reprinted in 1987
House Hearings, supra note 17, at 146-51; S. Rep. No. 305, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
(1988); id. at 117-18 (additional views of Senators Dixon, Sanford and Garn); see also
Garten, supra note 5, at 523 & n. 107 (explaining that commercial paper consists of short-
term unsecured promissory notes issued by corporations in the public debt markets with-
out the necessity of registration under the federal securities laws); Boemio & Edwards,
Asset Securitization: A Supervisory Perspective, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 659, 660 (1989) (ex-
plaining that asset-backed securities are securities representing interests in a pool of bank
loans of a particular type, such as home mortgages or consumer debt).
The increasing competitiveness of securities firms in the financial marketplace has been
attributed not only to the technological revolutions in telecommunications and data
processing, but also to the abolition of fixed commissions on securities transactions in
1975. The removal of fixed commissions compelled securities firms to invest in new tech-
nologies and seek new market opportunities for their products and services. See Restruc-
turing Financial Markets: The Major Policy Issues, Report from the Chairman of the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce 97-98 (Comm. Print 1986).
24. See 9 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 6, at 8-9 (Mar. 19, 1990) (reprinting excerpts
from 1991 Economic Report of the President).
25. See R. Litan, supra note 15, at 42-43; see also 9 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 6, at
8-9 (Mar. 19, 1990) (reprinting excerpts from 1991 Economic Report of the President)
(noting that the volume of nonfinancial corporations' outstanding commercial paper grew
from $7 billion in 1972 to $125 billion in 1989, and that the amounts of outstanding
1142 [Vol. 58
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In addition to losing market share in the area of commercial lending,
banks have experienced an overall decline in their percentage share of
total consumer loans. For example, the portion of automobile loans held
by banks declined from sixty percent in 1977 to forty-one percent in
1986, as automobile manufacturers greatly expanded the operations of
their consumer finance subsidiaries.26 Banks are likely to suffer a further
loss in their market share of consumer loans as the trend toward securi-
tization of consumer-related debt continues. For example, the total an-
nual issuances of securities backed by loans other than mortgages
increased from about $1 billion in 1985 to more than $16 billion in
1988.27
At the same time that nonbank competitors were aggressively entering
the commercial and consumer credit markets, high and volatile interest
rates impaired the ability of banks to retain low-cost deposits. Inflation-
ary pressures increased steadily during the 1970s. In response to these
pressures, the FRB determined in October 1979 to abandon its efforts to
control interest rates, and instead sought to control the money supply in
order to reduce inflation. The short-term result of the FRB's new mone-
tary policy was high and volatile interest rates. Banks and especially
thrift institutions suffered disintermediation as their customers withdrew
funds from deposit accounts controlled by Regulation Q and instead
placed their funds in money market mutual funds ("MMMFs") offered
by securities firms, which were not subject to Regulation Q. The total
assets of MMMFs increased from $3 billion in 1977 to $233 billion in
1982.28
Faced with this critical situation, Congress in 1980 mandated the
phasing out of federal interest rate controls, a process that was completed
in 1986.29 In addition, Congress in 1982 authorized banks and thrifts to
offer money market deposit accounts ("MMDAs") in order to compete
with MMMFs.30 These actions enabled banks and thrifts to compete for
mortgage-backed securities and high-yield (or "junk") bonds increased from compara-
tively small amounts in the mid-1970s to $810 billion and $130 billion, respectively, by
the end of 1988).
26. See Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 7, 9, reprinted in 1987 House Banking
Hearings, supra note 17, at 148, 150.
27. See Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 9-10, reprinted in 1987 House Banking
Hearings, supra note 17, at 150-51; Boemio & Edwards, supra note 23, at 660.
28. See R. Litan, supra note 15, at 34; Long, Schilling & Van Cleef, Enhancing the
Value of the Thrift Franchise: A Possible Solution for the Dilemma of the FSLIC?, 37
Cath. U. L. Rev. 385, 394-95 (1988); Simpson, Developments in the U.S. Financial System
Since the Mid-1970s, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 4-5 (1988).
29. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221 [hereinafter DIDMCA], tit. II, 94 Stat. 132, 142-45 (codified at various sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C. (1988)). See S. Rep. No. 368, supra note 15, at 3-5, 6-7, 10-12, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 238-40, 242, 246-48 (explaining
DIDMCA's removal of federal interest rate controls); Simpson, supra note 28, at 5
(same).
30. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-St Germain Act"),
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 327, 96 Stat. 1469, 1501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988)). See
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deposits, but the traditional ability of banks and thrifts to obtain low-cost
deposits was largely ended.3"
In practical effect, the actions of Congress abolishing Regulation Q
and authorizing MMDAs deregulated the liability side of the balance
sheet for banks.32 However, Congress has failed to deregulate the asset
side of the balance sheet by expanding the powers of banks.3 In part
because of this inconsistent approach to deregulation, there has been a
marked decline in the profitability and soundness of banks.
3 4
C. The Removal of Barriers to Bank Expansion and Increased
Competition from Foreign Banks
Additional competitive pressures on banks have resulted from the re-
laxation of geographic restraints on the expansion of domestic banking
organizations and the increased presence of foreign banks in the Ameri-
can market. Federal and state laws generally prohibit both national and
state banks from branching across state lines.35 However, in the 1970s
and 1980s, twenty-eight states reduced their restrictions on intrastate
branching, with the result that thirty-five states now permit statewide
expansion of banks through branching or merger. In addition, most of
the remaining states permit statewide expansion through the creation of
multibank holding companies.3 6
Even more significant than the relaxation of intrastate restrictions has
been the movement toward interstate banking. As stated above, the
Douglas Amendment establishes a general federal prohibition against in-
terstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies but permits the
states to lift this barrier.37 Beginning with Maine in 1975 and continuing
S. Rep. No. 536, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 18-20, 54, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3054, 3072-74, 3108 (explaining authorization of MMDAs under Garn-St
Germain Act).
31. By 1985, MMDAs totalled $500 billion while MMMFs, after decreasing to $181
billion by the end of 1983, had grown back to $250 billion. See R. Litan, supra note 15, at
35. As of October 1989, MMMFs had grown to about $400 billion, while banks
MMMDA's amounted to $473 billion. The relative closeness of these figures indicates
that MMMFs continue to exert significant competitive pressure on deposit-taking activi-
ties by banks. See Aguilar, Still Toe-to-Toe: Banks and Nonbanks at the End of the '86s,
Econ. Perspectives, Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 12, 14.
32. See Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Fi-
nancial Services (1984) [hereinafter Blueprint for Reform], reprinted in Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCII) No. 1050 (pt. II) 23 (Nov. 16, 1984).
33. See infra Part II(C).
34. See infra Part I(D).
35. For a discussion of the prohibition against interstate branching by national banks
and state member banks under the McFadden Act, see supra note 14. Cf. Miller, Inter-
state Branching and the Constitution, 41 Bus. Law. 337, 345 (1986) (describing state laws
preventing state banks from branching across state lines, but suggesting that state
prohibitions on interstate branching by state nonmember banks may be unconstitutional
under the dormant commerce clause).
36. See Amel & Jacowski, Trends in Banking Structure since the Mid-1970s, 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 120, 121-22 (1989).
37. For further explanation of terms of the Douglas Amendment, see supra note 14.
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with forty-five other states and the District of Columbia since 1981, state
legislatures have enacted laws permitting, at least to some degree, the
acquisition of local banks by out-of-state bank holding companies.38
The most common of these state laws are nationwide entry statutes
and regional reciprocity laws. As of March 1990, twenty-four states per-
mitted their local banks, under specified conditions, to be acquired by
bank holding companies located in any other state.3 9 In addition, as of
that date, twenty-two other states and the District of Columbia had in
force regional reciprocal laws that allow bank holding companies located
within a specified region to acquire local banks if the home state of the
acquiring bank holding company grants reciprocal privilege to bank
holding companies headquartered in the acquired bank's state. Six of
these regional reciprocal state laws will drop their regional limitation,
and permit nationwide entry, on or before July 1, 1992.'
The liberalization of state laws governing bank structure has unleashed
a wave of bank mergers and acquisitions, including more than 400 inter-
state acquisitions of banks between 1982 and 1988. 41 The impact of this
trend toward greater consolidation in the banking industry has been sig-
nificant. Although the number of banks has declined only slightly (a
four percent decrease from 14,399 in 1976 to 13,753 in 1987), the number
of separate banking organizations has declined substantially (a seventeen
percent drop from 12,404 in 1976 to 10,279 in 1987).42 In addition, the
number of banks controlled by multibank holding companies approxi-
mately doubled between 1976 and 1987 (from 2,296 to 4,465), and the
percentage of total banking assets held by such companies also doubled
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 168-73 (1985), the
Supreme Court held that the Douglas Amendment grants broad discretion to the states in
determining to what extent they wish to remove the federal barrier to interstate bank
acquisitions.
38. Actions taken by the states to permit interstate acquisitions of banks by bank
holding companies pursuant to the Douglas Amendment are described in Northeast
Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 163-65; Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 121-22; Simonson, Full-
Service Interstate Banking Statutes: The Conditions of Entry, 11 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 723
passim (1986); Wilmarth, The Case for the Validity of State Regional Banking Laws, 18
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1017, 1038-40 (1985); Interstate Banking Laws, September 1989, 8
Banking Expansion Rep. No. 19, Oct. 2, 1989, at 3-7.
39. For a survey of state laws in effect as of March 1990 with regard to interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies, see Conference of State Bank Supervi-
sors, State of the State Banking System: 1989, at 9-11 (1990) [hereinafter State of the
State Banking System 1989] (on file at Fordham Law Review).
40. See State of the State Banking System 1989, supra note 39, at 10-11. The Supreme
Court upheld the validity of state regional reciprocity laws in Northeast Bancorp, 472
U.S. at 168-78.
41. See Interstate Banking: 1982-1988, 8 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 4, Feb. 20,
1989, at 5; Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 123 & n.2. Of the interstate acquisitions
completed since 1982, 34 have involved transactions in which both the acquiring firm and
the acquired firm controlled total deposits of more than $1 billion. See id. at 128.
42. See Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 123-24. Since 1987 the number of FDIC-
insured banks has continued to decline, to 13,609 as of December 31, 1988 and 13,175 as
of December 31, 1989. See State of the State Banking System 1989, supra note 39, at 3.
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(from 35.7 percent to 70.3 percent).43
The greatest increase in size during the 1980s occurred among the
group of "superregional" bank holding companies that control banks in
more than one state with more than $10 billion in total assets. These
regional organizations took advantage of the problem loans and the re-
gional reciprocal state laws that constrained the expansion of "money
center" banking organizations in New York, California and Illinois dur-
ing the 1980s. As a result, superregional bank holding companies grew
to a size where they could successfully compete with the money center
banks.' However, regional banking organizations have recently begun
to experience their own loan problems, particularly in the real estate
area.
45
The creation and growth of regional bank holding companies was one
of the primary objectives of the regional banking movement, which
sought to allow local banks to expand and grow within their home region
before taking on the full competitive force of the money center banks.46
By facilitating this development, the states may have helped to preserve a
competitive banking environment in an era of interstate banking. Never-
theless, the movement toward bank consolidation has substantially in-
creased the percentage of total domestic banking assets held by the
largest 100 banking organizations (from 50.2 percent in 1977 to 61.5 per-
cent in 1987) and intensified the competitive pressures on all banks.47
Additional competitive stresses have resulted from the increased pres-
ence of foreign banks in the domestic market. During the ten-year pe-
riod ending on December 31, 1986, the number of foreign bank offices in
the United States more than tripled (from 155 to 487), and domestic as-
sets held by foreign banks quadrupled, a rate of increase that was more
than twice as rapid as the growth in domestic assets held by U.S. banks.48
By 1988 foreign banks held eighteen percent of all domestic commercial
and industrial loans, and by 1989 foreign bank offices in the United
States controlled about one-quarter of total domestic banking assets.4 9
Foreign bank entry into the domestic banking market, like nonbank
competition and the growing activities of American banks abroad, re-
flects the ongoing movement toward a global financial market.50 Federal
bank regulators have predicted that the planned movement of the Euro-
43. See id. at 124-25.
44. See id. at 125-27.
45. See, e-g., Danielson, Rocky Road Ahead for Many Banks in Post-FIRREA Era, 9
Banking Expansion Rep. No. 1, at 1, 10-12 (Jan. 1, 1990).
46. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 165, 172-
73, 177-78 (1985) (discussing objectives of regional reciprocal state laws).
47. See Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 126-28, 133.
48. See Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 10, reprinted in 1987 House Hearings,
supra note 17, at 151.
49. See S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at 118 (additional views of Senators Dixon,
Sanford and Garn); Corrigan, Trends in International Banking in the United States and
Japan, Q. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Autumn 1989, at 1, 3.
50. See Corrigan, supra note 49, at 3; R. Litan, supra note 15, at 55-57; Reed, Moving
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pean Community to a single financial market in 1992 will strengthen Eu-
ropean banks and increase competitive pressures on U.S. banks.51
Japanese banks have already emerged as major and potentially dominant
competitors, increasing their share of global banking assets from twenty-
four to forty percent between 1980 and 1987, while the share of such
assets held by U.S. banks declined from sixteen to less than nine percent
during the same period. 2
D. The Decline in Bank Profitability and the Increase
in Bank Failures
Nonban: competition, geographic expansion and foreign bank entry,
together with adverse economic developments during the 1980s such as
inflation, recession, and the decline in agricultural and oil prices in the
world markets, have exerted a serious downward pressure on bank profit-
ability. For the decade of the 1970s, the average rate of return on assets
for U.S. banks was 0.80 percent, but this rate declined to 0.70 percent
during 1981-85 and 0.64 percent in 1986.11 The overall decline in bank
profitability was most severe for small banks with less than $100 million
in assets, but affected banks of all sizes.5 4 Bank profitability has re-
mained generally weak since 1986.11
The decline in bank profitability has been accompanied by an increase
in risk-taking by banks. As banks have lost many of their largest and
most creditworthy corporate customers to the commercial paper and se-
Financial Services into the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects, Issues in Bank Regu-
lation, Bank Ad. Inst., Summer 1989, at 3, 3-5.
51. See 54 BNA Banking Rep. 521 (1990) (reporting testimony by Comptroller of the
Currency Robert L. Clarke); 53 BNA Banking Rep. 464 (1989) (reporting testimony by
Mr. Clarke and Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC).
52. See U.S. Banks Need More Liberal Laws to Compete in International Arena, 54
Banking Rep. (BNA) 873, 874 (May 21, 1990) (reporting remarks by Representative An-
nunzio); Corrigan, supra note 49, at 3.
53. See Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 11-12, reprinted in 1987 House Bank-
ing Hearings, supra note 17, at 152-53.
54. See id.; U.S. General Accounting Office, Commercial Banking: Trends in Bank
Performance from December 1976 through June 1987, at 30-31 (1988) [hereinafter
Trends in Bank Performance].
55. In 1987, average return on bank assets fell to 0.12 percent, due primarily to loan
loss provisions made by large banks to offset anticipated losses from their loans to devel-
oping countries. See McLaughlin & Wolfson, The Profitability of Insured Commercial
Banks in 1987, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 403, 403-08 (1988). Average return on bank assets
increased to 0.84 percent in 1988, in substantial part because banks chose to make their
lowest amount of loan loss provisions in several years (even though charge-offs of bad
loans increased over 1987). See Wolfson & McLaughlin, Recent Developments in the
Profitability and Lending Practices of Commercial Banks, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 461, 461-62
(1989). Bank profitability declined again in 1989. Total U.S. bank earnings fell from
$25.3 billion in 1988 to $16.3 billion in 1989, while U.S. banks made loan loss provisions
of $30.3 billion in 1989, an amount exceeded only by the $37.5 billion recorded in 1987.
See Banks' Earn $2.7 Billion in Fourth Quarter, $16. 3 Billion Overall in 1989, 54 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 425, 425-26 (Mar. 12, 1990) (reporting figures announced by the FDIC)
[hereinafter Banks' Earn].
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curities markets, they have shifted their lending to more risky borrowers,
such as less developed countries ("LDCs"), oil and gas producers, farm-
ers, real estate developers and companies acquired or reorganized in
highly leveraged transactions ("HLTs")."6 Not surprisingly, many of
these higher-risk loans have gone sour.
Many defaults occurred on LDC, farm and energy loans during the
early 1980s, in response to a severe recession in the American economy
and the collapse of agricultural and petroleum prices on the world mar-
kets. More recently, serious problems have emerged with respect to real
estate and HLT loans because of a slowdown in the domestic economy,
an overbuilt real estate market, and concerns about excessive levels of
debt in the business sector. 7 Thus, by the end of 1989, despite seven
years of expansion in the domestic economy, nonperforming bank loans
had more than doubled in amount since the end of 1982.5
Predictably, the competitive squeeze on bank profits and the increase
in bank risk-taking have resulted in a sharp rise in the rate of bank fail-
ures. During the entire decade of the 1970s there were only seventy-six
bank failures, but that number was exceeded in 1984 alone, when sev-
enty-nine banks failed.59 Since 1984 there has been a steady increase in
the number of bank failures, with 120 in 1985, 138 in 1986, 184 in 1987,
200 in 1988, and 206 in 1989.' The number of FDIC-insured institu-
tions on the FDIC's problem list has similarly increased from 200 in the
56. See R. Litan, supra note 15, at 48-49; Trends in Bank Performance, supra note 54,
at 54-60; McLaughlin & Wolfson, supra note 55, at 463-66; Simpson, supra note 28, at 2-
6, 8. For a study conc!uding that the default risk for assets of large bank holding compa-
nies increased substantially between 1981 and 1986, see Furlong, Changes in Bank Risk-
Taking, Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of San Francisco, Spring 1988, at 45-55.
57. See Miller, supra note 19, at 10-11; McLaughlin & Wolfson, supra note 55, at 465-
66; Simpson, supra note 28, at 3; 1989 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 191-93, 205
(testimony of Manuel H. Johnson, Vice Chairman of the FRB); 54 Banking Rep. (BNA)
425, 426 (1990) (reporting statement by Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC on
March 7, 1990, discussing the substantial increase during 1989 in problem real-estate
loans held by banks).
58. See Corrigan, Future Priorities in Banking and Finance, Q. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank
of N.Y., Winter, 1989-90, at 1, 1.
59. See Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 124 (Table 1); Miller, supra note 19, at 8.
60. See Amel & Jacowski, supra note 36, at 124 (Table 1) & n.4 (stating total number
of FDIC-insured bank failures in years 1977 through 1988); Bank Failures Nationwide
Reach 206 at End of 1989, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 14 (Jan. 8, 1990) (stating total
number of 1989 bank failures).
Poor management and insider fraud and abuse have been cited, along within excessive
risk-taking, as primary factors contributing to bank failure. See Safe Banking Perspec-
tives, supra, note 15, at 2-11; Miller, supra note 19, at 8-12; Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Bank Failure: An Evaluation of the Factors Contributing to the Failure of
National Banks (1988), reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) %87,387 (during 1979-87, poor management oversight contributed to 90 percent of
the difficulties encountered by failed and problem national banks, excessively risky man-
agement policies contributed to 80 percent of such difficulties, and insider fraud and
abuse was a significant factor leading to 35 percent of national bank failures). Cf. More
than Half ofFailed S & Ls Were Fraud Victims, Seidman Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA)
375 (Mar. 5, 1990) (reporting statement by FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman estimat-
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spring of 1981 to almost 1,100 as of December 31, 1989.61
E. The Debate Over Expanded Bank Powers
The foregoing discussion indicates that the U.S. banking industry is in
a condition of prolonged decline and threatened viability. The most
widely advocated solution for this critical problem is an expansion of
banking powers that would allow banks to increase their earnings and
reduce their risk by diversifying their operations. However, a number of
critics have questioned whether banks have the financial and managerial
resources to make safe and profitable use of expanded powers.
As explained below, the powers of national banks, state member banks
and bank holding companies are significantly restricted in the areas of
securities underwriting, insurance sales and underwriting, and real estate
investment and development. 62 Many professional economists, academ-
ics and federal banking regulators believe that the powers of banking or-
ganizations should be expanded in at least some of these areas.
Two major arguments have been advanced in support of increasing
bank powers. First, it is argued that bank entry into the securities, insur-
ance, and real estate businesses would benefit consumers by creating
greater competition and thereby reducing prices in these businesses.
4
Second, it is suggested that expanded powers would strengthen banks
and bank holding companies by enabling them to diversify their activi-
ties. Such diversification could improve profitability by allowing banking
organizations to take advantage of potential synergies and economics of
scope associated with the joint offering of related financial services. 65 In
ing that criminal insider fraud occurred at about 60 percent of the failed thrift institutions
placed under receivership or conservatorship with the Resolution Trust Corp.).
61. See Isaac & Marino, The FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund: Its Future Prospects, 8
Banking Expansion Rep. No. 22, Nov. 20, 1989, at 1, 9; Miller, supra note 19, at 8. The
number of problem banks increased to 1,196 in March 1986 and reached a peak of 1,624
as of June 30, 1987, before declining to 1,093 as of December 31, 1989. See Isaac &
Marino, supra, at 9; Miller, supra note 19, at 8; Banks' Earn, supra 55, at 425 (reporting
statement by Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC).
62. See infra Part II(B).
63. See, e.g., Mandate for Change, supra note 17, at 98-102 (setting forth views of the
FDIC), reprinted in 1987 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 239-43; 1987 House Hearings,
supra note 17, at 6-8, 267-302 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency); Legislative Proposals to Restructure our Financial System: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 86-104
(1987) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the FRB, in favor of expanding the
securities powers of bank holding companies) [hereinafter 1987 Senate Hearings]; R.
Litan, supra, note 15, at 60-189; Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 127-71;
Fischel, Rosenfeld & Stillman, supra note 16, at 319-30.
64. See, e.g., R. Litan, supra note 15, at 61-74; S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at 13-
15; 1987 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 272-73 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comp-
troller of the Currency); 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 63, at 161-62 (testimony of
George D. Gould, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Finance).
65. See, e.g., R. Litan, supra note 15, at 74-81; Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note
15, at 140; cf Hunter & Timme, Does Multiproduct Production in Large Banks Reduce
Costs?, Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, May/June 1989, at 2-11 (concluding that
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addition, diversification could reduce the risk of bank failure associated
with the excessive concentration of bank loans in industries subject to
cyclical fluctuations in the economy. 6
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of expanded bank powers,
critics have challenged the view that a diversification of bank activities is
likely to result in increased bank profitability without undue risk.67 For
example, some critics have argued that nonbank activities, particularly in
the areas of securities and real estate, would involve undue risks for
banks.6" Others have suggested that banks may lack the managerial ex-
the offering of multiple products does not appear to create economics of scope in terms of
bank production costs, but may increase consumer welfare by reducing transaction costs
and increasing convenience for those consumers who desire multiple financial services).
66. See, e.g., R. Litan, supra note 15, at 81-98; Fisehel, Eisenbeis & Wall, Bank Hold-
ing Company Nonbanking Activities and Risk, Proc. of Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition, Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago 340-57 (1984); Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman,
supra note 16, at 320-21.
For studies relating to the riskiness of specific nonbanking activities, see Brewer, For-
tier & Pavel, Bank Risk from Nonbank Activities, Econ. Perspectives, Fed. Res. Bank of
Chicago, July/August 1988, at 14, 23-24 (concluding that limited involvement by bank
holding companies in insurance underwriting and sales would probably reduce overall
risk, and that small investments in real estate and securities activities would probably not
cause a substantial increase in overall risk; however, a 10 percent or larger investment in
securities activities would increase risk substantially); Felgran, Bank Participation in Real
Estate: Conduct, Risk and Regulation, New England Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Bos-
ton, Nov./Dec. 1988, at 57, 68-72 (concluding that real estate investments would not
pose undue risk to banks, and could reduce bank risk through diversification, if such
investments are limited to less than six percent of bank assets); Pace, Financing Deregula-
tion: The Merging of Banking and Insurance Agency Activities, Issues in Bank Regula-
tion, Bank Ad. Inst., Summer 1989, at 24, 27 (concluding that insurance agency activities
would not involve undue risk for banks and could reduce bank risk by diversifying bank
operations).
67. See, e.g., Boyd & Graham, The Profitability and Risk Effects of Allowing Bank
Holding Companies to Merge with Other Financial Firms: A Simulation Study, Quarterly
Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Spring 1988, at 3, 3-13 (suggesting that risk of bank
failures would be increased by mergers between banking organizations and securities or
real estate development firms, but not necessarily by mergers between banking organiza-
tions and life insurance companies); Dale, The Grass May Not Be Greener: Commercial
Banks and Investment Banking, Econ. Perspectives, Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Nov./
Dec. 1988, at 3, 3-11 (suggesting that entry of commercial banks into the investment
banking business may not result in increased bank profitability, because of costly barriers
to entry and the likelihood that bank entry would result in greater competition and lower
profit margins in the securities business).
For other commentaries opposing or questioning bank entry into nonbanking busi-
nesses, see DiLorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis for
Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am. U.L. Rev. 647
(1986) (arguing that the businesses of commercial banking and investment banking
should continue to be separated in view of the risks and conflicts of interest that would
result from joinder of these businesses); Rhoades, Interstate Banking and Product Line
Expansion: Implications from Available Evidence, 18 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1115, 1145-57
(1985) (suggesting that potential advantages of diversification of bank powers may be
outweighed by increased operating risks resulting from inadequate managerial expertise
to administer a wider range of activities).
68. See, e.g., Boyd & Graham, supra note 67,passim (discussing potential risks result-
ing from bank involvement in real estate and securities activities); Dale, supra note 67,
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pertise and experience needed to compete successfully in businesses that
are unrelated to traditional banking activities.69 These critics point out
that many thrift failures in recent years have arisen out of the imprudent
investment of thrift assests in nontraditional areas such as commercial
real estate and high-yield debt securities ("junk bonds").7"
A recent analysis of nonbank activities of bank holding companies in-
dicates that the profits for nonbank subsidiaries between 1986 and 1988
followed a similar pattern to the profits for bank subsidiaries. This anal-
ysis "raises questions about the potential gains from diversification re-
sulting from currently allowed nonbank activities," because it suggests
that the trend in earnings from nonbanking activities may not necessarily
provide a countervailing balance to the pattern of earnings from tradi-
tional banking operations.71 The analysis also indicates that nonbank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, although more highly capital-
ized than their bank affiliates, appear to involve a higher degree of risk in
their operations.7 2
A comprehensive analysis of the arguments for and against the expan-
sion of bank powers is beyond the scope of this Article. One practical
problem is that there is a relative lack of hard information concerning the
safety and profitibility of bank involvement in securities underwriting,
insurance underwriting, and real estate development. This information is
lacking because federal law substantially restricts the ability of banks and
bank holding companies to engage in these activities.73
For present purposes, however, it is significant that support for new
bank powers has grown considerably over the past two decades in re-
sponse to the widespread perception that traditional banking methods
may no longer be competitively viable.74 For example, Professor Garten,
passim (discussing potential risks resulting from bank involvement in securities activities);
DiLorenzo, supra note 67, at 674-86 (same).
69. See, eg., Garten, supra note 5, at 556-58; Rhodes, supra note 67, at 1149-57.
70. See, e.g., N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong: A Look at the
Cause Behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s, at 54-81 (1988); Wallace, U.S.
May Become Largest 'Junk Bond' Holder, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1990, at D5, col. 1(describing difficulties encountered by some failed or troubled thrifts due to investments
in "junk bonds").
71. Liang & Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. 280, 287 (1990) (explaining that profits for both bank and nonbank subsidiaries
of bank holding companies declined form 1986 to 1987 and rose from 1987 to 1988).
72. Id. at 289-92.
73. See Rhodes, supra note 67, at 1146, 1149. For a discussion of the restrictions
placed by federal law on the involvement of banks and bank holding companies in securi-
ties, insurance and real estate activities, see infra Part II(B).
74. This growth of support for expanded banking powers can be perceived even in
Congress. Compare S. Rep. No. 1084, supra note 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5520-22, 5530-34 (explaining that 1970 amendments to BHC Act were
intended to continue congressional policy of separating banking activities from commer-
cial activities not closely related to banking), with S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at 2-15(proposing bill that would remove many of the existing federal barriers to affiliations
between banks and securities firms, in view of rapid and dramatic changes in the financial
markets). But see H.R. Rep. No. 822 (pt. 2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-80 (1988) (arguing
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who has expressed some skepticism about expanded bank powers, 75
agrees that the traditional activities of banks can no longer ensure profit-
ability and that some form of product deregulation is needed.76 In fact,
she has stated that "all observers of bank regulation today are to some
degree deregulators. 77
As shown below in Part II, Congress and the states have responded in
differing ways to the growing movement in favor of expanded bank pow-
ers. Congress has been unable to enact comprehensive legislation con-
cerning bank powers, because of a legislative gridlock created by
competing interest groups. A number of states, however, have chosen to
grant broader powers to state-chartered banks. These state experiments
may well provide concrete data that will assist in resolving the ongoing
debate over the desirability and safety of expanded bank powers. If so,
the states will have continued their record of constructive innovation
under our dual banking system.
II. THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS OF
CONGRESS AND THE STATES WITH RESPECT TO NEW
BANK POWERS
Since the early days of our Republic, the federal government and the
states have shared responsibility for the regulation of banking. Despite
numerous efforts to remove state authority over bank regulation, Con-
gress has consistently upheld the dual banking system. This congres-
sional policy has produced a decentralized and unconcentrated banking
system and a tradition of innovation in bank regulation.
The actions of many states in expanding bank powers provide the most
recent example of state experimentation within the dual banking system.
Federal law currently prohibits national banks and bank holding compa-
nies from engaging in most types of securities underwriting, insurance
underwriting and sales, and real estate investment and development ac-
tivities. In recent years Congress has been stymied by contests among
competing interest groups and has not acted on legislative proposals to
authorize new bank powers. In contrast, many state legislatures have
enacted laws permitting banking organizations to engage to some degree
in securities, insurance or real estate activities.
that broad-based entry by banks into the securities business, especially with regard to the
underwriting of equity or corporate debt securities, would be unsafe and undesirable).
75. See Garten, supra note 5, at 551-58 (suggesting that a diversification of banking
powers may increase rather than reduce the operating risks for banks, due to the inherent
tendency of banks to use banking assets to support nonbanking affiliates, the difficulties
involved in divesting ownership of unprofitable subsidiaries, and the lack of bank mana-
gerial expertise to administer a wide variety of activities).
76. See id. at 505-06, 521-28, 568.
77. Id. at 568.
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A. Federal and State Regulation of Banks Under the
Dual Banking System
1. Historical Background of the Dual Banking System
Since the founding of the United States, the federal and state govern-
ments have each exercised regulatory power over banks.7 8 Between 1787
and 1836, the federal government chartered and regulated only two
banks-the First (1791-1811) and Second (1816-36) Banks of the United
States-while the states chartered and regulated many banks. Due in
part to the intensity of public distrust of concentrated financial power,
the agrarian and pro-state bank elements of the Jeffersonian party de-
feated the rechartering of the First Bank of the United States, and the
Jacksonian party prevented the rechartering of the Second Bank.7 9
Following the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States,
state legislatures (led by Michigan in 1837 and New York in 1838) en-
acted "free banking" laws. These laws departed from the prior practice
of chartering banks by special legislative acts. Free banking laws were
essentially general incorporation laws that permitted any person to ob-
tain a bank charter upon the satisfaction of specified conditions.8 0 These
laws greatly facilitated the chartering of new banks and assured the de-
velopment of a decentralized banking industry. Significantly, when Con-
gress decided to reinstitute a system of national banks in 1863, it chose
the state free banking model instead of the centralized federal approach
of the First and Second Banks of the United States."
Congress did not intend to create a dual banking system when it au-
thorized the chartering of national banks in 1863. Congress expected
that state banks would voluntarily convert to national charters in order
to issue the newly-authorized national bank notes. When most state
banks chose not to convert, Congress attempted, in 1865, to drive state
78. For example, our nation's first bank, the Bank of North America, received a fed-
eral charter from the Confederation Congress on December 31, 1781, and subsequently
obtained a state charter from Pennsylvania on April 1, 1782, due to doubts about the
federal charter's validity. See B. Hammond, Banks and Politics in America, from the
Revolution to the Civil War 48-51 (1957).
79. Approval of the charter of the First Bank of the United States was successfully
obtained by Alexander Hamilton over the strenuous opposition of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison. See id. at 114-18. For discussion of the public and congressional debates
leading to the defeat of the rechartering of the First Bank and the prevention of recharter-
ing of the Second Bank, see id. at 210-26, 326-450.
In vetoing the bill to recharter the Second Bank in 1832, President Andrew Jackson
declared that the Second Bank was "unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the
rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the People." E. Symons & J. White,
Banking Law: Teaching Materials 14-15 (2d ed. 1984) (reprinting portions of Jackson's
veto message of July 10, 1832). The Second Bank was especially dangerous, in Jackson's
opinion, because it made possible "a concentration of power in the hands of a few men
irresponsible to the people." Id. at 16.
80. See B. Hammond, supra note 78, at 572-604, 617-22; E. Symons & J. White, supra
note 79, at 21-23.
81. See B. Hammond, supra note 78, at 723-28; E. Symons & J. White, supra note 79,
at 23-24; Wilmarth, supra note 38, at 1023.
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banks out of business by placing a prohibitive ten percent tax on their
circulating notes. This attempt failed, however, because state banks suc-
cessfully shifted from a note-based operation to a deposit-based business
by adopting the widespread use of checking accounts.8"
While the survival of a dual banking system after 1865 may have been
"an historical accident,"83 Congress in this century has repeatedly acted
in a manner that has preserved a central role for the states in bank regu-
lation. In 1933, Congress rejected proposals that probably would have
destroyed the state banking system by allowing national banks to branch
across state lines and by providing federal deposit insurance only to na-
tional banks and state member banks. Instead, Congress allowed na-
tional banks to establish branches only within their home state and only
to the degree expressly permitted by state law, and Congress also made
federal deposit insurance available to all state banks.8 4 Additionally, in
1956 Congress prohibited interstate acquisitions of banks by bank hold-
ing companies without state authorization, in part because that prohibi-
tion was deemed necessary to preserve state control over the expansion of
banking organizations.8 5
Both in 1933 and 1956, Congress determined that state control over
bank expansion would preserve a decentralized banking industry and
prevent the growth of concentrated financial power.8 6 More recently,
Congress has failed to act on several legislative proposals that would
have rescinded the existing authority of the states to prevent interstate
branching by national banks and interstate acquisitions of banks by bank
holding companies."7 Thus, Congress has continued to maintain an ira-
82. See B. Hammond, supra note 78, at 728-34; E. Symons & J. White, supra note 79,
at 24-25; Wilmarth, supra note 38, at 1023 n.29.
83. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 681.
84. See Wilmarth, supra note 38, at 1024-25.
85. See id. at 1025-31.
86. See id. at 1024-29. In adopting and amending the McFadden Act in 1927 and
1933, and in passing the Douglas Amendment in 1956, congressional supporters of state
control over bank branching and interstate bank acquisitions repeatedly referred to the
need for a decentralized banking system. These congressional supporters cited President
Jackson's destruction of the Second Bank of the United States as a key precedent favoring
the prevention of centralized financial power. See, eg., 66 Cong. Rec. 4438 (1925) (re-
marks of Senator Reed), quoted in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 413
(1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); S. Rep. No. 584, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. (pt. II) 3-5 (1932)
(minority views); 102 Cong. Rec. 6857 (1956) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
87. In January 1981, President Carter issued a report advocating the phased removal
of restrictions on interstate branching by national banks and interstate acquisitions of
banks by bank holding companies. For a discussion and critique of this report, see Bell &
Wilmarth, The Interstate Banking Controversy: President Carter's McFadden Act Report,
99 Bank. L.J. 722 (1982). As explained in Wilmarth, supra note 38, at 1033-34, Congress
declined to authorize interstate acquisitions of banks without regard to state law except in
the special case of failing or failed banks with assets of at least $500 million. See 12
U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 217(5), 103 Stat. 256-
57.
In 1984, the Senate passed a bill that would have clarified the states' authority to adopt
regional reciprocal banking laws, see Wilmarth, supra note 38, and 1049 n.163, but such
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portant role for the states in determining the structure of the banking
system.58
2. The Dual Banking System's Record of Innovation
Beyond the historic support that the dual banking system has enjoyed
because of its role in maintaining a decentralized banking system, 9 many
scholars and government officials have supported the system because of
its record of innovation in bank regulation. These commentators argue
that the dual banking system contains an inherent competitive dynamic
that causes both federal and state bank regulators to be flexible and inno-
vative in order to retain their regulated constituents.90 As Professor
Kenneth Scott has explained, the federal and state banking agencies "can
be viewed as firms producing different brands of regulation and engaged
in a species of competition for market shares."91
Thus, under the dual banking system it is not possible for one banking
agency to exercise a regulatory monopoly that would enable it to create
and enforce a "single industry cartel".92 Because federal and state bank-
ing laws allow banks to convert between national and state charters with-
out the approval of their current regulator, the dual banking system
contains a "safety valve" allowing banks to escape from arbitrary, inflexi-
ble or outdated regulation. 93 In addition, by allowing the states to adopt
new approaches to bank regulation, the dual banking system permits in-
dividual states to act as "laboratories for change" and to have their ex-
legislation was made unnecessary by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in North-
east Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 168-78 (1985). In 1985, a House
committee approved a bill that would have required any state allowing any degree of
entry by out-of-state bank holding companies to permit nationwide entry by July 1, 1992.
See H.R. Rep. No. 174, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 18-20 (1985). This bill, however, failed to
achieve passage in either the House or the Senate.
88. See, e.g., National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980) (discuss-
ing congressional deference to state banking regulation); Independent Bankers Ass'n of
Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 930-32, 936, 950 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862 (1976). Even critics of the dual banking system recognize the considerable political
support it enjoys in Congress. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 677-78; Miller,
supra note 19, at 1-2.
89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining support for decentralized
banking system as a key reason for congressional retention of state control over the geo-
graphic expansion of banking organizations).
90. See W. Brown, The Dual Banking System in the United States 33-38, 59-66
(1968); Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of Financial Institutions-A Policy Pro-
posal, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 53, 54-56 (1987); Scott, supra note 8, at 8-13, 30-35; Blueprint
for Reform, supra note 32, at 43-44; Rep. No. A-1 10, Advisory Comm'n on Intergovern-
mental Relations, State Regulation of Banks in an Era of Deregulation at 3, 5-6, 14-15, 17
(Sept. 1988) [hereinafter State Regulation of Banks]; Safe Banking Perspectives, supra
note 15, at 277-78.
91. Scott, supra note 8, at 32.
92. See id. at 35. According to Professor Scott, "[t]he closest analogy to the dual
system is a situation akin to oligopoly, involving competing cartels." Id.
93. See W. Brown, supra note 90, at 59, 60; Blueprint for Reform, supra note 32, at
43; State Regulation of Banks, supra note 90, at 17; Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note
15, at 277-78; Scott, supra note 8, at 8-13.
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periments adopted by Congress if they prove to be successful. 94
The benefits and costs of the dual banking system have been sharply
debated. Part V of this Article responds to two major criticisms of the
system-first, that the system encourages a "competition in laxity," 95
and second, that the competition permitted by the system is more mythi-
cal than real.9 6 For present purposes, it is important to note that the
dual banking system has produced a continuing series of innovations in
bank regulation at both the state and federal levels.
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the state banking system
originated free banking laws, checking accounts, branch banking, real
estate lending, trust services, reserve requirements, and deposit insur-
ance, all concepts that Congress later incorporated in laws governing na-
tional banks.9 7 More recently, the states have (i) permitted banks to
create interstate electronic funds transfer ("EFT") systems through the
establishment of networks of automated teller machines ("ATMs"), 98 (ii)
initiated the concept of negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW") ac-
counts,9 9 and (iii) authorized interstate acquisitions of banks by bank
94. See Blueprint for Reform, supra note 32, at 43-44; S. Rep. No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 89-90 (1984) (additional views of Senators Gain and Proxmire); Frankel, supra note
90, at 56.
95. See, e.g., Address dated Oct. 21, 1974 by Chairman Arthur Bums of the FRB,
quoted in Scott, supra note 8, at 13. For a discussion of the "competition in laxity"
argument, see infra Part V(A).
96. See Butler & Macey, supra note 1 1,passim. For a discussion of the argument that
competition within the dual banking system is a "myth," see infra Part V(B).
97. See, e.g., B. Hammond, supra note 78, at 556-63, 572-604, 617-22, 695-98
(describing state innovations in deposit insurance, free banking and reserve require-
ments); E. Symons & J. White, supra note 79, at 21-25, 33-34 (discussing state initiatives
in deposit insurance, free banking, checking accounts and trust services); State Regula-
tion of Banks, supra note 90, at 9-10, 11, 17 (describing state initiatives in deposit insur-
ance, free banking, checking accounts, real estate lending, and branch banking).
During the first third of the 20th century, Congress expanded national bank powers in
response to regulatory initiatives at the state level. For example, between 1913 and 1927
Congress enacted laws authorizing national banks to make real estate loans and to offer
trust services in order to give national banks competitive parity with state banks that
enjoyed these powers. See Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 275. Additionally,
in 1927 and 1933 Congress enacted and amended the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1988), which permitted national banks to branch within their home state to the degree
that branching was expressly authorized for state banks under state statutory law. De-
spite strong anti-branching sentiment in Congress, the 1927 and 1933 legislation was
passed because of evidence that national banks could not successfully compete in states
where state banks had been authorized to branch under state law. See Clarke v. Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 401-02 (1987) (White, J.); id. at 411-16 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
98. Interstate shared EFT systems enable customers of a participating bank to obtain
access to their accounts by using ATMs located at other participating institutions in the
same state or in different states. See Bell & Wilmarth, supra note 87, at 730. As of
December 31, 1987, more than 40 states permitted the creation of interstate shared EFT
systems. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, A Profile of State-Chartered Banking
188-90 (12th ed. 1988) [hereinafter State Banking Profile].
99. NOW accounts are savings accounts which allow the customer to withdraw funds
by means of a negotiable instrument such as a check. In practical effect, NOW accounts
are equivalent to interest-bearing checking accounts. See S. Rep. No. 368, supra note 15,
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holding companies."0
The authorization of NOW accounts and interstate bank acquisitions
are especially striking examples of recent state innovations. In the case
of NOW accounts, Congress gave nationwide authorization for this con-
venient service only after several states had demonstrated that NOW ac-
counts were highly desirable to both consumers and banks. 01 In the
case of interstate acquisitions of healthy banks by bank holding compa-
nies, the states acted while Congress was unable to adopt legislation due
to a stalemate among competing segments of the banking industry. As a
result, interstate acquisitions have been accomplished under state law in-
stead of by federal preemption.1
0 2
Thus, under the dual banking system the states have conferred sub-
stantial benefits on our banking industry by acting as "laborator[ies]" for
"experimentation" in the manner envisioned by Justice Brandeis in his
well-known dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. °3 As explained
below, this experimental role of the states has become increasingly signif-
icant in expanding the powers of state banks in the areas of securities,
insurance and real estate."o It seems likely that these state experiments
will provide useful practical experience that will assist in fashioning a
new federal policy on bank powers.
Moreover, regulatory innovation has not been absent on the federal
side of the dual banking system. From 1961 to 1966, James J. Saxon, as
Comptroller of the Currency, took steps to increase the attractiveness of
national bank franchises. He significantly liberalized chartering policies
and lending powers for national banks and issued rulings authorizing na-
tional banks to establish and operate collective investment funds, under-
write revenue bonds, operate insurance and travel agencies, establish
operations subsidiaries, open loan production offices without regard to
at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 240. NOW accounts have
been particularly attractive to consumers since the payment of interest on conventional
demand checking accounts by FDIC-insured banks is prohibited under 12 U.S.C.
§§ 371a and 1828(g) (1988).
100. For discussion of state laws authorizing interstate bank acquisitions, see supra
notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
101. In the 1970s, several New England states and New York authorized state-
chartered savings banks to offer NOW accounts. These accounts proved to be so popular
that Congress gave nationwide authorization in 1980 for the offering of NOW accounts
by all federally-insured depository institutions. See S. Rep. No. 368, supra note 15, at 5,
7-10, 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 240, 242-45, 256-57
(explaining amendments to 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1988)); Blueprint for Reform, supra note
32, at 43-44.
102. For a discussion of state laws authorizing interstate bank acquisitions and the
inability of Congress to act in that area, see R. Litan, supra note 15, at 38; supra notes 38-
40 & 87 and accompanying text.
103. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[ilt is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country").
104. See infra Part II(D).
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state branching laws, and offer personal property leasing and data
processing services."' Although most of Saxon's rulings were ultimately
reversed by court decisions,"0 6 his initiatives caused a substantial number
of state banks to convert to national charters and thereby placed pressure
on the states and other federal agencies to respond with their own inno-
vations.107 In addition, Saxon's initiatives established a precedent for
later rulings by his successors that have successfully enhanced the oper-
ating powers of national banks with respect to securities and insurance
activities. 108
Another example of federal innovation has been the consistent efforts
by recent Comptrollers of the Currency, especially Saxon and his succes-
sors, to expand the branching powers of national banks beyond those
permitted by state law to state commercial banks, notwithstanding the
restrictions contained in the McFadden Act.1 0 9 While many of the ear-
lier attempts of the Comptrollers to expand the branching powers of na-
tional banks were struck down under the policy of "competitive
equality," which the Supreme Court found to be inherent in the McFad-
den Act with regard to branching,110 several of the Comptroller's more
105. See W. Brown, supra note 90, at 33-35; R. Litan, supra note 15, at 31; Scott, supra
note 8, at 23-32.
106. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (striking down regu-
lation authorizing national banks to establish and operate collective investment funds);
Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (invalidating ruling permitting
national banks to operate travel agencies); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents,
Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (striking down interpretive ruling allowing national
banks to operate insurance agencies in towns with a population of more than 5,000); Port
of New York Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (invalidat-
ing regulation authorizing national banks to underwrite revenue bonds). For a detailed
discussion of Saxon's rulings and the court decisions concerning those rulings, see Dunn,
Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the Na-
tional Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J. 765
(1982).
107. See Scott, supra note 8, at 23-32. For example, state regulators put pressure on
the FRB to change its prior position and conform to Saxon's rulings by allowing state
member banks to establish operations subsidiaries and to open loan production offices
without obtaining branching approval. See id. at 31. In addition, as a means of providing
equal competitive opportunity for state banks, many states revised and modernized their
banking codes. See W. Brown, supra note 90, at 35, 38. For example, a number of states
adopted "wild card" statutes that would permit state banks, under specified circum-
stances, to exercise new powers granted to national banks. See Scott, supra note 8, at 36.
As of December 31, 1987, 38 states had enacted some type of wild card statute. Twenty-
six of these laws are unlimited wild card statutes (although 21 of these laws can be trig-
gered only with the approval of the supervisory authority for state banks), while the
remaining twelve apply only to limited matters (of which six can be triggered only with
supervisory discretion). See State Banking Profile, supra note 98, at 87-88.
108. For discussion of subsequent OCC initiatives, see infra notes 130-32, 137-39 &
153-57 and accompanying text.
109. As discussed supra at note 14, the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988), permits
a national bank to establish branches only in its home state and only to the degree ex-
pressly permitted to state banks under state statutory law.
110. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969)
(holding that, in view of the McFadden Act's principle of "competitive equality," the
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recent efforts have been successful. In some of these cases, the Comptrol-
ler has persuaded the courts that certain off-premises facilities operated
by national banks should not be treated as "branches" for purposes of the
McFadden Act under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1988).' In another recent de-
cision, the Comptroller successfully argued that national banks should be
given the same branching powers as state-chartered thrift institutions
based on a finding that such thrifts are "State banks" for purposes of the
McFadden Act under 12 U.S.C. § 36(h) (1988).112 These recent suc-
cesses by the Comptroller have pressured a number of states to liberalize
their branching laws in order to maintain a basic competitive parity be-
tween national and state commercial banks." 3
3. The Current Regulatory Structure
The structure of regulation in the U.S. banking industry is not one of
perfect duality between state and federal regulators. For nearly six de-
cades, Congress has invested both the FRB and the FDIC with supervi-
Comptroller could not permit a national bank to operate an armored car service and an
off-premises depository, because these facilities were "branches" within the meaning of 12
U.S.C. § 36(f) (1988) that were not permissible for state banks under state law); First
Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261-62 (1966) (holding
that, under the policy of "competitive equality," the Comptroller could not permit na-
tional banks to branch by any method where state law permitted state banks to branch
only by merger with another bank); see also Independent Banker's Ass'n of Am. v. Smith,
534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that ATM terminals established by national banks
were "branches" within the meaning of Section 36(f) and therefore, as a matter of com-
petitive equality, could be established only in accordance with state branching laws), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 404-09 (1987) (uphold-
ing Comptroller's rulings permitting national banks to establish discount brokerage of-
fices or subsidiaries without regard to the branching restrictions of the McFadden Act,
because such entities do not engage in "core banking functions," and therefore are not
"branches" within the meaning of Section 36(f)); Independent Bankers Ass'n of New
York State, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding Comp-
troller's regulation allowing national bank to contract with a supermarket to provide
ATM services to the bank's customers without regard to state branching law, so long as
the bank does not own or rent the ATM, and holding that supermarket's ATM was not a
"branch" of the bank within the meaning of Section 36(f)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(dismissing, on ground of laches, challenge to Comptroller's ruling allowing national
banks to establish loan production offices without regard to state branching law, and
indicating, in dicta, agreement with that ruling).
112. See Department of Banking & Consumer Fin. of Mississippi v. Clarke, 809 F.2d
266 (5th Cir.) ("Deposit Guaranty") (upholding Comptroller's ruling that state-chartered
thrift institutions with statewide branching privileges and bank-like powers were "State
banks" within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 36(h), so that national banks could also branch
statewide even though state law allowed state-chartered commercial banks to branch only
within 100 miles of their home offices), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
113. Twenty-eight states (including 22 states since January 1, 1980) liberalized their
branching laws for state banks during the 1970s and 1980s. See Amel & Jacowski, supra
note 36, at 121. For discussion of the impact of Deposit Guaranty in pressuring states to
give statewide branching powers to state commercial banks, see Butler, The Competitive
Equality Doctrine and the Demise of Intrastate Bank Branching Restrictions, 55 Tenn. L.
Rev. 703, 724-28 (1988).
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sory powers over banks that overlap with the respective jurisdictions of
the state bank supervisors and the OCC. Under the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913,114 Congress has empowered the FRB to manage the nation's
money supply and to exercise supervisory authority over both national
banks (which are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System)
and those state banks that choose to become members of the System.115
In 1933 Congress established the FDIC to provide deposit insurance
for the nation's banks. Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950
("FDI Act"), 116 the FDIC exercises a residual supervisory authority over
national banks and state member banks (which are required to maintain
deposit insurance) and a more direct supervisory authority over state
nonmember banks that elect to obtain deposit insurance (as almost all
do).117 Thus, the respective bank supervision powers of the FRB and the
FDIC overlap with the primary authority of the OCC over national
banks and the primary authority of state bank supervisors over state
banks.
A further level of federal regulation resulted from enactment of the
BHC Act in 1956.118 The BHC Act empowered the FRB to regulate
bank holding companies in a number of areas, including the acquisition
of banks or nonbanking entities.119 Congress did not, however, choose to
preempt all state regulation of bank holding companies. Instead, Section
7 of the BHC Act reserves to each state "such powers and jurisdiction
which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to companies,
banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof."' 120 Thus, Con-
114. Act of Dec. 13, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at various provi-
sions of 12 U.S.C. (1988), as amended by various provisions of FIRREA, supra note 8).
115. For discussions of the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act and the FRB's su-
pervisory authority over national banks and state member banks, see C. Golembe & D.
Holland, Federal Regulation of Banking, 1986-87, at 8, 27-31 (1986); E. Symons & J.
White, supra note 79, at 27-3 1; Aman, Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use
and Limits of Conditions By the Federal Reserve Board, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 841-51
(1989); Scott, supra note 8, at 3, 5-7. The FRB's general supervisory authority was sub-
stantially increased in 1980, when Congress authorized the FRB to establish reserve re-
quirements for all federally-chartered or federally-insured depository institutions under
an amendment to 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1988). See S. Rep. No. 368, supra note 15, at 14-15,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 249-51.
116. Ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1988),
as further amended by various provisions of FIRREA, supra note 8).
117. For general discussions of the creation of the FDIC and its supervisory powers
over insured banks, see C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 115, at 9,28-31; E. Symons
& J. White, supra note 79, at 41-43; Scott, supra note 8, at 3, 5-7.
118. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1988),
as further amended by various provisions of FIRREA, supra note 8).
119. For general discussions of the FRB's regulatory authority over bank holding com-
panies under the BHC Act, see C. Golembe & D. Holland, supra note 115, at 9, 31; E.
Symons & J. White, supra note 79, at 44; Aman, supra note 115, at 863-79.
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1988). The Supreme Court has indicated that Section 7 permits
the states to adopt nondiscriminatory laws with respect to bank holding companies that
are "more restrictive" than federal law. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27, 48-49 (1980); see also Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411, 418-19 & n.5, 424-25 (1965) (FRB may not approve an acquisition of a
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gress has provided for overlapping federal and state roles in the regula-
tion of both banks and bank holding companies.
B. Federal Restrictions on Banking Powers
The competitive opportunities of national banks and bank holding
companies have been significantly restricted by federal law in the areas of
securities underwriting, insurance sales and underwriting, and real estate
investment and development. State member banks have been similarly
restricted in the areas of securities underwriting and real estate invest-
ment and development. In recent years, the OCC and the FRB have
issued rulings that modestly expand bank powers in certain of these ar-
eas. However, Congress has been unable to enact any comprehensive
legislation to expand banking powers, because of strong opposition from
the securities, insurance, and real estate industries, and because of con-
gressional doubts about the safety and desirability of bank involvement in
these industries.121 It is therefore open to question whether any broad-
scale expansion of banking powers under federal law will be forthcoming
in the immediate future.
1. Federal Restrictions on Bank Involvement in Securities
Underwriting
Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933,122 which are
often collectively referred to as the "Glass-Steagall Act," restrict the per-
missible securities activities of banks and bank holding companies. Sec-
tion 16123 provides that national banks and state member banks may not
engage in the "business of dealing in securities and stock" except for (i)
purchasing and selling securities without recourse and solely on the order
and for the account of their customers, (ii) purchasing investment securi-
ties in accordance with regulations of the OCC,124 and (iii) underwriting
and dealing in United States Treasury securities, general obligation
bonds of state and local governments, and certain other government-re-
lated securities. Thus, national banks and state member banks are pro-
bank by a bank holding company if that acquisition would violate a valid state law re-
stricting the creation or operation of bank holding companies). Lower federal courts
have held that Section 7 allows the states to prohibit bank holding companies entirely,
see, eg., Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Board of Governors, 451 F.2d 86, 89 (8th Cir. 1971),
or to forbid bank holding companies from engaging in specified nonbanking activities.
See, e.g., Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 591 F.2d 334, 336-39,
342 (5th Cir. 1979).
121. For a discussion of the debate within the academic community, the financial serv-
ices industry and Congress over the desirability and safety of expanded bank powers, see
supra Part (I)(E) and infra Part II(C).
122. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21 & 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189 & 194
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 78, 377 & 378 (1988)).
123. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988). The provisions of Section 16, which apply to
national banks, are made applicable to state member banks under 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988).
124. The OCC's regulations governing investment securities are set forth in 12 C.F.R.
Part 1 (1989).
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hibited from underwriting or dealing in securities that are not eligible for
underwriting by national banks pursuant to Section 16 of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act ("national bank-ineligible securities")."' 5 Section 21 provides
that any deposit-taking institution (including a state nonmember bank)
may not directly underwrite, distribute or sell securities if such activities
are prohibited to national banks under Section 16.126
Section 20 prohibits any national bank or state member bank from
affiliating with any organization that is "engaged principally" in the un-
derwriting or distribution of national bank-ineligible securities.1 27 Sec-
tion 32 similarly prohibits any national bank or state member bank from
sharing any officer, director or employee with such a securities organiza-
tion. 12 8 Significantly, neither Section 20 nor Section 32 applies to state
nonmember banks, and these banks may therefore affiliate with compa-
nies engaged principally in securities underwriting and dealing
activities. 129
The OCC and the FRB have issued a number of rulings in recent years
that have modestly expanded the securities-related activities of national
banks, state member banks and bank holding companies.130 For exam-
ple, the OCC and the FRB have permitted national banks and bank hold-
ing companies to provide securities brokerage and investment advisory
services to their customers.13 ' In addition, the OCC and the FRB have
permitted national banks, state member banks and bank holding compa-
nies to engage in the private placement of bank-ineligible securities, in-
cluding commercial paper and corporate equity securities.'1 2
125. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
126. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1988).
127. See id. § 377.
128. See id. § 78.
129. See Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 847 (1987).
130. For a recent survey of OCC and FRB orders under the Glass-Steagall Act, see
Isaac & Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 281,
294-95, 298-99, 320-46 (appendix) (1988).
131. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) (up-
holding FRB order permitting bank holding company to provide discount brokerage
services); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(upholding FRB order permitting bank holding company to provide discount brokerage
and investment advisory services to institutional and wealthy customers), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F.
Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983) (upholding OCC orders permitting national banks to provide
discount brokerage services), aff'd per curiam, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700 (1988)
(FRB order permitting bank holding company to provide discount brokerage and invest-
ment advisory services to both institutional and retail customers); OCC Interpretive Let-
ter No. 403, dated Dec. 9, 1987, reprinted in 1988 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCII) 85,627
(permitting national bank to provide discount brokerage and investment advisory services
to both institutional and retail customers).
132. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (upholding FRB order allowing state member bank to act as agent in private place-
ments of commercial paper), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Bankers Trust New York
Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 829 (1989) (FRB order permitting bank holding company to act
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In 1988, two federal courts of appeal upheld FRB orders authorizing
bank holding companies to establish subsidiaries that engage to a limited
extent in underwriting and dealing with respect to four types of national
bank-ineligible securities: commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, and securities backed by consumer receiv-
ables.133 The courts held that these subsidiaries would not be "engaged
principally" in the underwriting of national bank-ineligible securities in
violation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, because the FRB's or-
ders restricted the subsidiaries' involvement in such underwriting to not
more than five percent of their gross revenues over any two-year pe-
riod. 13 The FRB subsequently amended its orders to permit such secur-
ities subsidiaries to increase their underwriting and dealing activities with
respect to national bank-ineligible securities to no more than ten percent
of their gross revenues during any two-year period. '35
Most recently, a federal court of appeals has upheld an FRB order
permitting securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies to under-
write and deal in corporate debt and equity securities. However, the
FRB's order, as subsequently amended, limits the amount of such activi-
ties (together with all other national bank-ineligible securities activities)
to not more than ten percent of the securities subsidiary's gross revenues
during any two-year period. In addition, the FRB has not yet given final
approval to any bank holding company's securities subsidary to begin
underwriting or dealing in corporate equity securities. The FRB has also
required bank holding companies to establish special corporate proce-
dures and other safeguards designed to ensure that the approved activi-
ties of securities subsidiaries do not threaten the safety or soundness of
the bank holding companies or their subsidiary banks."36
as agent in the private placement of all securities). For additional discussion of permissi-
ble bank-related private placements, see Isaac & Fein, supra note 130, at 331-32
(appendix).
133. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("Chase"); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) ("Citicorp").
134. Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 62-67; Chase, 847 F.2d at 895.
135. See Announcement of Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751
(1989). In Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 67, the Second Circuit upheld the FRB's determination
that Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act "allows an affiliate [of a national bank or state
member bank] to engage in bank-ineligible securities activities so long as those activities
do not exceed five to ten percent of the affiliate's gross revenue." Id.
136. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
aff'g J.P. Morgan & Co., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989) ("J.P. Morgan"); 53 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 160 (1989) (reporting FRB approvals for securities subsidiaries of four bank
holding companies to begin underwriting and dealing in corporate debt securities); An-
nouncement of Modifications to Section 20 Orders, supra note 135 (increasing authorized
national bank-ineligible activities of any securities subsidiary to not more than 10 percent
of the subsidiary's gross revenue during any two-year period). In February 1990, the
FRB, in accordance with its order in JA Morgan, commenced its review on the question
of whether to allow securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies to underwrite and
deal in corporate equity securities on the same basis as corporate debt securities. See Fed
Could Irritate Congress on Corporate Equities Underwriting, 9 Banking Expansion Rep.
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For its part, the OCC has issued, and successfully defended against
court challenges, rulings that allow national banks to establish subsidiar-
ies that provide insurance for municipal bonds,137 and to sell mortgage
pass-through certificates representing undivided interests in mortgages
owned by the banks.1 3 8 In both cases, the courts found that the approved
securities-related activities were functionally equivalent or properly inci-
dental to the exercise of national bank powers authorized by 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (Seventh) (1988).139
Notwithstanding the recent successes of the OCC and the FRB in ex-
panding the permitted securities-related activities of national banks, state
member banks and bank holding companies, the Glass-Steagall Act still
places substantial restrictions on the securities powers of these organiza-
tions. National banks and state member banks still may not directly (or
indirectly through an affiliate) underwrite or deal in national bank-ineli-
gible securities, except for asset-backed securities representing participa-
tion interests in assets owned by the banks themselves."4 And bank
holding companies that control a national bank or state member bank
may not establish a securities subsidiary that underwrites or deals in na-
tional bank-ineligible securities unless the subsidiary's revenues from
such activities are less than ten percent of its gross revenues.4
The foregoing restrictions, while representing a degree of liberalization
from prior law, still appear to hinder national banks, state member banks
and bank holding companies substantially in competing with securities
firms in the domestic market. 142 For example, a recent study by the U.S.
No. 9, Mar. 19, 1990, at 1, 4; see also J.P. Morgan, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 213 (stating that
the FRB would not authorize underwriting of or dealing in corporate equity securities
until completion of further review at least a year after the date of the FRB's order).
137. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'g 656 F.
Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987) ("AMBAC'). As explained supra in notes 105-06 & 122-25 and
accompanying text, national banks are prohibited from underwriting or dealing in munic-
ipal revenue bonds.
138. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Security
Pacific"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990).
139. See Security Pacific, 885 F.2d at 1047-50 (upholding OCC's determination that a
national bank's sale of mortgage pass-through certificates backed by the bank's own
mortgage loans was properly incidental to the bank's express power to sell the loans
themselves); AMBAC, 865 F.2d at 281-84 (upholding OCC's determination that the issu-
ance of municipal bond insurance was functionally equivalent to the permitted bank ac-
tivity of issuing standby letters of credit).
140. See, e.g., Security Pacific, 885 F.2d at 1047-48 (indicating that any involvement by
national banks in securities underwriting or dealing activities would be prohibited if it
could not be justified by reference to the banking powers or limited securities powers
conferred by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988)); 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) (prohibiting state
member banks from engaging in securities underwriting or dealing activities that are for-
bidden to national banks).
141. See, e.g., Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 67 (indicating that a bank holding company's se-
curities subsidiary would violate the "principally engaged" limitation of Section 20 of
Glass-Steagall Act if the subsidiary's involvement in bank-ineligible securities activities
exceeded ten percent of its gross revenues).
142. For the adverse impact of the Glass-Steagall Act on the competitive position of
U.S. banking organizations, see Isaac & Fein, supra note 130, at 293-95; supra notes 122-
1164 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
General Accounting Office ("GAO") indicates that while the national
bank-ineligible activities of securities subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies increased substantially during 1989, those activities still accounted
for a relatively small share of the total underwriting and dealing activities
conducted by firms in the securities industry.143 In addition, certain evi-
dence cited in the GAO's study suggests that, unless the FRB's orders
are further modified, the ten percent revenue limitation and the struc-
tural restraints and other prudential "firewalls" contained in those orders
will prevent securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies from
achieving major competitive positions with regard to national bank-ineli-
gible securities activities. 1"
As previously noted, state nonmember banks, unlike national banks
and state member banks, are not barred by federal law from affiliating
with companies that are principally engaged in underwriting or dealing
in national bank-ineligible securities. 45 Indeed, the FDIC has adopted
regulations that permit an FDIC-insured state nonmember bank to es-
tablish a subsidiary, or to affiliate with another entity (e.g., through com-
mon ownership by a parent holding company), that primarily engages in
national bank-ineligible securities activities."' The FDIC's regulations
require that any such securities subsidiary must be adequately capital-
ized, and that any such subsidiary or securities affiliate must be operated
in a manner that clearly separates the subsidiary or affiliate from the
28 and accompanying text. The Glass-Steagall Act does not apply to securities activities
conducted abroad by U.S. banking organizations, but foreign securities activities of U.S.
banks and bank holding companies are restricted to some degree by Regulation K of the
FRB. See 12 C.F.R. Part 211 (1989); S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at 12; id. at 120
(additional views of Sens. Dixon, Sanford and Garn); Isaac & Fein, supra note 130, at
296, 343-46 (appendix).
143. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Bank Powers: Activities of Securities Sub-
sidiaries of Bank Holding Companies, GAO Document No. GAO/GGD-90-48 (Mar.
1990). This study states that the underwriting and dealing activities of "Section 20" se-
curities subsidiaries of bank holding companies with regard to mortgage-backed securi-
ties, municipal revenue bonds and asset-backed securities represented less than two
percent of the total underwriting and dealing activities of securities firms in these types of
securities during the third quarter of 1989. See id. at 28. The total revenues (including
those from national bank-eligible activities) and the total capital of Section 20 securities
increased markedly during 1989. However, as of June 30, 1989, Section 20 subsidiaries
accounted for only 7.2 percent of total securities industry revenues and 3.7 percent of
total securities industry capital. See id. at 29-30.
144. See, eg., id. at 8-10, 15-17, 41-57 (citing comments from banking industry officials
criticizing the FRB's revenue limitation and other "firewalls" as substantial and ineffi-
cient restraints on Section 20 subsidiaries, but also citing comments from securities indus-
try officials arguing that these provisions do not unduly restrict Section 20 subsidiaries
and are essential to protect bank safety and assure fair competition between Section 20
subsidiaries and securities firms).
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1989). The FDIC's regulations were upheld in Investment
Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987). For a
discussion of the regulations as originally adopted in November 1984, see Saba, Regula-
tion of State Nonmember Insured Banks' Securities Activities: A Model for the Repeal of
Glass-Steagall?, 23 Harv. J. Legis. 211, 253-56 (1986).
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bank. 47 In addition, the underwriting activities of a securities subsidiary
are limited to certain types of lower-risk securities unless the subsidiary is
a member in good standing of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, and has been in continuous operation for at least five years with
no serious violations of the securities laws. 48 The FDIC's regulations
also place strict limitations on permissible extensions of credit or other
transactions by the bank that involve or affect the bank's securities sub-
sidiary or affiliate.'49
Thus, the FDIC's regulations permit state nonmember banks to en-
gage indirectly through a subsidiary or affiliate in a broad range of securi-
ties activities that are not allowed to national and state member banks.
The limitations contained in the FDIC's regulations have two primary
purposes. First, the regulations seek to ensure that a state nonmember
bank is sufficiently separated from its securities subsidiary or affiliate so
that the bank is not found to be directly engaged in the underwriting or
sale of national bank-ineligible securities in violation of Section 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act. 150 Second, the regulations are designed to protect the
safety and soundness of the bank from being undermined by any losses
that may be suffered by its securities subsidiary or affiliate.' 5 '
2. Federal Restrictions on Bank Involvement in Insurance Activities
Federal law restricts the insurance powers of national banks and bank
holding companies. Under 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988), a national bank may
147. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 337.4(a)(2) and (b)(1)(ii) (1989). In order to be adequately sepa-
rated from the bank, the securities subsidiary or affiliate must (i) maintain physically
separate offices or office space, (ii) not share a majority of directors with the bank, (iii) not
share with the bank any employee directly involved in customer contacts, and (iv) con-
duct business pursuant to independent policies designed to inform customers that the
subsidiary or affiliate is a separate organization whose investment products are not bank
deposits and not guaranteed by the bank or insured by the FDIC. In the case of a securi-
ties subsidiary, the bank's investment in the subsidiary is excluded in calculating the
bank's capital, and the subsidiary must maintain separate accounting and other corporate
records, retain and compensate separate employees, and observe separate corporate for-
malities such as separate board of directors' meetings. See id. §§ 337.4(a)(2), (b)(1)(ii),
(b)(3) & (c).
If a securities subsidiary or affiliate shares the same or a similar name or logo with the
bank, or conducts business at the same location as the bank, or participates in joint adver-
tising with the bank, the subsidiary or affiliate must make specific disclosures to its cus-
tomers stating that it is not a bank and that the securities it sells are not guaranteed by
the bank or insured by the FDIC. See id. § 337.4(h).
148. Unless a securities subsidiary meets these qualifications, the subsidiary may un-
derwrite only (i) "investment quality" equity and debt securities as defined in 12 C.F.R.
§§ 337.4(a)(7) & (8) (1989), or (ii) securities of investment companies that maintain at
least 75 percent of their investments in (A) investment quality equity and debt securities,
or (B) highly liquid securities generally held by money market mutual funds. See id.§ 337.4(b)(1)(i).
149. See id. § 337.4(e).
150. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46709, 46710-11 (1984) (FDIC interpretive statement accompa-
nying original adoption of 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 in Nov. 1984).
151. See id. at 46711-13.
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provide general insurance agency services only if it is "located and doing
business" in a town having a population of 5,000 or less.' 2 In 1986, the
OCC issued an interpretive ruling stating that Section 92 permits a na-
tional bank to act as a general insurance agent for customers resident
anywhere as long as the main office or a branch of the bank is located in a
town with a population of 5,000 or less." 3 That ruling has recently been
upheld by a federal district court,154 and the ruling appears to provide
substantial insurance agency opportunities for national banks that choose
to locate their main office or a branch in a small town.
Except as permitted by Section 92, national banks may act as agents
only for the sale of credit-related life, disability and involuntary unem-
ployment insurance.' 55 In addition, national banks may not underwrite
insurance. 15 6 However, national banks have been permitted to issue
standby credits that resemble insurance in circumstances where the bank
credits are functionally equivalent to the authorized issuance of standby
letters of credit."'57
The insurance powers of bank holding companies are substantially
constrained by Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, ' as amended by Section
601 of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 ("Garn-
St Germain Act"). 5 9 Section 4(c)(8) prohibits bank holding companies
from acting as underwriters, agents or brokers for insurance, with seven
limited exemptions. The most significant of these exemptions, as imple-
mented by regulations of the FRB, permit a bank holding company (i) to
act as underwriter, agent or broker for credit-related life, disability and
involuntary unemployment insurance, (ii) to act as insurance agent in
any town of 5,000 or less in which the bank holding company or any of
its subsidiaries maintains a lending office, (iii) to engage in specific insur-
152. As explained supra at notes 105-06 and accompanying text, the attempt of Comp-
troller James Saxon to permit national banks located in places having a population of
more than 5,000 to act as general insurance agents was struck down in Saxon v. Georgia
Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
153. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366, Aug. 18, 1986, reprinted in 1986 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536; accord, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7100 (1989) (OCC interpretive
ruling concerning insurance agency activities of national banks with offices in places of
5,000 or less).
154. See Nat'l Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162 (D.D.C. 1990).
155. See Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980) (holding that national banks may act as
agents in providing credit-related life insurance because this activity is incidental to their
express power to make loans on personal security); Pace, supra note 66, at 25-26 (discuss-
ing authority of national banks to act as agents for credit-related insurance). In addition,
the OCC ruled in 1983 that national banks could lease office space to insurance agents
and receive a portion of the agents' commissions under the lease agreement. See id.
156. See, eg., AMBAC, 656 F. Supp. at 407, 408.
157. See id. at 408-11, aff'd, 865 F.2d at 281-84 (upholding OCC ruling allowing na-
tional bank to issue standby credits that served as "insurance" for payment of municipal
bonds, because OCC reasonably determined that such standby credits were functionally
equivalent to authorized standby letters of credit).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
159. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 601, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536 (1982).
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ance agency activities in restricted locations that are "grandfathered" be-
cause the bank holding company or its predecessor or a subsidiary
thereof had conducted or received FRB approval for such activities at
nearby locations prior to May 1, 1982, and (iv) to engage in unrestricted
insurance agency activities at all locations if the particular bank holding
company had received FRB approval for any insurance agency activities
prior to January 1, 197 1.160 But these exemptions, even considered col-
lectively, do not permit most bank holding companies to maintain a sub-
stantial presence in the insurance business. 161
As discussed below, there is an ongoing controversy over the issue of
whether state banks controlled by bank holding companies, or subsidiar-
ies of such banks, may engage in insurance activities without regard to
the restrictions contained in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. It will be
shown that holding company-owned state banks and their operations
subsidiaries are not subject to Section 4(c)(8) and should be permitted to
engage in insurance activities that are authorized under state law. 162
With regard to insurance activities conducted by state member banks
that are not owned by bank holding companies, the FRB has claimed
authority to approve or deny proposals by state member banks to com-
mence such activities. The FRB's regulations governing state member
banks provide, as a condition of membership in the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, that a state member bank may not change the general character of
its business or the scope of its powers after becoming a member without
obtaining the FRB's prior approval.16 In two opinions, the FRB staff
declared that a state member bank would be required to obtain the prior
approval of the FRB before it could commence an insurance activity,
either directly or through a subsidiary, that would result in a change in
160. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8)(i), (iii), (iv) and (vii) (1989) (interpreting exemptions
(A), (C), (D) and (G) contained in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act). For recent court
decisions upholding orders and regulations of the FRB relating to insurance activities of
bank holding companies, see National Ass'n of Casualty and Sur. Agents v. Board of
Governors, 856 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding FRB orders interpreting exemption
(D) under Section 4(c)(8)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2430 (1989); Independent Ins. Agents
of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 835 F.2d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding FRB
regulation interpreting exemption (C) under Section 4(c)(8)).
161. Indeed, it was the specific intent of Section 601 of the Garn-St Germain Act to
amend Section 4(c)(8) so that bank holding companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries
would generally be barred from carrying on an insurance business. See, e.g., S. Conf.
Rep. No. 641, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 3128, 3134; S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 30, at 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 3055, 3091.
162. See infra Part IV(C). For example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
upheld an FRB order determining that Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act did not prohibit
two state bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company from engaging in general insur-
ance agency activities permitted by state law. See Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc.
v. Board of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W.
3695 (U.S. April 18, 1990) (No. 89-1620), affg Merchants National Corp., 75 Fed. Res.
Bull. 388 (1989) ("Merchants National"). For a further discussion of Merchants Na-
tional, see infra Part IV(C)(3).
163. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1989).
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the general character of its business or the scope of its powers. 1 4 As
discussed below, it is highly questionable whether the FRB has authority
to exert such a veto power over the state-authorized activities of state
member banks.1 65
The FDIC has not imposed any general restrictions on the insurance
activities of state nonmember banks. The FDIC chose not to adopt pro-
posed regulations, issued in 1985, that would have prohibited all FDIC-
insured banks from directly engaging in the underwriting of insurance
(except for the underwriting of life insurance under certain conditions).
The proposed regulations would have permitted insured banks to engage
in insurance underwriting only indirectly through a subsidiary that met
essentially the same tests of separateness as are required by the FDIC's
regulations concerning securities subsidiaries of state nonmember
banks. 166
The FDIC withdrew these proposed regulations in December 1987, in
part because the FDIC had found "no system wide problems" resulting
from the direct involvement of state banks in insurance activities. The
FDIC concluded that any potential supervisory problems could be ade-
quately dealt with "on a case-by-case basis." 167 However, the FDIC has
recently stated that it will reconsider adopting similar regulations in re-
ponse to a new Delaware statute that allows state banks to underwrite
and sell all types of insurance except title insurance.1 68
3. Federal Constraints on Bank Involvement in Real Estate
Investment or Development
Federal statutes and regulations generally bar national banks, state
member banks, and bank holding companies from engaging in real estate
or investment or development activities. National banks may acquire in-
terests in real estate only if the property is used for the bank's business
premises, or has been mortgaged to the bank as security for debts previ-
164. See 1 Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 3-447.6 & 3-447.61 (1989) (summaries of FRB staff
opinions dated April 2 and 6, 1981).
165. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
166. See FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Powers Inconsistent with Purposes of
Federal Deposit Insurance Law, 50 Fed. Reg. 23964-93 (1985) [hereinafter FDIC Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking]. For the specific restrictions that the proposed regulations
would have imposed on insurance underwriting activities, see id. at 23,980-81, 23,992.
For discussion of the FDIC's requirements applicable to securities subsidiaries of insured
state nonmember banks, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
167. See FDIC Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, Powers Inconsistent with Purposes of
Federal Deposit Insurance Law, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,447, 48,448 (1987). In May 1988,
Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC reiterated, in testimony before Congress, that
the FDIC had "seen no evidence that insurance activities pose risks that would form the
basis for imposing any restrictions on the insurance activities authorized for state banks."
50 Banking Rep. (BNA) 813 (1988).
168. See Thomas, FDIC Will Seek Curbs on Delaware Law Allowing Banks into Insur-
ance Sector, Wall St. J., June 13, 1990, at A2, col. 3. For a further discussion of the new
Delaware statute and the responses thereto, see infra notes 213-16 & 243 and accompany-
ing text.
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ously contracted, or has been acquired in satisfaction of a debt in de-
fault. 69 The FRB has applied similar restrictions upon state member
banks. The FRB, under a highly questionable assertion of its authority
to place conditions on banks admitted to membership in the Federal Re-
serve System, has generally prohibited state member banks from engag-
ing in real estate investment or development activities. 170
The FRB has also adopted regulations that generally bar bank holding
companies from involvement in real estate development and investment
activities. 171  As discussed below, the FRB is presently considering
rulemaking proposals that might allow such activities but only under
very limited and stringent conditions.1 7' Thus, for the time being, bank
holding companies are generally excluded from real estate activities ex-
cept for those activities that may be lawfully conducted by holding com-
pany-owned state nonmember banks and their operations subsidiaries.173
The FDIC has not generally prohibited state nonmember banks from
involvement in real estate investment or development. In June 1985, the
FDIC proposed regulations that would have limited all FDIC-insured
banks to investments not exceeding fifty percent of the investing bank's
primary capital with respect to all real estate projects and ten percent of
the bank's primary capital with regard to any single project. The pro-
posed regulations would have required any investments exceeding these
limits to be made by a separate subsidiary meeting essentially the same
requirements as the FDIC imposes on securities subsidiaries of state non-
member banks.174 As noted above, the FDIC withdrew these proposed
169. See 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988). Real property obtained by a national bank in satisfac-
tion of a debt previously contracted may not remain in the bank's possession for a period
of longer than five years (unless that period is extended to not more than ten years with
the approval of the OCC). See id.
170. See 1 Fed. Res. Reg. Serv. 3-447.62 (summary of FRB staff opinion dated Nov.
20, 1984). In one case, the FRB staff permitted a state member bank, whose charter
expressly authorized it to engage in real estate development activities, to do so but only
on a strictly limited basis. The bank was required to limit such activities to passive,
nonmanagerial investments not exceeding twenty percent of its equity capital, and the
bank agreed to conform its real estate activities to future regulatory actions that might be
taken by the FRB. See id.; see also 1989 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 326 (letter from
Vice Chairman Manuel Johnson of the FRB to Representative Leach, explaining general
FRB policy of prohibiting involvement by state member banks in real estate investment
or development activities).
For analysis questioning the FRB's authority to restrict state bank powers as a condi-
tion of membership in the Federal Reserve System, see infra Part IV(B)(1).
171. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(c)-(e) (1989).
172. For a discussion of the FRB's proposed regulations concerning real estate activi-
ties by bank holding companies, see infra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the authority of holding company-owned state nonmember
banks and their operations subsidiaries to engage in state-authorized activities, see infra
Part IV(C).
174. See FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, at 23,979-88, 23,991-
22 (proposing restrictions on the involvement of FDIC-insured banks in real estate activi-
ties). For a discussion of the FDIC's requirements for securities subsidiaries of state
nonmember banks, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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regulations in December 1987. At that time, the FDIC stated that the
involvement of state banks in real estate investment and development
activities did not present any "system wide problems," and that potential
supervisory problems could be handled "on a case-by-case basis."17
C. The Failure of Congress to Expand Banking Powers
As shown by the foregoing survey of federal constraints on banking
powers, national banks, state member banks, and bank holding compa-
nies are substantially (and in some cases entirely) precluded from in-
volvement in securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting
and sales, and real estate investment and development. Notwithstanding
the deteriorating profitability of banks during the 1980s and repeated
proposals for legislative reform,176 Congress has failed to expand banking
powers. The most significant action taken by Congress since 1980 with
regard to the asset-side powers of banks has been to restrict the insurance
powers of bank holding companies. In view of entrenched opposition to
increased banking powers from the securities, insurance and real estate
industries, as well as doubts expressed by many members of Congress
concerning the desirability and safety of such powers, it is doubtful
whether a congressional expansion of bank authority will be forthcoming
in the immediate future.
In the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, Congress expanded the liability-
side powers of banks and thrift institutions by empowering them to ac-
cept MMDAs that would be competitive with MMMFs offered by secur-
ities firms. 177 However, while the Garn-St Germain Act also expanded
the asset-side powers of federally-chartered thrifts, 178 Congress took no
action to increase the asset-related powers of banks. Indeed, the only
action of Congress on bank powers was to place stringent limitations on
the insurance activities that could be conducted by bank holding compa-
nies and their nonbank subsidiaries. 179
175. See FDIC Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, supra note 167, 52 Fed. Reg. at 48,448.
In a subsequent article, Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC stated that "[a]t
present, we see only isolated instances in the state bank 'laboratory' where commercial
banks are having problems in the real estate investment area." Seidman, A New Approach
to a Cooperative State-Federal Examination Program, Issues in Bank Reg., Bank Admin.
Inst., Fall 1988, at 25, 26.
176. For discussion of the decline in bank profitability since the 1970s and proposals
for expansion of banking powers, see supra Parts I(B)-(E).
177. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note 159, § 327, 96 Stat. 1501. For a discussion
of the impact of congressional authorization for bank MMDAs, see supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
178. See Garn St-Germain Act, supra note 159, §§ 322, 325, 329 & 330, 96 Stat. 1499,
1500, 1502 (increasing authority of federally-chartered thrifts to make commercial real
estate loans, commercial and consumer loans, and to engage in leases or sales of personal
property).
179. See id. § 601, 96 Stat. 1536 (amending Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1988)). For a discussion of this provision, see supra notes 158-61 and ac-
companying text).
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In September 1984, the Senate passed a bill that would have author-
ized bank holding companies to establish securities subsidiaries author-
ized to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds (except for most
industrial development bonds), mortgage-backed securities and commer-
cial paper.180 However, this legislation failed because the House refused
to consider authorizing expanded powers for banks, ostensibly due to
concern about bank safety and soundness in light of the federal bailout of
Continental Illinois in May 1984.181
In 1987, Congress decided to place a temporary moratorium on any
further expansion of securities, insurance or real estate powers by the
federal banking agencies while Congress attempted to fashion compre-
hensive legislation on bank powers.182 Accordingly, the Competitive
Equality Banking Act of 1987 ("CEBA") l1 3 prohibited federal banking
agencies, between March 6, 1987 and March 1, 1988, from permitting
any FDIC-insured bank or bank holding company to engage in any se-
curities, insurance or real estate activities that had not been legally au-
thorized prior to March 5, 1987. However, Congress made clear that,
without additional federal legislation on banking powers, the morato-
rium enacted by CEBA would have no effect, following its expiration, on
the preexisting securities, insurance and real estate authorities of banking
organizations.8 4
Congress failed to take action on new banking powers before the
CEBA moratorium expired on March 1, 1988. On March 30, 1988, the
Senate did pass a bill that would have allowed bank holding companies
to establish securities subsidiaries with authority to engage in most secur-
ities underwriting and dealing activities. The authority of such subsidiar-
ies to underwrite mutual funds and corporate debt securities would have
180. See S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(e) (1984), reprinted in 130 Cong. Rec.
25343 (1984). For discussion of the provisions of the Senate bill relating to securities
subsidiaries, see S. Rep. No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-21, 57-58 (1984).
In many respects, the Senate bill would also have restricted banking powers. For ex-
ample, the bill would have (i) prohibited state banks from engaging in activities outside
their home state that were not permitted to bank holding companies under Section
4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, and (ii) extended the limitations on the insurance powers of bank
holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) to holding company-owned state banks and
their subsidiaries. See id. at 25-26, 59.
181. See 130 Cong. Rec. 26580-81 (1984) (remarks of Representative St Germain,
chairman of House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs). For a description
of the federal rescue of Continental Illinois, see I. Sprague, Bailout: An Insider's Ac-
count of Bank Failures and Rescues 149-211 (1986).
182. See S. Rep. No. 19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 489, 492-94.
183. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
184. See CEBA, supra note 183, §§ 201(d) - (e) & 202, 101 Stat. 583-84. For further
expressions of the understanding of Congress that CEBA's moratorium would not affect
the preexisting powers of banking organizations, see, e.g., H. Rep. No. 261, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 147-49 (Conference Rep.), reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
588, 616-18; S. Rep. No. 19, supra note 182, at 15-17, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News at 505-07; 133 Cong. Rec. S 3802 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1987) (remarks of
Senator Proxmire, Senate floor manager for CEBA).
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been delayed until 180 days after enactment, and the power to under-
write corporate equity securities would have been contingent on a further
congressional vote.185 The Senate bill took no action on real estate pow-
ers and would have placed restrictions on the insurance activities of na-
tional banks and holding company-owned state banks.186
Notwithstanding the 1988 Senate bill's phased approach to the expan-
sion of securities authority for bank holding companies, and the absence
of any expansion of bank insurance or real estate powers, the Senate bill
failed to win House approval. Two House committees reported legisla-
tion with fewer securities powers for bank holding companies than those
permitted by the Senate bill. In addition, the House provisions would
have restricted bank insurance and real estate powers and would have
imposed significant additional consumer protection requirements on
banks.18 7 The respective chairmen of the two House committees-Rep-
resentatives Dingell and St Germain-were unable to agree on a unified
approach to the legislation, and the legislation died without a vote by the
185. See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 102 & 113 (1988), reprinted in 134 Cong.
Rec. S 3360-61, S 3365 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988). For Senate passage of S. 1886, see id. at
S 3437. For a discussion of the provisions of S. 1886 relating to the expansion of securi-
ties powers for bank holding companies, including extensive conditions designed to pro-
tect the safety and soundness of holding company-owned banks by erecting "firewalls"
between such banks and their securities affiliates, see S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at
15-21, 41-59, 73; 131 Cong. Rec. S 2283-84 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (remarks of Senator
Proxmire, Senate floor manager for S. 1886).
186. S. 1886 would have prohibited holding company-owned state banks from engag-
ing in insurance activities not permitted to bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8)
of the BHC Act, unless (i) a holding company-owned state bank conducted such activities
pursuant to state law in the home state of both the holding company and the bank, and
(ii) such activities were directed only at residents of that state. S. 1886 would also have
prohibited national banks from engaging in insurance activities except for credit-related
insurance, unless (i) a national bank was located in a place with a population of 5,000 or
less, and (ii) the bank restricted its general insurance activities to that place and sold
general insurance products only to residents of its home state. See S. 1886, supra, §§ 802
& 803, reprinted in 134 Cong. Rec. S 3378-79 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988).
187. See H.R. Rep. No. 822 (pt. 1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (text and explanation
of House bill reported by House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; House
bill would have permitted qualified securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies to
underwrite and deal in securities of any type except for corporate equity securities, and
would also have restricted the insurance activities of national banks and holding com-
pany-owned state banks, placed a two-year moratorium on any new real estate activities
by bank holding companies and any of their subsidiaries, and mandated significant new
consumer protections); H.R. Rep. No. 822 (pt. 2), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (text and
explanation of amendments to House bill as reported by House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce; these amendments would have permitted qualified securities subsidiaries of
bank holding companies only to underwrite and deal in revenue bonds, commercial paper
and asset-backed securities and to sell mutual funds, while prohibiting such subsidiaries
from underwriting or dealing in mutual funds or corporate debt or equity securities; the
amendments would also have further limited the insurance activities of holding company-
owned state banks). For reports of opposition by the banking industry to the House
legislation, see House Banking Approves Bill Granting Key BHC and Bank Securities Pow-
ers, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 161 (Aug. 1, 1988); Energy and Commerce, Judici-
ary Alter Provisions in Banking Bill, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 522 (Sept. 26,
1988).
1990] 1173
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
House.188 The failure of the Senate bill to obtain House approval ap-
pears to have been due, in substantial part, to strong reservations ex-
pressed by many House members about the ability of banking
organizations to exercise broader powers safely and without harmful
conflicts of interest. 8 9
Congress did not consider the issue of bank powers in 1989 because of
its preoccupation with the thrift crisis and the insolvency of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). 190 Congress en-
acted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989 ("FIRREA")' 9 ' to address these problems. FIRREA abolished
the FSLIC and transferred the responsibility for insuring the deposits of
thrift institutions to a new Savings Association Insurance Fund
("SAIF") under the administration of the FDIC. 192 FIRREA also au-
thorized $50 billion in immediate and long-term funding to enable the
new Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") to achieve an orderly dispo-
sition of the assets of failed thrifts. 193
In addition, FIRREA imposed minimum capital requirements on fed-
188. See, e.g., Proxmire to Revamp Banking Bill in Effort to Regain House Approval, 51
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 611, 612-13 (Oct. 10, 1988); House Rules Will Not Con-
sider Banking Industry Reform Bill, id. at 647 (Oct. 17, 1988); St Germain Urges Fed to
Hold Off on New Securities Powers for Banks, id. at 693-94 (Oct. 24, 1988).
189. After the legislation died in the House, Representative Dingell, chairman of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, declared that the Senate bill "did not ade-
quately protect taxpayers and bank depositors and failed to provide effective functional
regulation," and therefore was properly "cashier[ed]." Letter from Representative
Dingell to the Editor, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1988, at A21. See also H.R. Rep. No. 822
(pt. 1), supra note 187, at 136-38 (report of House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, proposing two-year moratorium on bank involvement in real estate activi-
ties because of potential risks presented by such activities to bank safety and soundness);
id. at 349-60 (additional views of Representatives Annunzio, Schumer et al., opposing
bank involvement in underwriting corporate debt or equity securities because of the at-
tendant risks of bank failure, conflict of interest and concentration of financial power);
H.R. Rep. No. 822 (pt. 2), supra note 187, at 66-70, 73-80 (report of House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, contending that banking organizations should not be permitted
to underwrite or deal in corporate debt or equity securities or to sponsor or underwrite
mutual funds, because of the high risks of the attendant loss and conflict of interest inher-
ent in these activities).
190. For discussion of the causes of the thrift crisis and the insolvency of the FSLIC,
see H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 294-308, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 86, 90-104; S. Rep. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-10 (1989); see
also the further discussion of those causes infra at notes 573-86 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 8.
192. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 211(3), 103 Stat. 218-20 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(a) by establishing SAIF to insure deposits of thrift institutions formerly insured
by FSLIC, and establishing the Bank Insurance Fund, also administered by the FDIC, to
insure bank deposits formerly insured by the FDIC); id. § 401(a)(1), 103 Stat. 354 (abol-
ishing FSLIC).
193. See id. §§ 501(a), 103 Stat. 364-93 (establishing and defining powers of RTC and
providing $20 billion of current funds, see id., 103 Stat. 375-76, for use by the RTC); id.
§ 51 l(a), 103 Stat. 394-406 (establishing the Resolution Funding Corporation to provide
up to $30 billion of additional long-term financing, see id., 103 Stat. 400, for use by the
RTC).
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erally-insured thrift institutions and authorized the FDIC to prohibit
thrifts from exercising any powers found by the FDIC to present a signif-
icant risk to SAIF or the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF"). 194 FIRREA
also reduced the commercial real estate lending authority of federally-
chartered thrifts.195 In view of the extensive legislative reforms needed to
address the thrift crisis, it is not surprising that FIRREA did not deal
with the powers of banks insured by BIF. FIRREA did, however,
strengthen the enforcement authorities of the FDIC, FRB, and OCC
with respect to banks.1 96
It now appears unlikely that Congress will adopt legislation on bank
powers during 1990. The Bush administration recently acknowledged
that the funding provided by FIRREA is far short of the amount needed
to resolve all of the thrift insolvency problems, and that congressional
action to provide additional funds will be needed. 197 These funding con-
194. See id. § 301, 103 Stat. 303-10 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t) by establishing min-
imum capital standards for federally-chartered or insured thrifts); id. § 221, 103 Stat. 268
(adding new section 18(m)(3) of the FDI Act, which authorizes the FDIC, by regulation,
to prohibit insured state-chartered thrifts or their subsidiaries from engaging in any spe-
cific activity determined by the FDIC to pose a serious threat to SAIF); id. § 222, 103
Stat. 269-73 (adding new section 28 of the FDI Act, which prohibits insured state-
chartered thrifts from (i) engaging in any activity not authorized to federally-chartered
thrifts, unless the FDIC determines that the activity does not pose any significant risk to
SAIF or BIF, or (ii) engaging in any activity permitted to federal thrifts but in an amount
greater than the amount permitted to federal thrifts, if the FDIC has determined that
engaging in that amount of the activity poses a significant risk to SAIF or BIF, or (iii)
acquiring or retaining any equity investment not permitted to federal thrifts, except for
shares of a service corporation determined by the FDIC not to pose a significant risk to
SAIF or BIF).
195. See id. § 301, 103 Stat. 286 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(B)) (reducing com-
mercial real estate lending authority of federal thrifts from a maximum of 40 percent of
assets to a maximum of four times capital). For explanation of this restriction on the
prior authority of federal thrifts, see H.R. Rep. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (Con-
ference Rep.), reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 432, 447.
196. See FIRREA, supra note 8, §§ 901-914, 103 Stat. 446-86 (increasing enforcement
authorities of FDIC, FRB, OCC and Office of Thrift Supervision with respect to feder-
ally-chartered or insured banks and thrifts). For discussion of certain supervisory and
enforcement authorities of the FDIC and FRB with regard to state banks and bank hold-
ing companies, see infra Part IV(B). For a general discussion of FIRREA's expansion of
civil enforcement authorities for federal bank regulatory agencies, see McSpadden &
Byrne, FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases Penalties Al-
lowed, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 427-37 (Sept. 25, 1989).
197. See, e.g., Thomas, Brady Says Cost of S & L Bailout Could Double, Wall St. J.,
May 24, 1990, at A3, col. 1 (reporting testimony by Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady
stating that total thrift bailout costs are estimated at between $90 billion and $130 billion,
exclusive of interest, compared with $73 billion of total funding to be provided by FIR-
REA, and that costs with interest over 10 years could approach $300 billion compared
with the Bush Administration's original estimate of $166 billion); Thomas, Brady Says S
& L Bailout Cost Expected to Increase By as Much as $50 Billion, Wall St. J., June 15,
1990, at A4, col. 2 (reporting testimony by Treasury Secretary Brady indicating that an
additional $30 to $50 billion in funds will be needed to meet projected thrift bailout costs
in 1991). [Editors' Note: On July 30, 1990, FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman esti-
mated that the RTC would need $80 to $100 billion of additional funds to meet its likely
thrift bailout costs during fiscal 1991, including $50 to $60 billion of working capital to
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cerns are likely to preclude action on new bank powers during 1990.198
In addition, the imprudent use by thrift institutions of expanded powers
under federal and state law may well discourage Congress from taking
any immediate action to increase bank powers.1 99
In view of these disincentives to congressional action, and the en-
trenched opposition of the insurance and real estate industries,2" it is
doubtful whether Congress will take any action in the near future to ex-
pand bank powers in the insurance or real estate areas. However, two
major securities industry groups have recently indicated their willingness
to support a repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act under circumstances that
would allow bank holding companies to own securities subsidiaries and
securities firms to own banks, provided that a strict separation is main-
tained between subsidiaries conducting a traditional banking business
and those engaged in the securities business. 0 1 This sudden change in
finance the retention of failed thrift assets until they are sold. See RTC May Need Up to
$100 Billion in FY 1991, Seidman, Glauber Say, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 221
(Aug. 6, 1990).]
198. See Meyer, In Congress, 1990 Looks Like Year for Oversight, Not Major Legisla-
tion, 9 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 4 at 1, 4-5 (Feb. 19, 1990).
199. See Meyer, SIA Proposal Alters Complexion of Debate on Glass-Steagall Reform, 9
Banking Expansion Rep. No. 1, at 2, 5 (Jan. 1, 1990) (stating that "Congress ... has little
appetite for legislation dealing with bank powers in the wake of the FSLIC-thrift deba-
cle"). For examples of congressional statements blaming the collapse of the thrift indus-
try, in part, on the imprudent use of expanded thrift powers under federal and state law,
see H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 296-97, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News at 92-93; S. Rep. No. 19, supra note 190, at 8-9. For a discussion
of other factors that contributed to the thrift crisis, and that appear to distinguish the
case for expanded bank powers from the past record of misuse of thrift powers, see infra
notes 573-86 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Insurers, Lawmakers Raise Concerns About Implications of Merchants
National Ruling, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 611, 611-12 (April 9, 1990) (reporting testi-
mony by insurance industry representatives urging Congress to adopt legislation prohibit-
ing state banks from engaging in insurance activities); 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note
63, at 546-48 (testimony of Kent W. Colton on behalf of Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders,
opposing involvement of banks in real estate investment or development); id. at 560-62
(statement of Robert R. Googins on behalf of American Council of Life Ins., opposing
entry by banks into the securities or general insurance businesses); id. at 569-70 (state-
ment by Norman D. Flynn on behalf of Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, opposing involvement of
banks in real estate brokerage, management, investment or development).
201. In December 1989, the Securities Industry Association ("SIA") announced that it
was willing for the first time to support a reform of the Glass-Steagall Act that would
broaden bank securities powers, if bank securities activities were strictly separated from
traditional banking activities and if securities firms were permitted to acquire "consumer
financing banks." The SIA conditioned its proposal for legislative reform on an immedi-
ate moratorium on further regulatory actions expanding bank securities powers. See
Meyer, supra note 199, at 2-5.
The Investment Company Institute ("ICI") announced a similar change of position in
April 1990. The ICI's proposal would allow holding companies to own both bank and
securities subsidiaries, but only if such subsidiaries were strictly separated and the bank's
assets were invested in a narrow range of safe, liquid investments. See ICI Urges Glass-
Steagall Repeal, BHC Act Amendments, Narrow Banks, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 722
(April 30, 1990).
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the securities industry's position may provide the basis for repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1991.
D. State Initiatives to Expand State Bank Powers
While Congress has been unable to act on proposals to expand banking
powers, several states have enacted laws authorizing state banks to en-
gage in securities underwriting, insurance agency and underwriting, and
real estate investment and development activities that are not permissible
for national banks or bank holding companies. This expansion of state
bank powers in the context of congressional paralysis has been very simi-
lar to the interstate banking movement, where Congress was unable to
enact legislation and the states took the lead in liberalizing geographic
restraints on interstate acquisitions of banks.202
With respect to securities powers, recent surveys prepared by the Con-
ference of State Bank Supervisors ("CSBS")2 °3 and the FDIC2" together
indicate that twenty-six states allow state banks, directly or indirectly, to
underwrite at least some types of national bank-ineligible securities.20 5
202. For a discussion of congressional inaction and state laws authorizing interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies, see supra notes 38-40, 87, 100 & 102
and accompanying text.
203. CSBS prepared a detailed survey describing state laws which, as of March 1989,
provided expanded securities, insurance, and real estate powers for banks. CSBS' de-
tailed survey was attached as Appendices 1-4 to a comment letter dated April 28, 1989,
from Lawrence E. Kreider of CSBS to William W. Wiles of the FRB. This comment
letter was filed in FRB Docket No. R-0652, Solicitation of Public Comment, Bank Hold-
ing Companies and Change in Bank Control: Rescission of Existing Regulation Regard-
ing Investments in Voting Shares of Nonbanking Companies by State Banks Owned by
Bank Holding Companies, 53 Fed. Reg. 48915 (1988). A copy of the CSBS comment
letter and detailed survey [hereinafter CSBS Detailed Survey] is on file with the Fordham
Law Review.
CSBS subsequently prepared a summary of state laws granting expanded securities,
insurance, and real estate powers to state banks as of March 1990. This summary survey
is printed in State of the State Banking System, supra note 39, at 9-10 [hereinafter CSBS
Summary Survey].
204. See Saulsbury, State Banking Powers: Where Are We Now?, Regulatory Review
(FDIC), April/March 1987, at 1-16 (containing FDIC staff survey of state laws permit-
ting state banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities as of April 8,
1987).
205. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 3 (indicating that laws in
Arizona, California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West Virginia would au-
thorize banks to underwrite at least some types of securities not eligible for underwriting
by national banks). For description of national bank-ineligible securities, see supra notes
123-25 and accompanying text.
In addition to the states identified in the CSBS Detailed Survey, the CSBS Summary
Survey identifies Florida, Maine, and Massachusetts, and Saulsbury's FDIC staff survey
identifies Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont as states permitting state banks to engage directly or indirectly in
underwriting at least some types of national bank-ineligible securities. See CSBS Detailed
Survey, supra note 203; Saulsbury, supra note 204, at 7-9, 11-12. With regard to New
York, the New York State Banking Department issued a ruling in December 1986 (noted
by Saulsbury) that permits state banks to affiliate with a securities firm if the firm's under-
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Of these states, at least nine limit the types of national bank-ineligible
securities that may be underwritten,0 6 at least nine require such under-
writing to be conducted through a subsidiary or affiliate of the bank,
2 7
and at least eight limit the amount of a single issuance or all issuances of
securities to a specified percentage of bank capital.2"'
With regard to insurance powers, the CSBS and FDIC surveys indi-
cate that six states allow banks to engage in insurance underwriting ac-
tivities not permitted to national banks and bank holding companies, 209
and sixteen states permit state banks to engage in insurance agency activ-
ities that would be prohibited to national banks and bank holding compa-
nies.210 Of these states, at least six require that the insurance
writing activities with respect to national bank-ineligible securities do not exceed 25 per-
cent of the firm's total business activities. See N.Y. State Banking Dept. Ruling dated
Dec. 23, 1986, reprinted in 1987 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCI-) % 86,771.
206. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 3 (indicating that (i) Indi-
ana limits state banks to underwriting of municipal bonds, (ii) Kansas limits state banks
to underwriting of municipal bonds and mutual funds, and (iii) Pennsylvania limits state
banks to underwriting of municipal bonds and mortgage-related securities); Saulsbury,
supra note 204, at 11-12 (indicating that, in addition to the states identified in the CSBS
Detailed Survey, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi and Vermont limit
state bank underwriting of national bank-ineligible securities to municipal revenue
bonds).
207. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 3 (indicating that under-
writing of national bank-ineligible securities by state banks in Arizona, Indiana, Kansas,
and North Carolina may be conducted only through a subsidiary of the bank); Saulsbury,
supra note 204, at 11-12 (indicating that, in addition to the states listed in the CSBS
Detailed Survey, the following states allow bank underwriting of such securities only
through a subsidiary or affiliate: California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Texas).
208. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 3 (indicating that Califor-
nia, Kansas, New Jersey, and West Virginia limit state bank underwriting of either a
single issue of securities or all issues to a specified percentage of bank capital); Saulsbury,
supra note 204, at 8-9, 11-12 (stating that, in addition to the states identified in the CSBS
Detailed Survey, the following states limit state bank involvement in securities underwrit-
ing activities to a specified percentage of bank capital: Arkansas, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island).
209. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 4 (indicating that North
Carolina, South Carolina, and South Dakota permit state banks to engage in insurance
underwriting); Saulsbury, supra note 204, at 7-8, 15-16 (stating that, in addition to the
states listed in the CSBS Detailed Survey, Florida, Massachusetts, and New Jersey permit
banks, directly or indirectly, to engage in insurance underwriting). For discussion of the
federal limitations on insurance underwriting by national banks and bank holding compa-
nies, see supra Part II(B)(2).
210. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 4, and CSBS Summary
Survey, supra note 203 (together indicating that Alabama, California, Indiana (except for
life insurance sales), Iowa (limited to property and casualty insurance sales), Nebraska
(except in towns of 200,000 or more), New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming permit state banks to engage, directly or
indirectly, in general insurance agency activities not permitted to national banks); Sauls-
bury, supra note 204, at 8, 15-16 (stating that, in addition to the states identified in the
CSBS surveys, the following states permit state banks to engage, directly or indirectly, in
such agency activities: Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and North Dakota). For dis-
cussion of the federal limitations on insurance sales by national banks and bank holding
companies, see supra Part II(B)(2).
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underwriting or agency activities must be conducted through a subsidi-
ary or affiliate, 211 and at least four limit such activities to a specified per-
centage of bank capital.212
In May 1990, Delaware enacted a law that permits Delaware state
banks to underwrite and sell all types of insurance except title insurance.
The Delaware statute requires that any insurance business must be con-
ducted in a separate subsidiary or department of the bank with separate
assets, capital, officers and records. In addition, a Delaware state bank
may not invest more than twenty-five percent of its total capital, surplus
and individual profits in an insurance subsidiary, department or affiliate.
A companion law prohibits Delaware state banks controlled by out-of-
state bank holding companies from marketing most insurance products
(except for credit-related insurance) to Delaware residents. However,
such banks would not be limited in the types of insurance they may sell
to out-of-state residents.21 3
Citicorp and other large bank holding companies announced plans to
establish nationwide insurance underwriting and agency operations
through Delaware state banks.214 However, insurance industry groups
have petitioned the FRB to prevent Citicorp and other bank holding
companies from commencing an insurance business through Delaware
banks.2" 5 In addition, the FDIC has announced that it is likely to adopt
regulations that would restrict the ability of FDIC-insured banks to un-
derwrite insurance, because of safety and soundness concerns. 216
Finally, with regard to real estate powers, the CSBS and FDIC surveys
indicate that twenty-seven states permit state banks to participate ac-
211. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 4 (indicating that Oregon
requires general insurance agency activities to be conducted by a subsidiary that is physi-
cally separated from the state bank and that has a name and employees that are separate
from the bank, and that state banks in South Carolina may engage in general insurance
agency or underwriting activities only through a subsidiary or affiliate); Saulsbury, supra
note 204, at 8-9, 15-16 (stating that state banks in Alabama may engage in general insur-
ance agency activities only through a subsidiary, and that state banks in Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and North Carolina may engage in general insurance agency or underwriting
activities only through a subsidiary or affiliate).
212. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 4 (indicating that state
bank involvement in general insurance agency or underwriting activities in New Jersey
and South Carolina is limited to a specified percentage of bank capital); Saulsbury, supra
note 204, at 8-9, 15-16 (indicating that state bank involvement in general insurance
agency or underwriting activities in Massachusetts and North Carolina is limited to a
specified percentage of bank capital).
213. For descriptions of the new Delaware law, see, for example, Garcia, Banks'Insur-
ance Bill in Delaware Is Signed into Law, Wall St. J., May 31, 1990, at A16, col. 1;
Insurance Groups Urge Fed to Block Sale of Insurance By Citicorp's Delaware Sub, 54
Banking Rep. (BNA) 946 (June 4, 1990) [hereinafter Insurance Groups Urge Fed]; Dela-
ware Passes Bill to Let Banks Sell, Underwrite Insurance Nationwide, 54 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 905, 905-06 (May 28, 1990).
214. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 213.
215. See, e.g., id.; Insurance Groups Urge Fed, supra note 213. For a discussion of the
possible response of the FRB to these petitions, see infra note 456.
216. See, e.g., Thomas supra note 168.
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tively in real estate development ventures or to make passive investments
in such ventures.217 Of these states, at least seven permit such participa-
tions or investments to be conducted only through a subsidiary or affili-
ate,21 8 and at least twenty-six limit such participations or investments to
a specified percentage of bank capital, deposits or assets.2 19
Thus, the states have taken significant initiatives in expanding the
powers of state banks in the securities, insurance, and real estate areas. It
should be noted that the potential impact of state law is not as great with
respect to the liberalization of bank powers as it has been in the removal
of geographic barriers to interstate banking. The Douglas Amendment
authorizes the states to determine the degree to which the federal barrier
to interstate bank acquisitions may be lifted.220 In contrast, federal law
imposes significant restraints on national banks, bank holding companies
and to some degree on state member banks with respect to their involve-
ment in securities, insurance, and real estate activities. 2 ' These federal
restraints, unlike the Douglas Amendment, are not subject to liberaliza-
tion by operation of state law.222 Nevertheless, by expanding the powers
217. See Saulsbury, supra note 204, at 13-14 (stating that the following states permit
state bank involvement, directly or indirectly, in active participations or passive invest-
ments in real estate development projects: Alaska (passive investments only), Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri (passive investments only), Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota (passive investments only), Tennes-
see, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appen-
dix 2 (indicating that, in addition to the states listed in Saulsbury's survey, Michigan,
Virginia, and West Virginia permit state banks to make investments or take active partici-
pations in real estate projects); CSBSSummary Survey, supra note 203 (indicating that, in
addition to the states listed in the CSBS Detailed Survey, Maine and Wisconsin allow
banks to engage in real estate investment or development activities).
218. See Saulsbury, supra note 204, at 7-9, 13-14 (stating that state banks in Arizona,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, and North Carolina may invest or participate in real
estate development only through a subsidiary or affiliate); CSBS Detailed Survey, supra
note 203, at Appendix 2 (indicating that, in addition to the states identified in Saulsbury's
survey, Florida and New Hampshire permit state banks to participate or invest in real
estate development only through a subsidiary).
219. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, at Appendix 2 (indicating that all
states permitting bank involvement in real estate investment or development, except Ari-
zona, impose limitations based on percentage of bank capital, deposits or assets); Sauls-
bury, supra note 204, at 7-9, 13-14 (same); see also Felgran, supra note 66, at 65-66
(stating that all states except Arizona limit the amount of state bank involvement in real
estate development ventures); CSBS Summary Survey, supra note 203, at 9 (stating that
"[a]ll but one of these [states] have imposed investment limitations on [real estate]
activities").
220. For a discussion of the authority granted to the states under the Douglas Amend-
ment, see supra notes 14 & 37-40 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of the federal restraints on the securities, insurance and real
estate powers of national banks, bank holding companies and state member banks, see
supra Part II(B).
222. See, e.g., Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 1262,
1271-79 (1989) (distinguishing between provisions of the Natural Gas Act which estab-
lish exclusive federal control over the interstate transportation and sale of natural gas,
thereby preempting any inconsistent state laws, and another provision of the Act that
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of state nonmember banks, which are less constrained by federal law,223
the states are exerting substantial pressure on the federal regulators, and
ultimately Congress, to increase the powers of banking organizations
generally.2 24
III. THE RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL AGENCIES AND CONGRESS TO
THE EXPANSION OF STATE BANK POWERS
The widespread state initiatives to expand the powers of state banks
have not occurred without resistance from federal authorities. The FRB
has been particularly hostile and has issued proposed regulations that
would substantially diminish the ability of holding company-owned state
banks and their operations subsidiaries to exercise expanded state pow-
ers. The FDIC has been more accommodating, but it too has asserted
authority to take action that might restrict the newly-expanded powers of
FDIC-insured state banks.
As demonstrated below, the broad claims of authority made by the
FRB and FDIC are based on highly questionable grounds.225 Moreover,
Congress has failed to override state laws expanding bank powers, de-
spite numerous calls for such action by the FRB and by nonbank com-
petitors. In the absence of further legislation by Congress, it appears that
the states will probably be able to continue their efforts to increase the
operating authorities of state banks.
A. The Responses of the FRB and the FDIC to the Expansion of State
Bank Powers
1. The Response of the FRB
The FRB has generally been critical of the state initiatives in ex-
panding bank powers. The FRB has argued that increased state powers,
especially in the areas of real estate investment and development, are in-
herently risky and potentially threaten the safety and soundness of the
banking industry. The FRB has also suggested that expanded state pow-
ers, when exercised by holding company-owned state banks, undermine
the effectiveness of the BHC Act's regulation of the nonbanking activities
of bank holding companies.226
expressly reserves to the states the authority to regulate the intrastate transportation,
distribution and production of natural gas).
223. For a discussion of relative absence of federal restraints on the securities, insur-
ance and real estate powers of state nonmember banks, see supra Part II(B).
224. See, e.g., R. Litan, supra note 15, at 57-58 (expressing the view that state liberali-
zation of bank powers will continue and will "place increasing pressure on Congress to
liberalize activity authority for national banks or bank holding companies, or both, to
level the federal-state playing field") (quote at 58); Saulsbury, supra note 204, at 1, 4
(indicating the competitive impact of state initiatives in expanding state bank powers).
225. See infra Part V.
226. See, e.g., FRB Proposed Rule: Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control; Permissibility of Real Estate Investment Activities for Bank Holding Companies
and Their Direct and Indirect Nonbank Subsidiaries, 52 Fed. Reg. 543 (1987) [hereinaf-
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In view of these concerns, the FRB has asserted authority to restrict
the state-authorized activities of state member banks and holding com-
pany-owned state banks. First, as previously noted, the FRB has
adopted a regulation prescribing conditions for membership of state
banks in the Federal Reserve System.227 One of the conditions specified
in the regulation requires prior FRB approval before a state member
bank may change the general character of its business or the scope of its
corporate powers. 228 The FRB staff has taken the position that this con-
dition requires state member banks to obtain FRB approval before com-
mencing any new insurance or real estate activities authorized under
state law.229 As a general policy, the FRB has not permitted state mem-
ber banks to engage in real estate development activities.230
With respect to bank holding companies, the FRB has issued proposed
regulations that, if adopted, would allow bank holding companies, under
Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, to engage in real estate investment and
development activities but only under stringent limitations. 231 The
FRB's proposed regulations would (i) allow a bank holding company to
make only passive noncontrolling investments in real estate ventures
through a nonbank subsidiary of the holding company, (ii) limit the
amount of such investments both in any single real estate venture and in
all such ventures, and (iii) exclude part or all of the real estate invest-
ments made by the holding company or any of its subsidiary banks in
determining whether the holding company's capital would satisfy the
FRB's capital adequacy requirements.23 2
The FRB has made several additional proposals that, if adopted,
would place direct restrictions on the real estate activities of banks as
ter FRB Real Estate Proposal 1] at 544, 548-49; Strengthening the Safety and Soundness
of the Financial Services Industry: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Senate
Safety and Soundness Hearings] (testimony of Chairman Paul A. Volcker of the FRB).
A more balanced view of the FRB with regard to state power initiatives was recently
indicated in testimony given by Vice Chairman Manuel H. Johnson of the FRB before a
House subcommittee on April 4, 1990. Mr. Johnson acknowledged that "[t]he dual
banking system has contributed, on balance, to the flexibility and resiliency of the bank-
ing system and has helped make it more responsive to the needs of both business and
consumers." However, Mr. Johnson added that "a serious question must be raised about
any state action that might have the potential of posing undue risk to the resources of the
federal safety net." 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 444, 445 (1990) (reprinting testimony).
227. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1989), discussed supra at note 163 and accompanying text.
228. See id.
229. For discussion of the FRB staff's reliance on 12 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1989) to restrict
the ability of state member banks to engage in insurance or real estate activities author-
ized under state law, see supra notes 164 & 170 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 170; 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 444, 446 (1990) (reprinting testimony of
Vice Chairman Manuel H. Johnson of the FRB before a House subcommittee on April 4,
1990).
231. As previously discussed supra at note 171 and accompanying text, the FRB's cur-
rent regulations under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988),
prohibit bank holding companies from engaging in real estate investment or development.
232. See FRB Real Estate Proposal I, supra note 226, passim.
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well as bank holding companies. One of the FRB's proposals, for exam-
ple, would prohibit any holding company-owned state bank from engag-
ing in real estate investment or development activities through a
subsidiary of the bank, even if such activities were permitted by state
law.233 A second proposal would require a bank holding company ac-
quiring a state bank, as a condition of the FRB's approval of the acquisi-
tion, to transfer real estate investment or development activities
conducted by the bank or a subsidiary of the bank to a separate nonbank
subsidiary of the holding company. 34 A third proposal would apply the
restrictions on affiliate transactions under Sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act0 35 to transactions between any FDIC-insured bank
and any subsidiary of the bank engaged in real estate investment or de-
velopment activities.2 36 A fourth proposal would impose special capital
requirements directly on real estate subsidiaries of holding company-
owned banks.2 37
The most far-reaching FRB proposal would rescind the FRB's current
regulation concerning subsidiaries of holding company-owned state
banks. The current regulation provides that Section 4 of the BHC Act,
which restricts the nonbanking activities of bank holding companies,
does not apply to a wholly-owned subsidiary of a holding company-
owned state bank if the subsidiary engages solely in activities that the
parent bank may conduct at locations at which the bank is authorized to
carry on such activities.238 The rescission proposal reflects the FRB's
concerns about the expanded powers that have been granted to state
banks but are not permissible for bank holding companies.2 39
If the rescission proposal is adopted, the FRB would permit a holding
company-owned state bank to engage directly in state-authorized activi-
ties that are not permissible for bank holding companies, but would not
233. See id. at 545.
234. See FRB Solicitation of Public Comments, Regulations Regarding Real Estate
Investment and Development Activities of Subsidiaries of Holding Company Banks, 52
Fed. Reg. 42,301 (1987) [hereinafter FRB Real Estate Proposal I1] at 42302. As de-
scribed infra at notes 440-42 and accompanying text, the proposed condition requiring
transfer of real estate activities would be imposed based on the FRB's authority to ap-
prove acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies under Section 3 of the BHC Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988).
235. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1988).
236. See FRB Real Estate Proposal II, supra note 234, 52 Fed. Reg. at 42,302-03. For
discussion of the FRB's authority under Sections 23A and 23B, see infra Part IV(B)(5).
Sections 23A and 23B apply by their terms to national banks and state member banks.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1988). In addition, the provisions of Sections 23A and
23B are extended to state nonmember banks under 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j)(1) (1988).
237. See FRB Real Estate Proposal II, supra note 234, 52 Fed. Reg. at 42303.
238. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989). For additional discussion of this regula-
tion and the FRB's rescission proposal, see infra notes 481-85 and accompanying text.
239. See FRB Solicitation of Public Comments, Rescission of Existing Regulation Re-
garding Investments in Voting Shares of Nonbanking Companies by State Banks Owned
by Bank Holding Companies, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,915 (1988) [hereinafter FRB Rescission
Proposal], passim.
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allow the bank to conduct such activities indirectly through an opera-
tions subsidiary.2" As discussed below, it appears that any assertion by
the FRB of regulatory authority over operations subsidiaries of holding
company-owned state banks would be contrary to the clear intent of the
BHC Act.241
2. The Response of the FDIC
In contrast to the FRB, the FDIC has generally supported the expan-
sion of securities, insurance, and real estate powers for state banks. The
FDIC has stated that expanded state powers are responsive to the need of
banks to meet competition from nonbank firms and the need of consum-
ers for expanded services. In addition, the FDIC has said that the new
state powers have not presented any generalized threat to bank safety
and soundness.242 As noted previously, however, the FDIC has recently
indicated that it may take action to restrict the exercise of nationwide
insurance underwriting powers granted by a new Delaware statute to
Delaware state banks.243
In addition, the FDIC has asserted broad authority to condition or
prohibit the exercise of new state powers in order to preserve bank safety
and soundness. As previously discussed, the FDIC has issued final regu-
lations that require any state nonmember bank engaged in national bank-
ineligible securities activities to do so only through a subsidiary or affili-
ate that is adequately separated from the bank and meets certain other
conditions. 2" In addition, the FDIC proposed in 1985, but withdrew in
late 1987, regulations imposing similar requirements on FDIC-insured
banks that engage in insurance underwriting or real estate investment or
development.24 In these rulemaking proceedings, the FDIC claimed au-
thority to place restrictions or conditions on the exercise of expanded
state banking powers pursuant to Sections 6, 8(a), 8(b) and 9 of the FDI
Act.2 46 However, as shown below, these statutory provisions do not au-
thorize the FDIC to impose sweeping prohibitions on the activities of
240. See id. at 48,917, 48,919.
241. See infra Part IV(C).
242. See, e.g., 1987 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 430-31 (letter dated Nov. 13,
1987, from Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC to Representative St Germain);
1987 Senate Safety and Soundness Hearings, supra note 226, at 582 (written response of
Chairman Seidman to written question of Senator Proxmire). For further expressions of
the FDIC's view that expanded state powers do not present a generalized threat to bank
safety or soundness, see supra notes 167 & 175 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 168, 213-216 and accompanying text.
244. For a discussion of the FDIC's regulations concerning securities subsidiaries of
state nonmember banks, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
245. For a discussion of the FDIC's proposed regulations with respect to insurance
and real estate activities of FDIC-insured banks, see supra notes 166-67 & 174-75 and
accompanying text.
246. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46,709, 46,710, 46,722 (1984) (adopting original version of 12
C.F.R. § 337.4 and amending "Authority" preamble to 12 C.F.R. Part 337); FDIC Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23967-68.
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state banks.247
B. The Response of Congress to Expanded State Bank Powers
As discussed above, Congress has largely failed to take action on pro-
posals to expand or restrict bank powers.248 With the exception of the
temporary moratorium enacted by CEBA, which expired on March 1,
1988,249 Congress has not acted since 1982 to restrict the powers of state
banks. For example, Congress failed in 1984 and again in 1988 to adopt
proposed legislation that would have restricted the powers of state
banks.25 ° The inaction of Congress is particularly significant in view of
repeated requests by the FRB and insurance industry groups for legisla-
tion that would prevent holding company-owned state banks and their
operations subsidiaries from engaging in activities not permitted to bank
holding companies under the BHC Act.251
Moreover, Congress has adopted two recent pieces of legislation that
indicate a congressional intent not to impose any generalized restrictions
on the powers of state banks or their operations subsidiaries. First, in
1982, Congress amended the Bank Service Corporation Act ("BSC
Act") 252 to allow one or more national or state banks to establish a
wholly-owned or partly-owned subsidiary, known as a bank service cor-
poration ("BSC"), to provide banking services to any person.253 Section
4 of the BSC Act, as amended, authorizes a BSC that is owned by one or
247. See infra Parts IV(B)(2)-(4).
248. See supra Part II(C).
249. For a discussion of the temporary restrictions placed on securities, insurance, and
real estate activities of state banks under CEBA's moratorium, see supra notes 182-84 and
accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of the proposed 1984 and 1988 legislation, see supra notes 180-81
& 185-89 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., 1987 Senate Safety and Soundness Hearings, supra note 226, at 29-30
(testimony of Chairman Paul A. Volcker of the FRB); id. at 463-64 (testimony of Wil-
liam V. Irons on behalf of the Ins. Agent Coalition); id. at 468-70 (testimony of Robert R.
Googins on behalf of the American Council of Life Ins.); Comprehensive Reform in the
Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 21-24, 27-28 (1985) (testimony of Chair-
man Volcker); id. at 875-93 (testimony of William T. Huntley on behalf of Independent
Ins. Agents of America, et aL); Competitive Equality in the Financial Services Industry:
Hearings on S. 2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (pt. 3) 195-97 (1984) (testimony of David F. Woods on behalf of the
Independent Ins. Agents of America, et aL); id. at 1590-91, 1621-24 (testimony of FRB
Chairman Volcker).
252. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-856, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1988)).
253. Prior to 1982, a BSC could be established only by two or more banks and could
provide services only to the shareholding banks. See Act of Oct. 23, 1962, supra note
252, §§ l(c) & 4, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861(c) and 1864 (1982)). The
1982 amendments to the BSC Act allowed a single FDIC-insured bank to organize a
wholly-owned BSC, and also permitted BSCs to provide nondeposit banking services to
persons other than banks. The 1982 amendments retained the existing authority of two
or more banks to establish a jointly-owned BSC. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note
159, § 709, 96 Stat. 1540-42, amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861(b)(2) & 1864 (1988).
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more state banks to provide any nondeposit banking services that the
parent banks are authorized to provide under state law, as long as the
BSC provides these services at locations within the parent banks' home
state where the parent banks could offer such services under state law.254
In addition to these state-authorized services, a BSC may provide, with
the approval of the FRB, nondeposit services that are authorized for
bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.25
Thus, the 1982 amendments to the BSC Act empower one or more
state banks to establish a BSC to perform any of the nondeposit services
which the parent banks may offer under state law. 256 The authority
granted to a BSC owned by a state bank is identical to the powers of an
operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned state bank as recog-
nized by the FRB's regulations under the BHC Act.257 The BSC Act
strongly indicates that the powers of a BSC (ie., an operations subsidi-
ary) established by a holding company-owned state bank are not subject
to the activity limitations imposed on bank holding companies under
Section 4 of the BHC Act, as long as the BSC performs nondeposit serv-
ices that the parent bank may provide under state law.258
254. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864(b)(1) & (c) (1988).
The 1982 amendments to the BSC Act were introduced during the Senate debates on
the Garn-St Germain Act by Senator Garn, who was Senate floor manager for the legisla-
tion. Senator Garn explained that the 1982 amendments would "expando the types of
activities that a bank service corporation can perform so as to include all those activities
and services that can be performed by a State-chartered bank in any given State." 128
Cong. Rec. 25,131 (1982). After adoption by the Senate, the amendments were accepted
by the conference committee on the Garn-St Germain Act. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 641,
supra note 161, at 92 (stating that a BSC "can engage in the same activities as its parent
banks"), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Cong. Code & Admin. News at 3135.
255. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864(b), 1864(f) & 1865(b) (1988).
256. The only precondition to state bank establishment of a BSC is that the bank re-
ceive prior approval from its appropriate federal regulator (the FRB in the case of a state
member bank and the FDIC in the case of a state nonmember bank) before investing in
the capital stock of the BSC. See 12 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (1988).
257. As discussed supra at note 238 and accompanying text, the FRB's regulations
permit an operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned state bank to engage in all
of the activities in which the parent bank may engage under state law at the same loca-
tions, without regard to the restrictions of Section 4 of the BHC Act. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989).
258. The express terms of the BSC Act allow any state or national bank to establish a
BSC and do not deny this privilege to holding company-owned banks. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1861(b)(2), 1862, 1863 & 1865 (1988). Moreover, a BSC owned by a state bank may
perform any nondeposit services that its parent bank is authorized to provide under state
law, even if those services are not permissible for nonbank subsidiaries of a bank holding
company under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864(b)(1), (c) & (f)
(1988); see also 128 Cong. Rec. 25,131 (1982) (remarks of Senator Garn, explaining that
1982 amendments to BSC Act authorize BSCs owned by State banks to perform "all
those activities and services that can be performed by a state-chartered bank in any given
State, as well as most of the activities and services that can be engaged in by a bank
holding company subsidiary") (emphasis added).
For further discussion of the FRB's lack of authority under the BHC Act to regulate
the activities of operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned state banks, in view of
the provisions of the BSC Act, see infra Part IV(C). The relevance of the BSC Act to the
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The 1982 amendments to the BSC Act are especially significant in
view of their concurrent adoption with the amendments limiting the in-
surance powers of bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) of the
BHC Act. At the same time that Section 601 of the Garn-St Germain
Act restricted the insurance activities of nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act,259 Section 709
of the Garn-St Germain Act amended the BSC Act to authorize BSCs
owned by state banks to engage in all nondeposit activities that are lawful
for the parent banks under state law."6 The simultaneous enactment of
Sections 601 and 709 of the Gain-St Germain Act provides compelling
evidence that Congress did not intend to subject BSCs established by
holding company-owned state banks to the activity restrictions imposed
on bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries under Section
4 of the BHC Act.261
The second recent statute indicating that Congress has not authorized
any generalized restriction on the powers of state banks or their opera-
tions subsidiaries is FIRREA. As discussed above, FIRREA authorizes
the FDIC to adopt regulations generally prohibiting insured thrift insti-
question of FRB authority over operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks
was pointed out in the memorandum, dated April 7, 1989, submitted by John D. Hawke,
Jr., et aL of Arnold & Porter on behalf of the American Bankers Association [hereinafter
ABA Memorandum] in opposition to the FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239. Dis-
cussion of the BSC Act appears in the ABA Memorandum at 27-30 (copy on file at Ford-
ham Law Review). As noted in the ABA Memorandum, the FRB has consistently
granted applications by BSCs to engage in activities authorized for bank holding compa-
nies based solely on the FRB's authority under Section 4(f) of the BSC Act, as amended,
12 U.S.C. § 1864(f) (1988), even if the BSCs are subsidiaries of holding company-owned
banks. The FRB has never indicated that BSCs would also need permission for such
activities under the BHC Act if they were established by holding company-owned banks.
See ABA Memorandum supra, at 29-30 and n.60 (citing, e.g., Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
74 Fed. Res. Bull. 343 (1988)).
259. For a discussion of the restrictions placed on the insurance activities of bank hold-
ing companies under Section 601 of the Garn-St Germain Act, see supra notes 158-61 and
accompanying text.
260. For a discussion of the amendments to the BSC Act enacted by Section 709 of the
Garn-St Germain Act, see supra notes 252-258 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute and excludes it from another, it is
generally presumed that Congress did so intentionally to create different legal standards);
Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 60-61 n.26, 64-65 (1981) ("FRB
v. 1Cr') (fact that Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall Act prohibit all direct bank in-
volvement in specified securities activities, while Section 20 permits a bank affiliate to
offer such activities if not "engaged principally" therein, demonstrates that Section 20
allows bank affiliates to engage in some securities activities that are prohibited to banks).
Moreover, to argue that a holding company-owned state bank cannot establish a BSC
under Section 4 of the BSC Act, if the BSC intends to engage in activities forbidden to
bank holding companies under Section 4 of the BHC Act, would be to contend that a
portion of the 1982 amendments to the BSC Act was repealed by implication by the
simultaneous enactment of the 1982 amendments to Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.
Such a strange construction is unsupported by any expression of congressional intent and
is also contrary to the general principle that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
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tutions from conducting any activity that the FDIC has determined to
present a serious threat to the SAIF insurance fund. FIRREA also gen-
erally prohibits state-chartered thrift institutions from engaging in any
activity or making any investment that would not be permissible for fed-
erally-chartered thrifts, unless the state institution maintains adequate
capital and the FDIC determines that the activity or investment poses no
significant risk to the affected insurance fund.262
In contrast to these broad provisions authorizing the FDIC to impose
general prohibitions on activities by insured thrifts, FIRREA contains
only a single limited provision, Section 902, that authorizes the responsi-
ble federal regulator263 to restrict unsafe or unsound activities by individ-
ual national or state banks. Section 902 amends Section 8(b) of the FDI
Act by providing that a cease and desist order issued by the responsible
federal regulator may "place limitations on the activities or functions of
an insured depository institution."' 26 Thus, Section 902 indicates that
Congress has only authorized the federal banking agencies to impose ac-
tivity restrictions that insure the safety and soundness of individual
banks on a basis that takes approporiate account of the particular finan-
cial circumstances of each bank.265
Additionally, as discussed below, the provisions of FIRREA establish-
ing general restrictions on the powers of state-chartered thrifts were en-
acted in response to Congress' perception that overly generous powers
for state thrifts and inadequate regulation of state thrifts had contributed
significantly to the thrift bailout crisis. In contrast, the record of the
states with regard to the regulation of banks has not revealed any serious
systemic risk to the FDIC insurance fund. Thus, there has not been any
demonstrated need for preemptive federal legislation with respect to the
powers of state banks.266
262. For a discussion of the FDIC's authority under FIRREA to prohibit particular
activities of insured thrift institutions, see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
263. The responsible federal regulator, for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the
FDI Act, is the OCC with respect to national banks, the FRB with respect to state mem-
ber banks, and the FDIC with respect to state nonmember banks. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(q) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 204(f), 103 Stat. 192.
264. FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 450-51 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
265. As explained infra in Parts IV(B)(3) and (4), Sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the FDI
Act authorize the FDIC and the FRB, in general, to restrict unsafe or unsound activities
of state banks only with appropriate regard to the financial and managerial resources and
profile of each individual bank. Moreover, as discussed infra at notes 342-44 and accom-
panying text, the BSC Act indicates that an operations subsidiary of a state bank is to be
treated in the same manner as its parent bank for purposes of Sections 8(a) and 8(b).
266. For a discussion of the significant contrast between the past regulation of state
thrifts and the regulation of state banks, see infra notes 566-86 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE LIMITED AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
AND THE FDIC TO RESTRICT THE POWERS
OF STATE BANKS
The FRB and the FDIC, as shown above, have each asserted broad
authority to limit the powers that may be exercised by state banks and
their operations subsidiaries under state law.267 The FRB and the FDIC
have not yet attempted to exercise the full extent of their claimed author-
ity, perhaps because of the failure of Congress to mandate any general
restriction on state bank powers. This Part shows that, in general,
neither the FRB nor the FDIC has power to adopt sweeping regulations
that would prohibit state banks or their operations subsidiaries from en-
gaging in state-authorized activities. It seems likely, therefore, that the
states will be able to continue their expansion of state bank powers absent
preemptive action by Congress.
Part IV(A) discusses the relevant legal standards to be applied in de-
termining the validity of the FRB's and the FDIC's interpretations of
their authority under the governing statutes. Part IV(B) considers the
authority of the FRB and the FDIC to regulate the activities of state
banks and their operations subsidiaries under the Federal Reserve Act
and the FDI Act. Finally, Part IV(C) analyzes the FRB's authority
under the BHC Act to regulate holding company-owned state banks and
their operations subsidiaries.
A. Standards for Reviewing Claims of Statutory Authority By the FRB
and the FDIC
The basic criteria for judicial review of agency claims of statutory au-
thority are set forth in the Supreme Court's Chevron 268 and Cardoza-
Fonseca269 decisions. Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca establish a two-part
test for determining whether an agency has properly construed its au-
thority under the governing statute. First, the reviewing court must de-
termine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."270 If Congress has clearly indicated its intent with regard to that
question, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. '"271
Second, if the intent of Congress on the relevant question is not clear
because the governing statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,"'2 72 the court must determine whether the agency's inter-
267. See supra Part III(A).
268. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
269. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Both Chevron and Cardoza-Fon-
seca were authored by Justice Stevens.
270. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29.
271. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29.
272. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29.
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pretation of the statute is "reasonable."273 Thus, in the case of statutory
ambiguity on the relevant issue, an agency ruling will be upheld unless it
is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
274
Both Chevron and Cardoza-Fonseca make clear that reviewing courts
"must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent. ' 275  In determining whether Congress has ex-
pressed a clear intention on the specific question at issue, the courts
should use "traditional tools of statutory construction. 2 76 The court
should first look to the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language
as the best evidence of congressional intent.277 In many cases, however,
it is not sufficient to rely on the literal meaning of a single statutory pro-
vision, and the reviewing court must ascertain the actual intent of Con-
gress by construing that provision in the context of the entire statute and
related statutes on the same subject.278
Moreover, the plain language of a statutory provision is not conclusive
where the legislative history demonstrates a "'clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention' contrary to that language. '279 In such a case, the clear
intent of Congress manifested in the legislative history of the entire stat-
ute will overcome a single provision's apparent literal meaning. 2 0 In
addition, if the terms of a statute are silent or ambiguous on the relevant
273. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S at 445 n.29.
274. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445 n.29.
275. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48;
accord Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 32 (1981) (a reviewing court "must reject administrative constructions of [a] statute
... that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that
Congress sought to implement").
276. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, quoted in Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448.
277. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431-32 & n.12; accord Board of Governors v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1986) (best evidence of statutory purpose is
the plain language of the statute).
278. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1981); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 541-51 (1974); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
542-45 (1940); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-53 (1988) (meaning of a
statutory provision should be construed in light of the purpose, text, and structure of the
entire statute and related statutes).
279. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12 (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S.
597, 606 (1986)).
280. See, e.g., FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 430-38 (1986); Watt,
451 U.S. at 265-72; Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. 426 U.S. 1, 9-
10, 23-24 (1976); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 75-82 (1974); American Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. at 543-44.
It must be noted that the Supreme Court in recent years has not followed a consistent
line in its approach to construing legislative history. In some cases the Court has readily
adhered to a congressional intent discerned in the legislative history even where that
intent conflicts with the literal meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear, 476
U.S. at 430-38. In other cases, the Court has refused to depart from the "plain language"
of a statute even where the "plain purpose" of the statute might be different. See, e.g.,
Dimension 474 U.S. at 373-74; see also Philadelphia Gear, 476 U.S. at 440-41 (Marshall,
Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for failing to
adopt plain meaning approach to statutory construction as followed in Dimension).
For a recent discussion of the tension between textual (e.g., plain meaning) and contex-
1190 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
question, the court must consult the statute's legislative history to deter-
mine whether a clear legislative intent on the issue can be ascertained.2s'
If such an intent can be identified, it is binding on the agency.
282
B. Limitations on the Authority of the FRB and the FDIC to Regulate
the Activities of State Banks
The FRB and the FDIC have claimed authority to impose general
prohibitions or restrictions on the state-authorized activities of state
member banks (in the case of the FRB) and state nonmember banks (in
the case of the FDIC) pursuant to various provisions of the Federal Re-
serve Act and the FDI Act. Analysis of these provisions, however,
reveals that they grant no such general authority to the FRB and the
FDIC. The FRB may regulate transactions between state banks and
their affiliates. The FRB and the FDIC also may impose capital require-
ments on state banks and their operations subsidiaries. In addition, the
FRB and the FDIC have authority under the FDI Act to take regulatory
actions designed to prevent individual state banks or their operations
subsidiaries from engaging in unsafe or unsound banking practices.
However, absent an unusual case in which a specific activity is so inher-
ently risky as to threaten the soundness of virtually every banking organ-
ization that might choose to engage in the activity, neither the FRB nor
the FDIC has authority to prohibit all state banks or their operations
subsidiaries from conducting that activity.
1. The FRB's Authority to Place Conditions on the Entry of State
Banks into the Federal Reserve System
The FRB has adopted regulations placing conditions on the admission
of state banks as members of the Federal Reserve System. One of these
conditions, noted above, seeks to control the future powers and activities
of each state member bank by prohibiting the bank, without the FRB's
prior approval, from changing the general character of its business or the
scope of its corporate powers after the date of its admission as a member
bank.2"3 The FRB's asserted authority for this condition of membership
is Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act.28 4 In fact, however, the condi-
tion appears to be contrary to both the terms and legislative history of
Section 9.
The relevant provisions of Section 9 are contained in 12 U.S.C. §§ 321,
tual (e.g., legislative purpose) approaches to statutory construction, see Sunstein, Inter-
preting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 415-43 (1989).
281. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 168-69
(1985); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 779-91 (1985).
282. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
283. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1989). For further discussion of this condition, see supra
notes 163 & 227 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 114, § 9 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 321-38 (1988)). For
the FRB's claim of regulatory authority under Section 9, see "Authority" preamble to 12
C.F.R. Part 208 (1989).
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322 and 330 (1988). Section 321 provides that a state bank may apply for
membership in the Federal Reserve System "under such rules and regu-
lations as [the FRB] may prescribe." Section 321 further states that the
FRB may admit state banks to membership "subject to the provisions of
the [Federal Reserve Act] and to such conditions as [the FRB] may pre-
scribe pursuant thereto." Section 322 provides that, in acting upon a
state bank's application for membership, the FRB must consider whether
or not the bank's "corporate powers exercised are consistent with the
purposes of the [Federal Reserve Act]. 'u 5 Finally, Section 330 provides:
Subject to the provisions of [the Federal Reserve Act] and to the regu-
lations of the [FRB] made pursuant thereto, any [State] bank becom-
ing a member of the Federal reserve system shall retain its full charter
and statutory rights as a State bank or trust company, and may continue
to exercise all corporate powers granted it by the State in which it was
created .... 286
The explicit terms of Sections 322 and 330 indicate that the FRB's
authority to review the powers of a state member bank is limited to the
bank's powers as of the date on which the FRB acts on the bank's appli-
cation for membership.287 Nothing in the language of Section 322 or
Section 330 indicates that the FRB has discretion to veto or restrict new
powers that are granted to a state member bank under state law after its
admission to membership. 288 The lack of any such discretion is further
suggested by other provisions of the Federal Reserve Act that do place
specific limitations in the powers of state member banks after their ad-
285. The other factors to be considered by the FRB in acting on a state bank's applica-
tion for membership are the bank's financial condition and the general character of its
management. See 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1988).
286. 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1988) (emphasis added).
287. If Congress had intended to authorize the Board to restrict the powers granted by
state law to state member banks after their admission to membership, Congress could
have empowered the FRB, under Section 322, to place restrictions on "the corporate
powers exercised or to be exercised" by a prospective state member bank. Another indi-
cation of Congress' understanding that it did not grant such power is that Congress sub-
sequently authorized the FRB to issue cease and desist orders under Section 8(b) of the
FDI Act to prevent particular state member banks from engaging in unsafe or unsound
activities. For discussion of the FRB's cease and desist authority under Section 8(b), see
infra Part IV(B)(4).
288. It is noteworthy that, while Section 322 requires the FRB to consider a state
bank's powers as of the time of its application for membership, Section 329 requires such
a bank to possess adequate capital stock and surplus at the time of its application and not
to reduce its capital stock thereafter without prior approval of the FRB. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 322 & 329 (1988). The fact that a subsequent approval requirement is not included in
Section 322 indicates that Congress did not intend to require FRB approval for a state
member bank's exercise of state powers granted after it becomes a member bank. See
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (use of condition in one section of a
statute but not in another section gives rise to presumption that the condition was not
intended to operate in the latter section); cf. Farley v. Albers, 112 F.2d 401, 403 (D.C.
Cir.) (under Section 330, a state member bank "may continue to exercise all corporate
powers granted it by the state in which it was created" subject to the limitations con-
tained in the Federal Reserve Act; the FRB may not add to or enlarge the bank's powers
beyond those authorized by state law), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940).
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mission to membership.2"9 In the absence of any express restrictions on
state powers granted after admission to membership, Section 330 creates
a general presumption that state member banks may exercise all such
powers under state law.29°
Moreover, the FRB's power to adopt regulations under Sections 321
and 330, and to impose conditions of membership under Section 321, is
expressly limited to such regulations or conditions as are made "pursuant
to" the Federal Reserve Act.29 1 Accordingly, the FRB may not adopt
regulations or conditions that extend its jurisdiction beyond the bounda-
ries established by the terms and intent of the Federal Reserve Act.2 92
The legislative history of Sections 321, 322 and 330 confirms that the
FRB does not have a general power to veto or restrict the powers that are
granted to state member banks under state law after their admission to
membership. These provisions were added by a 1917 amendment to the
Federal Reserve Act.29 3 The amendment was intended to encourage
289. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988) (restricting state member banks to the branching
authority permitted to national banks); id. § 324 (requiring state member banks to meet
reserve and capital requirements, and to comply with provisions applicable to national
banks regulating the payment of dividends and preventing the impairment of capital); id.
§ 325 (requiring examination of state member banks by the FRB, subject to the FRB's
discretion to accept state examinations under § 326); id. § 329 (requiring each state mem-
ber bank, as a condition of initial membership, to possess adequate capital stock and
surplus and not to reduce its capital stock thereafter without the prior approval of the
FRB); id. § 335 (restricting state member banks to the securities activities permitted to
national banks); id. § 339 (prohibiting state member banks from engaging in lotteries or
related activities).
290. See 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1988), quoted supra at note 286 and accompanying text. For
example, in Old Kent Bank and Trust Co. v. Martin, 281 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the
court held that the FRB had no authority under Section 321 to prohibit a state member
bank from acquiring a national bank and its branches by merger. The court held that
Section 321's explicit limitations on branching by state members banks did not apply to
bank merger transactions. The court further found that no other language in the Federal
Reserve Act could authorize the FRB to prohibit a state member bank from exercising its
authority under state law to merge with a national bank pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 214a-
214c (1988).
In contrast, in Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Woodall, 239 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 909 (1957), the court upheld an FRB condition that required a state
member bank to maintain adequate capital. The court pointed out that, in addition to the
FRB's authority to prescribe conditions for membership under Section 321, there were
explicit statutory provisions (e.g., Section 324) requiring state member banks to maintain
adequate capital. Thus, the FRB's continuing authority to require adequate capital did
not rest solely on its power to prescribe conditions for membership.
291. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 321 & 330 (1988).
292. See, e.g., Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6
(1986) (FRB's authority under Section 5(b) of the BHC Act to issue regulations to ad-
minister and carry out the purposes of the BHC Act, and to prevent evasions thereof,
"only permits the [FRB] to police within the boundaries of the Act; it does not permit the
[FRB] to expand its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries established by Congress"); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213 (1976) (regulations of a federal agency that
exceed the authority delegated by Congress are invalid, because "[t]he rulemaking power
granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute
is not the power to make law").
293. See Federal Reserve Act, 1917, c. 32, § 3, 40 Stat. 232 (1917).
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more state banks to join the Federal Reserve System by "liberaliz[ing]
the terms" for admission 94 while maintaining "reasonable safe-
guards." '9 5 At the suggestion of state banks, the 1917 amendment was
modified on the Senate floor. This modification made clear that the
FRB's authority to prescribe rules regarding the admission of state mem-
ber banks was "not intended to give the [FRB] the right to make future
regulations applicable solely to State member banks which might further
curtail their power as member banks after they have entered the [Federal
Reserve] system." 96
Thus, Congress did not intend that the FRB's authority to prescribe
rules for admission of state member banks under Section 321 would en-
able the FRB to restrict or veto powers that are granted to state banks
under state law after they become members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. Since the language of Section 321 authorizing the FRB to impose
conditions for membership of state banks was adopted at the same time
as the provision in Section 321 empowering the FRB to adopt rules gov-
erning admission to membership, 97 both provisions should be inter-
preted in the same manner.298
In sum, the FRB's power under Section 321 to impose conditions on
the admission of state member banks extends only to the powers of such
banks as of the date of their admission, which the FRB is entitled to
review under Section 322. Section 321 does not authorize the FRB to
impose conditions that have the effect of vetoing or restricting the exer-
cise of new state powers granted to state member banks after their admis-
sion to membership. The FRB's imposition of such a condition in its
current regulation clearly appears to be an invalid extension of its au-
thority under Section 321.299
294. 55 Cong. Ree. 1581 (1917) (remarks of Rep. Glass, House floor manager for the
1917 amendments to the Federal Reserve Act).
295. S. Rep. No. 11, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1917).
296. 55 Cong. Rec. 1987 (1917) (remarks of Senator Owen, Senate floor manager for
the 1917 amendments) (emphasis added). Because Senator Owen's statement concerning
this modification of the FRB's authority to prescribe rules for state bank membership was
the only statement made prior to adoption of the modification by the Senate, see id.,
Senator Owen's remarks are entitled to great weight in construing 12 U.S.C. § 321
(1982), as modified by the 1917 amendment. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board
of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985).
297. See Federal Reserve Act, supra note 293, § 3, 40 Stat. 232 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 321 (1988)).
298. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 148-49
(1984) (concluding that Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits national
banks from engaging in specified securities activities, "seek[s] to draw the same line" and
should be interpreted to have the same scope as Section 21 of the same Act, which pro-
hibits companies engaged in such securities activities from engaging in deposit banking)
(quote at 149); Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 62-63 (1981)
(same).
299. For discussion of the FRB's imposition of this condition under 12 C.F.R. § 208.7
(1989), see supra notes 163, 227 & 283 and accompanying text. The use by the FRB of
regulatory conditions to extend the scope of its statutory authority has been criticized in
Aman, supra note 115, at 879-99; see also Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
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2. The FDIC's Authority to Review the Powers of State Nonmember
Banks Applying for Deposit Insurance
Section 5(a) of the FDI Act"c° requires the FDIC to consider seven
factors set forth in Section 6301 in determining whether to approve the
application of a state nonmember bank for deposit insurance. The FRB
must consider the same factors in determining whether to admit a state
bank to membership in the Federal Reserve System, as must the OCC in
deciding whether to approve a national bank charter, because state mem-
ber banks and national banks are automatically insured by the FDIC.3" 2
The sixth factor set forth in Section 6 is "whether or not [the applying
bank's] corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of [the FDI
Act]."3"3 Based on this factor, the FDIC has claimed authority to regu-
late the scope of state powers that may be granted to an insured bank
after it obtains deposit insurance, in order to protect the safety and
soundness of the bank and preserve the deposit insurance fund.3° This
claim, however, is unsupported by either the terms or legislative history
of Section 6.
The explicit terms of Sections 4(b), 5(a) and 6 demonstrate that the
factors set forth in Section 6 apply only to decisions by the OCC to grant
charters for new national banks, by the FRB to admit new state member
banks, and by the FDIC to approve new deposit insurance for state non-
member banks.3"5 None of these sections authorizes the FDIC to restrict
or veto powers obtained by a bank after it secures deposit insurance.
Moreover, the absence of such authority is strongly suggested by Sections
8(a) and 8(b), which empower the FDIC to restrict or prohibit the activi-
ties of insured banks on a case-by-case basis under carefully limited cir-
cumstances requiring prior notice and opportunity for a hearing.30 6
474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6, 374-75 (1986) (FRB may not extend by regulation the boundaries
of its jurisdiction as established by Congress).
300. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 206(a),
103 Stat. 195-96.
301. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 207, 103
Stat. 206.
302. See 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 205(2),
103 Stat. 194-95.
303. The other factors to be considered under Section 6 are the bank's financial history
and condition, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the
general character of its management, the risk it presents to the deposit insurance fund,
and the convenience and needs of the community it is to serve. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816
(1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 207, 103 Stat. 206.
304. See FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23967-
68. The FDIC's claim of authority under Section 6 to regulate the powers of insured
banks is further discussed supra at note 246 and accompanying text.
305. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814(b), 1815(a) & 1816 (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra
note 8, §§ 205-207, 103 Stat. 194-96, 206.
306. For a discussion of the limits on the FDIC's regulatory authority under Sections
8(a) and 8(b) of the FDI Act, see infra Parts IV(B)(3) and (4). The fact that Congress
has provided carefully tailored remedies in Sections 8(a) and 8(b) to enable the FDIC to
regulate the activities of insured banks, and that these remedies contain procedural safe-
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The relevant legislative history confirms that the authority of the fed-
eral banking agencies to consider the factors contained in Section 6 ap-
plies only to the time period prior to a bank's receipt of deposit
insurance.307 In view of this limitation on the FDIC's authority under
Section 6, the FDIC cannot rely on that statute to veto or restrict powers
granted to banks after they obtain deposit insurance.30 8
3. The FDIC's Authority to Terminate Deposit Insurance and to
Issue Regulations to Protect the Deposit Insurance Fund
Section 8(a) of the FDI Act empowers the FDIC to terminate the de-
posit insurance of any insured bank if it determines that the bank has
engaged or is engaging in any unsafe or unsound practice or violation of
law or is in an unsafe or unsound condition to continue in operation.319
However, before the FDIC may seek to terminate a bank's deposit insur-
ance, it must first give notice and an opportunity for corrective action to
the OCC (in the case of a national bank), the FRB (in the case of a state
member bank), or the responsible state supervisory authority (in the case
of a state nonmember bank).310 The FDIC must also provide notice and
an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing on the record to the bank
whose deposit insurance is to be terminated.311 In addition, any bank
whose deposit insurance is terminated may seek judicial review of the
FDIC's termination order.31 2
The FDIC has claimed that Section 8(a) authorizes the FDIC to adopt
guards to protect the rights of affected parties, strongly indicates that the FDIC does not
possess a broad regulatory authority under Section 6. See, eg., SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 112-14 (1978); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
307. See, eg., S. Rep. No. 1007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935) (Section 6 defines the
factors "which are deemed proper for consideration in determining whether the applying
bank should be insured") (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 1822, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1935) (Conference Rep.) (statement of House managers taking part in the conference
committee on the 1935 legislation) (factors contained in Section 6 are to be considered by
the FDIC "in connection with the admission of banks to the benefits of deposit insurance")
(emphasis added); 79 Cong. Rec. 11776 (1935) (remarks of Senator Glass, Senate floor
manager for the 1935 legislation) (Section 6 authorizes the FDIC "to determine the char-
acter of banks which are to be insured") (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt.
1), supra note 190, at 327, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 123 (Sec-
tion 207 of FIRREA amends Section 6 of the FDI Act by adding, "as a new factor for
agencies to consider when evaluating applications for deposit insurance, the risk presented
to the BIF or the SAIF') (emphasis added).
308. See, eg., Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374-75
(1986); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976); FAIC Securities, Inc.
v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-64 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'g 595 F. Supp. 73, 78-79
(D.D.C. 1984) ("FAICSecurities").
309. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 926, 103
Stat. 488-92.
310. See id. § 1818(a)(2)(A), as amended at 103 Stat. 489. In the case of the OCC or
the FRB, the FDIC must allow 30 days for corrective action unless a shorter period is
agreed to by the OCC or the FRB. See id.
311. See id. § 1818(a)(2)(B), (3) & (4), as amended at 103 Stat. 489-90.
312. See id. § 1818(a)(5), as amended at 103 Stat. 490.
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general regulations prohibiting or restricting particular activities of in-
sured banks in order to protect the safety and soundness of those banks
and to preserve the deposit insurance fund. 3 The FDIC has also cited
its general power under Section 9 of the FDI Act to issue "such rules and
regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of [the
FDI Act] or of any other law which it has the responsibility of adminis-
tering or enforcing."3"4 Neither Section 8(a) nor Section 9, however,
provides a persuasive basis for the FDIC's claim of authority.3 15
As already noted, the express terms of Section 8(a) only empower the
FDIC to bring proceedings to terminate the deposit insurance of an indi-
vidual bank based upon that particular bank's unsafe practices, unsound
condition or violations of law. Moreover, the FDIC must give prior no-
tice both to the bank's primary federal or state supervisor and to the
bank itself, and must provide an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing
before issuing a termination order. The legislative history of Section
8(a), as enacted in 1935 and amended in 1966 and 1989, confirms the
intent of Congress that the FDIC would conduct involuntary termina-
tions of deposit insurance on an individualized basis and only after pro-
viding extensive procedural safeguards.316
The FDIC has argued that it "cannot be expected to proceed solely on
a case by case basis" in defining unsafe and unsound banking practices,
and that, under Sections 8(a) and 9, it has discretion to adopt general
regulations identifying risky practices that "threaten the viability of the
deposit insurance fund." '317 This argument might be sustained if the
FDIC prohibited by general regulation an activity so inherently unsafe
that it would entail severe financial risks to virtually all banks that en-
gaged in it, regardless of the individual financial strength of any such
bank."' In such a case, neither a bank engaged in such an activity nor
313. See FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23967-
68. For further discussion of this claim of authority, see supra note 246 and accompany-
ing text.
314. 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (Tenth) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, § 209(2), supra note 8,
103 Stat. 216. The FDIC's claim of authority under Section 9 to regulate the activities of
insured banks is set forth in FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, 50
Fed. Reg. at 23,967, and is further discussed supra at note 246 and accompanying text.
315. For an analysis concurring in the view that Section 9 does not authorize the FDIC
to adopt regulations placing general restrictions on the powers of state banks, see Lyons,
The FDIC's General Legislative Rulemaking Authority: Are There Limits in a Dual Bank-
ing System?, 11 Seton Hall Legis. J. 153 (1987).
316. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1007, supra note 307, at 4-5; 79 Cong. Rec. 6583 (1935)
(remarks of Representative Steagall, House floor manager for the 1935 legislation); S.
Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3532, 3558-59 (1966); H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 5), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted
in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 397, 406 (explaining that procedures for adju-
dicatory hearing and judicial review under Section 8(a) must conform to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act).
317. FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23,698.
318. For example, the FDIC might properly issue a regulation prohibiting insured
banks from making loans, especially those secured by interests in real estate, based on
oral agreements. Oral loan agreements would entail such serious problems of enforceabil-
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its primary supervisor could remove the threat to the bank without com-
pletely stopping the activity.319
In any other case, however, an activity might or might not present a
serious financial risk to a bank based upon that particular bank's finan-
cial strength or other circumstances. In such a case, the FDIC's promul-
gation of a prohibitory regulation would be contrary to Section 8(a),
unless it is carefully tailored to provide the adjudicatory procedures and
the prior opportunity for state corrective action mandated by Section
8(a).320 In other words, the FDIC may not rely on Section 8(a) to issue a
blanket regulation that restricts or prohibits the exercise of state-author-
ized powers by FDIC-insured state banks, unless the regulation provides
the individualized determination procedures and other protections re-
quired by Section 8(a).321
The FDIC's general authority under Section 9 to adopt regulations to
carry out its statutory responsibilities cannot validate any attempt by the
ity (such as under the Statute of Frauds) that they would present grave risks to any bank
that made them.
The FDIC has issued regulations prohibiting all insured banks from acting as surety,
issuing fidelity insurance or real estate title insurance, or making guarantees except for
transactions in the usual course of banking business, such as (i) letters of credit, endorse-
ments and acceptances, and (ii) check and credit card guaranty programs for customers.
See 12 C.F.R. Part 332 (1989) (hereinafter Part 332). These prohibitions are similar to
the judicial doctrine and administrative regulations that generally bar national banks
from making guarantees but allow national banks to issue letters of credit, check guaran-
tees and certain other types of guarantees approved by the OCC. See, eg., Philadelphia
Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
476 U.S. 426 (1986); 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.7000 - 7.7016 (1989). The FDIC's regulations in
Part 332, which were originally adopted in 1946, have not been challenged and have not
had a significant impact on bank operations, evidently because of their limited scope. See
Lyons, supra note 315, at 167 n.100.
319. It is noteworthy that Congress has prohibited all FDIC-insured banks from par-
ticipating in lottery-related activities. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 25a, 339 & 1829a (1988). The
fact that Congress has not seen fit to impose a similar general prohibition on other activi-
ties of state nonmember banks places a heavy burden of justification on the FDIC in
adopting any blanket prohibition on such activities. See Lyons, supra note 315, at 161.
320. For discussion of these procedures and the prerogative of the primary supervisor,
see supra notes 310-12 & 316 and accompanying text; see also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103,
117 (1978) (SEC's power to order a 10-day suspension in the trading of a company's
securities provides the SEC with "a powerful weapon for dealing with certain problems,"
but this power may not be "administratively extended" beyond the limits established by
Congress).
321. See Lyons, supra note 315, at 167-68; see also Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 728
F.2d 518, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Boston Five Cents") (Section 8 of the FDI Act "sur-
rounds the power it grants to the FDIC over federally insured banks with procedural
safeguards of the banks' rights"); FAIC Securities, 595 F. Supp. 73, 78 n.7 (D.D.C. 1984)
(FDIC's authority to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices under Section 8 of
the FDI Act "relate[s] to specific enforcement actions brought against individual
banks").
One decision that might arguably be read to support the FDIC's broad assertion of
rulemaking power under Section 8(a) is Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 856
F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However, as explained infra at notes 369-79 and accompa-
nying text, Lincoln actually is consistent with the more limited interpretation of the
FDIC's authority advanced in this Article.
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FDIC to extend its jurisdiction beyond the statutory limits established by
Congress.322 Moreover, the general purposes of the FDI Act as a whole,
and Section 8(a) in particular, contradict the FDIC's claim of a broad
authority under Section 9 to prohibit or restrict state bank powers. The
House debates on Section 8(a), as originally adopted in 1935, demon-
strate that Congress intended to protect the soundness of insured banks
and the deposit insurance system while preserving the viability of the
state banking system.323 For example, Representative Sauthoff declared
that he opposed any federal regulatory scheme under which the "supervi-
sion and regulation [of state banks] would be taken away from the State
authorities and vested in Washington. 3'24 These expressions of congres-
sional intent to preserve the dual banking system in 1935 were consistent
with statements made by supporters of the original legislation creating
the FDIC in 1933.325
In 1950, when Congress readopted the provisions establishing the
FDIC and incorporated those provisions in the new FDI Act,3 26 it was
again understood that the Act would preserve a strong state banking sys-
tem. 27 In accordance with that understanding, the Senate committee
report on a 1960 amendment to the FDI Act stated that the FDIC's
supervisory authority over FDIC-insured banks was limited to "specific
types of actions which have a direct bearing upon its role as insurer. "328
The committee report further declared that, while the FDIC's supervi-
sory powers were designed "to supplement and strengthen the supervi-
sion of banks by the older State and Federal banking agencies," it was
Congress' intent that "[t]he direct and primary responsibility for the su-
pervision of banks rests with [the state banking agencies and the
OCC]. ' 329
322. See, e.g., Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6,
374-75 (1986); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
323. See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 6922-24 (1935) (remarks of Representatives Igoe and
Sauthoff); id. at 6927-28 (remarks of Representative Farley); id. at 6943 (remarks of Rep-
resentative Spence); id. at 7263-66 (remarks of Representatives Wolcott, Dirksen and
Steagall).
324. Id. at 6923.
325. See, e.g., 77 Cong. Rec. 4033 (1933) (remarks of Representative Steagall, House
floor manager for 1933 legislations) (FDIC insurance is intended "to preserve independ-
ent, dual banking in the United States"); id. at 181-82, 185 (remarks of Senators Robin-
son and Vandenberg). For further discussion of the 1933 legislative history, see Lyons,
supra note 315, at 159.
326. See FDI Act, supra note 116.
327. See, e.g., 96 Cong. Rec. 10,658 (1950) (remarks of Rep. Multer) (FDI Act is not
intended to permit "a nationalization of our banking system"), quoted in Lyons, supra
note 315, at 159.
328. S. Rep. No. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3234, 3236, quoted in First State Bank of Hudson County v. United
States, 599 F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). The FDIC
has endorsed this statement as an accurate description of the scope of its supervisory
authority. See FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 166, at 23,967.
329. S. Rep. No. 1821, supra note 328, reprinted in 1960 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 3236 (emphasis added).
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As described below, the terms and legislative history of Section 8(b)
provide further evidence of the intent of Congress to limit the supervi-
sory powers of the FRB and FDIC over state banks in order to preserve
the primary supervisory authority of the state agencies.330 Thus, Con-
gress has mandated in the FDI Act that the FDIC "must take care not to
usurp... the primary role Congress intended state agencies to play in the
regulation of state banks."' 331 In view of this clear congressional man-
date, it would not be proper for the FDIC to rely on Sections 8(a) and 9
to issue regulations imposing a blanket restriction or prohibition on
banking activities authorized by state law, unless those activities
presented serious risks to the safety and soundness of virtually every state
bank that chose to engage in them.332 It does not appear that any of the
recently expanded powers of state banks presents risks to bank safety
that cannot be adequately dealt with on a case-by-case basis.333 Accord-
ingly, the FDIC may not properly rely on Section 8(a) or Section 9 to
impose general restrictions or prohibitions on these state powers.
4. The Authority of the FRB and the FDIC to Require State Banks
to Terminate Unsafe or Unsound Activities
a. Statutory Provisions of Section 8(b) of the FDI Act
Section 8(b) of the FDI Act empowers the FDIC (with respect to state
nonmember banks) and the FRB (with respect to state member banks) to
issue orders requiring state banks to cease and desist from engaging in
unsafe or unsound business practices or committing violations of law. 34
Section 8(b) was amended in 1989 by FIRREA to make clear that the
FDIC's or FRB's power to issue cease and desist orders includes "the
authority to place limitations on the activities or functions of an insured
[state bank]. 335
Like Section 8(a), Section 8(b) contains detailed procedures to safe-
guard the rights of state banks that become the subject of cease and desist
proceedings.336 Before commencing a cease and desist proceeding
330. See infra Part IV(B)(4).
331. Boston Five Cents, 728 F.2d at 525 (construing the FDIC's enforcement powers
under Section 8 of the DI Act).
332. For a discussion of the FDIC's authority to issue regulations under Section 8(a) in
such a situation, see supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
333. For the FDIC's view that expanded state bank powers have not resulted in wide-
spread risks to bank safety, see supra notes 167, 175 & 242 and accompanying text.
334. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8,
§ 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 450-51. In the case of national banks, the OCC is authorized to
issue cease and desist orders. See id. For the allocation of supervisory and enforcement
responsibilities among the federal regulators with respect to FDIC-insured banks, see id.
§ 1813(q) (1988), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 204(f)(4), 103 Stat. 192.
335. Id. § 1818(b)(7), added by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 450. For
further discussion of this provision see supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text; infra
notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
336. For a discussion of the procedural safeguards under Section 8(a), see supra notes
310-12 and accompanying text.
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against a state bank, the FDIC or FRB must first provide, in accordance
with Section 8(m), a notice of the grounds for its action to the responsible
state supervisory agency and permit that agency to take corrective ac-
tion.33 If the state agency fails to take satisfactory corrective action
within the time permitted by the FDIC or FRB, the federal agency may
commence a cease and desist proceeding by delivering a notice of charges
to the state bank.338 The FDIC or FRB must provide the bank with at
least thirty days' prior notice of its intention to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing on the charges. Any cease and desist order (unless entered with the
actual or implied consent of the bank) must be made on the record after
the hearing and is subject to judicial review.339
Under Section 8(b)(3), the FRB has authority to issue a cease and de-
sist order to a bank holding company or any of its subsidiaries "other
than a bank."3" Based on the plain language of Section 8(b)(3), the
FRB would not have authority to issue a cease and desist order to a
holding company-owned state nonmember bank.34 1
It further appears that the FRB does not have authority to issue a
cease and desist order to an operations subsidiary of a holding company-
owned state nonmember bank. The BSC Act provides that, for purposes
of Section 8 of the FDI Act, a BSC is to be treated "as if [it] were an
insured bank" regulated by the primary federal supervisor of its principal
investor bank.342 Thus, the FDIC would have sole authority to bring a
cease and desist proceeding against a BSC established by a holding com-
pany-owned state nonmember bank, and such a BSC would not be
treated as a "nonbank subsidiary" of the parent bank holding company
subject to FRB supervision under Section 8(b)(3). 43 Because an opera-
tions subsidiary is identical to a wholly-owned BSC, the BSC Act
strongly indicates that an operations subsidiary of a holding company-
owned state nonmember bank, like a BSC of such a bank, is not subject
to the FRB's supervisory authority over bank holding companies under
Section 8(b)(3). 3 4
337. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(m) (1988).
338. See id.; id. § 1818(b)(1), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), 103
Stat. 450.
339. See id. §§ 1818(b)(1) & 1818(h)(2), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8,§§ 902(a)(1) & 920(a), 103 Stat. 450, 488.
340. Id. § 1818(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added), as amended by FIRREA, supra note 8,
§ 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 450.
341. See id. Of course, as indicated supra at note 334 and accompanying text, the FRB
has direct authority under Section 8(b)(1) to issue a cease and desist order to a state
member bank.
342. 12 U.S.C. § 1867(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
343. Id. §§ 1813(q), 1818(b)(1) & 1818(b)(3) (1988) (emphasis added), as amended by
FIRREA, supra note 8, §§ 204(f)(4) & 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 192, 450. The FRB would
have sole authority to bring a cease and desist proceeding against an operations subsidi-
ary established by a state member bank. See id.
344. As described supra at notes 10 & 256-58 and accompanying text, an "operations
subsidiary" and a wholly-owned BSC are identical in that each is a subsidiary of a bank
engaged in providing banking services authorized by the bank's chartering authority.
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The FDIC and the FRB have claimed that Section 8(b) authorizes
them to issue general regulations prohibiting activities of state nonmem-
ber banks (in the case of the FDIC) and state member banks (in the case
of the FRB) that are deemed by the FDIC or the FRB to be unsafe,
unsound or violations of law.345 However, as in the case of Section
8(a), 46 the explicit terms of Sections 8(b) and 8(m) contemplate that un-
safe or unsound banking practices of state banks will be defined in the
context of individual adjudicatory proceedings and only after the state
supervisory agencies have been afforded an opportunity to take corrective
action. 47
This statutory scheme indicates that the FDIC or FRB can properly
adopt general regulations defining a state bank activity as unsafe or un-
sound if the activity is so inherently risky, or entails such a high
probability of legal violations, that the activity would present a severe
threat to the financial soundness or operational legitimacy of virtually
every bank that engaged it.3 48 In such a case, neither a state bank nor its
supervisor could remove the danger of the activity without terminating
it. In the alternative, an FDIC or FRB general regulation could be de-
fended as legitimate if it is framed in a manner that takes appropriate
account of the individual financial condition of each affected state bank,
provides the procedural safeguards contemplated by Section 8(b), and
requires prior consultation with the responsible state supervisor before
enforcement action is taken against the bank.3 49
The FDIC and FRB have issued certain regulations in reliance on
their authority to prevent unsafe, unsound or illegal banking practices.
For example, the FDIC and FRB have each issued regulations prohibit-
ing any insured state bank from issuing standby letters of credit or simi-
lar credit-related instruments if such instruments, when combined with
345. For the FDIC's claim of authority to issue general regulations defining unsafe,
unsound or illegal practices of state nonmember banks under Section 8(b), see, e.g., 49
Fed. Reg. at 46,709, 46,710 (1984) (FDIC interpretive statement accompanying original
adoption of 12 C.F.R. § 337.4); 12 C.F.R. § 337.1 (1989). For an exercise of similar
claimed authority by the FRB, see 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1989).
346. For a discussion of the case-by-case decisionmaking and the procedural safe-
guards contemplated by Section 8(a), see supra Part IV(B)(3).
347. For discussion of the adjudicatory proceedings and opportunity for state correc-
tive action contemplated by Sections 8(b) and 8(m), see supra notes 336-39 and accompa-
nying text. See Boston Five Cents, 728 F.2d at 525 (Section 8 provides "procedural
safeguards of the banks' rights" in enforcement proceedings, and Section 8(m) ensures
that the federal agencies cannot "usurp" the prior right of the state supervisory authori-
ties "to take corrective action"); FAIC Securities, 595 F. Supp. 73, 78 n.7 (D.D.C. 1984)
(provisions of Section 8 authorizing federal banking agencies to prevent unsafe or un-
sound banking practices "relate to specific enforcement actions brought against individ-
ual banks").
348. As discussed supra in note 318, an example of a universally risky banking practice
would be the making of loans under oral agreements.
349. For an example of a regulation that could pass muster under Section 8(b), see the
regulation of the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") regarding "direct
investments" of federally-insured, state-chartered thrifts, discussed infra at notes 370-79.
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all other extensions of credit by the bank, would violate either the bank's
legal lending limits or legal restrictions on transactions between the bank
and its affiliates.3 50 Since standby letters of credit and similar instru-
ments have been recognized as the functional equivalent of extensions of
credit,35 these regulations are properly designed to prevent state banks
from engaging in excessive credit-granting activities that would result in
violations of law.352
As discussed above, the FDIC has also issued, in reliance on its au-
thority under Section 8(b), a regulation governing any state nonmember
bank that has a subsidiary or affiliate engaged in underwriting or dealing
in national bank-ineligible securities.35 3 These regulations are primarily
designed to maintain an adequate legal separation between the bank and
the securities subsidiary or affiliate.354 This legal separation is needed to
prevent state nonmember banks from being found to have engaged di-
rectly in securities underwriting or dealing activities. Such a direct in-
volvement of banks in the securities business would violate Section 21 of
the Glass-Steagall Act. 355 Thus, the FDIC's securities regulations, in ac-
cordance with the FDIC's authority under Section 8(b) of the FDI Act,
prescribe general prohibitions and restrictions that are needed to prevent
violations of law by state nonmember banks.356
350. See 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1989) (FRB regulation applicable to state member
banks); id. § 337.2 (FDIC regulation applicable to state nonmember banks).
351. See, eg., AMBAC, 865 F.2d at 281-83.
352. The FRB and the FDIC have adopted other general regulations under Section
8(b) that are designed to prevent state banks from committing hazardous banking prac-
tices or violations of law. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(e)-(g), (j) & (k) (1989) (FRB rules
prohibiting state member banks from making loans in federally-declared flood hazard
areas on properties not covered by flood insurance; regulating state member banks that
act as securities transfer agents, clearing agents or municipal securities dealers; and pre-
scribing recordkeeping requirements for securities transactions effected on behalf of cus-
tomers); id. § 337.3 (FDIC rule requiring state nonmember banks to comply with FRB
regulations implementing federal statutory limitations on bank extensions of credit to
executive officers, directors and principal shareholders).
353. For a discussion of 12 C.F.R. § 337.4 (1989), governing the affiliation of state
nonmember banks with securities subsidiaries or affiliates, see supra notes 146-151 and
accompanying text.
354. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46,709, 46,713 (1984) (FDIC interpretive statement accompany-
ing original adoption of 12 C.F.R. § 337.4).
355. See Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1546-49 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987). For additional discussion of the prohibition imposed by
Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act on any direct involvement of state nonmember banks
in national bank-ineligible securities activities, see supra notes 126 & 150 and accompany-
ing text.
356. The FDIC has also stated that the legal separation requirements contained in its
securities regulation are designed to protect the safety and soundness of the bank from
losses that may be insured by its securities subsidiary or affiliate. See 49 Fed. Reg.
46,709, 46,711-13 (1984) (FDIC interpretive statement accompanying adoption of 12
C.F.R. § 337.4). For discussion of these requirements, see supra notes 146-151. These
requirements do not prohibit state nonmember banks from affiliating with securities
firms. Instead, the requirements appear to be proper responses by the FDIC to generic
safety and soundness concerns resulting from the higher potential risks posed by bank
affiliation with securities firms. See Investment Co. Inst, 815 F.2d at 1550.
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In other circumstances, where the risks presented by an activity to the
safety, soundness or legality of a state bank's operation would vary de-
pending on the bank's particular financial strength and other circum-
stances, as well as the state regulatory scheme to which the bank is
subject, Section 8(b) does not authorize the FDIC or the FRB to impose
general prohibitions or restrictions on the activity. This conclusion finds
additional support in the decision of Congress in FIRREA to clarify the
authority of the federal banking agencies under Section 8(b) by providing
that the agencies may issue cease and desist orders requiring particular
banks to refrain from particular activities.357 In contrast, as discussed
above,358 FIRREA granted to the FDIC authority to issue regulations
prohibiting all federally-insured thrifts from engaging in activities deter-
mined to be unsafe by the FDIC. Thus, a clear distinction can be drawn
between FIRREA's limited amendment of Section 8(b) with respect to
bank activities and its sweeping grant of authority to the FDIC over
thrift activities. This distinction strongly indicates that Congress has not
given the FDIC and the FRB a general authority to prohibit state banks
from engaging in activities authorized by state law.3 59
b. Judicial Inteipretations of Section 8(b)
The courts have recognized that Section 8(b) provides broad discretion
to the federal banking agencies in determining whether specific bank ac-
tivities should be prohibited as unsafe or unsound banking practices.3"'
However, the courts have also made clear that such discretion is not un-
bounded. First, the term "unsafe or unsound practice" as used in Section
8(b) has been held to apply only to an activity which has "a reasonably
direct effect on a bank's financial stability."36' Thus, the federal banking
agencies may not prohibit, under Section 8(b), a lawful banking activity
that bears "only the most remote relationship to [the bank's] financial
integrity and the government's insurance risk." '362
357. See FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), adding provision to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)(7). For further discussion of this provision, see supra notes 263-65 &
335 and accompanying text.
358. For a discussion of the authority granted by FIRREA to the FDIC over the activ-
ities of thrift institutions, see supra notes 194 & 262 and accompanying text.
359. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (use by Congress of
particular language in one section of a statute and use of different language in another
section leads to a general presumption that the two sections are intended to provide dif-
ferent legal standards); Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 58-59
n.24, 64 (1981) (use of different language in Sections 20 and 21 of Glass-Steagall Act
indicates that the two sections establish different restrictions on the permissible degree of
bank involvement in securities activities).
360. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, 815 F.2d 1540, 1550 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 679-81 (5th
Cir. 1983).
361. Bellaire, 697 F.2d at 681; accord Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651
F.2d 259, 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting cease and desist authority of former
FHLBB over federally-chartered thrifts), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
362. Gulf Federal, 651 F.2d at 264.
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Second, the courts have generally agreed that the federal banking
agencies may bring action under Section 8(b) to prevent a bank from
committing violations of law, even if those violations do not threaten the
bank's financial soundness.3 63 However, in redressing such a violation,
an agency has no authority to fashion remedial policies that extend be-
yond the statutory powers granted to the agency.3 4
Third, the courts have emphasized that Section 8(b) does not give the
federal banking agencies "a 'blank check' authority' 365 and instead em-
powers them to act only "within carefully guarded limits. ' 366 Thus, for
example, the courts have pointed to the "procedural safeguards" pro-
vided by Section 8(b), such as the requirement that the federal agency
must commence a cease and desist proceeding by giving the bank a notice
of charges and an opportunity to appear at an adjudicatory hearing.367
363. See, e.g., Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 879 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir.
1989) (interpreting FHLBB's former cease and desist authority with respect to federally-
insured, state-chartered thrifts); Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 665 F.2d 279, 286,
291 (10th Cir. 1981) (opinions of Holloway and McKay, JJ.) (same); Nat'l State Bank v.
Long, 630 F.2d 981, 988 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that Section 8(b) is applicable to a
violation of state law that "directly implicates concerns in the banking field"). But see
Bellaire, 697 F.2d at 681 (Section 8(b) applies only to violations of law "with a reasonably
direct effect on a bank's financial stability").
364. See, eg., MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 862-64 (5th
Cir. 1990) (FRB does not have authority under Section 8(b) to require a bank holding
company to transfer its own funds to replenish the capital of a failing subsidiary bank);
Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1248-56 (7th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (OCC lacked authority under pre-FIRREA version of Section 8(b) to require bank
directors to reimburse the bank for losses resulting from violations of national bank lend-
ing limits under 12 U.S.C. § 84); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield v. FDIC, 751 F.2d
209, 216-19 (8th Cir. 1984) (FDIC lacked authority under pre-FIRREA version of Sec-
tion 8(b) to require bank directors to reimburse consumers for bank violations of federal
Truth in Lending Act); Otero, 665 F.2d at 286-92 (opinions of Holloway and McKay, JJ.)
(FHLBB lacked authority under pre-FIRREA statute to require thrift institution to cease
and desist from offering lawful NOW accounts as penalty for past offering of illegal inter-
est-bearing checking accounts).
In response to Larimore, Congress added Section 8(b)(6) to the FDI Act in 1989 to
authorize the federal banking agencies to require bank insiders to make reimbursement or
restitution in cases involving unjust enrichment or reckless disregard of the law. See
FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), 103 Stat. 450; H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note
190, at 392, 467-68, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 188, 263-64
(discussing Section 8(b)(6)).
In addition, as discussed supra at notes 263-65 & 357-59, FIRREA added Section
8(b)(7) of the FDI Act to empower the federal banking agencies to issue cease and desist
orders requiring individual banks to limit or halt particular activities. See FIRREA,
supra note 8, § 902 (a)(1), 103 Stat. 450; H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt.1), supra note 190, re-
printed in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 392 (discussing Section 8(b)(7)). But
neither Section 8(b)(6) nor Section 8(b)(7) authorizes the FDIC or the FRB to impose
blanket restrictions or prohibitions on the powers of state banks.
365. Larimore, 789 F.2d at 1253; see also [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866,
869-73 (D.D.C. 1985) (reaching similar conclusion as to FDIC's authority to suspend
bank officers under Section 8(e) of the FDI Act).
366. Larimore, 789 F.2d at 1253 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1482, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3532, 3538) (emphasis added in Lari-
more); accord Otero, 665 F.2d at 288 (Holloway, J.) (quoting same language).
367. See Boston Five Cents, 728 F.2d at 524, 527 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also [Anony-
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Moreover, in the case of a state bank, the courts have highlighted the
prior notice and opportunity for corrective action that must be provided
to the state supervisory agency, so that the federal agency does not
"usurp state banking agencies' regulatory authority over state banks." '368
The broadest judicial interpretation of the language of Section 8(b) ap-
pears in Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB.3 69 Lincoln held that
the former FHLBB had authority, under the parallel cease and desist
statute applicable to federally-insured, state-chartered thrifts, to adopt a
general regulation limiting high-risk "direct investments" made by such
thrifts under state law.37° In upholding the FHLBB's regulation, Lincoln
specifically rejected the contention that the FHLBB could act only on a
case-by-case basis against individual thrifts under its cease-and-desist
authority.371
The Lincoln decision is subject to criticism on the ground that it fails
to give due recognition to the statutory prerogatives of state thrift regula-
tors with regard to state-chartered thrifts.37 2 More importantly, how-
ever, the FHLBB's regulation upheld in Lincoln was substantially
consistent with the standards articulated in this Article. First, the
FHLBB had adopted the regulation only after it reviewed "extensive
studies by experts" and performed "additional studies" establishing that
excessive levels of state-authorized direct investments were contributing
mous], 619 F. Supp. at 869-73 (emphasizing procedural safeguards provided by Section
8(e) of the FDI Act).
368. Boston Five Cents, 728 F.2d at 525 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(m) (1988)); ac-
cord Otero, 665 F.2d at 285 & 285 n.4 (Holloway, J.) (discussing parallel pre-FIRREA
statute requiring that the FHLBB provide prior notice and opportunity for corrective
action to state authorities before commencing cease and desist proceedings against
FSLIC-insured state-chartered thrifts).
369. 856 F.2d 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'g 670 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C. 1987).
370. "Direct investments," as defined in the FHLBB's regulation, included invest-
ments in equity securities, real estate, real estate acquistion, development and construc-
tion loans, and operations subsidiaries. See Lincoln, 856 F.2d at 1559.
371. See id. at 1562-63, aff'g 670 F. Supp. at 451-52.
372. For example, in upholding the FHLBB's regulation with respect to state-
chartered thrifts, the Court of Appeals (like the District Court) relied on a broad reading
of Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 823 (1980). See Lincoln, 856 F.2d at 1563, affg 670 F. Supp. at 452-53. Hei-
mann upheld the authority of the OCC to adopt general regulations under Section 8(b)
that define and prohibit specified activities as "unsafe or unsound" practices for national
banks. In relying without qualification on Heimann, the Court of Appeals failed to ap-
preciate that the OCC has primary supervisory authority over national banks and is not
required to consult with any other agency before taking action under Section 8(b) to
prevent national banks from engaging in unsafe or unsound practices. See Heimann, 613
F.2d at 1168-69 & n.13. In contrast, the FDIC and the FRB are required by federal
statute to consult with the responsible state bank supervisor before requiring a state bank
to cease and desist from a specific activity, and a parallel statutory requirement was appli-
cable to the former FHLBB when acting with respect to state-chartered thrifts. See au-
thorities cited supra in note 368. While the opinions in Lincoln noted that the FHLBB
regulation correctly required prior consultation with the responsible state thrift regula-
tors, the opinions failed to acknowledge the federal statutory basis for this crucial re-
quirement. See Lincoln, 856 F.2d at 1559, aff'g 670 F. Supp. at 451 n.3.
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to a large number of thrift failures.373 Second, the regulation was not a
blanket rule barring all direct investments. Instead, it restricted direct
investments according to a sliding scale that took into account each
thrift's capital position.374 Third, a state-chartered thrift could apply for
FHLBB permission to exceed the level of direct investments allowed by
the regulation, and the FHLBB was required to consult with the respon-
sible state thrift supervisor before denying such an application. 375
Thus, in accordance with the interpretation of Section 8(b) set forth in
this Article, 76 the FHLBB regulation in Lincoln (i) was based on exten-
sive evidence showing that particular state-authorized activities of thrifts
posed a serious risk to the financial health of a large number of state-
charterd thrifts,3 77 (ii) took into account the individual financial position
of each affected state-chartered thrift, 78 and (iii) required prior consulta-
tion with the responsible state authority before a state-chartered thrift
would actually be prohibited from engaging in a state-authorized activ-
ity.379 Viewed in this context, Lincoln did not uphold a broader scope of
federal rulemaking authority over state-chartered institutions than is
warranted by the terms of Section 8(b).
c. Legislative History of Section 8(b)
The legislative history of Section 8(b), as originally enacted in 1966,380
373. See Lincoln, 670 F. Supp. at 450-5 1.
374. Thus, for example, a state-chartered thrift whose tangible capital was equal to at
least six percent of its total liabilities could make direct investments of up to three times
its tangible capital without prior FHLBB approval. In contrast, a state-chartered thrift
with a tangible capital of less than six percent but more than the minimum regulatory
requirements could make direct investments of not more than 2.5 times its tangible capi-
tal (or three percent of its assets, if greater) without prior FHLBB permission. Finally, a
state-chartered thrift which did not meet its regulatory capital requirements could not
make any direct investments absent prior FHLBB clearance. See Lincoln, 670 F. Supp.
at 451 n.3, aff'd, 856 F.2d at 1559.
375. See Lincoln, 670 F. Supp. at 451 n.3, aff'd, 856 F.2d at 1559.
376. For the interpretation of Section 8(b) advocated by this Article, see supra notes
347-349 and accompanying text.
377. As discussed infra at notes 573-74 and accompanying text, excessive powers
granted by certain states to state-chartered thrifts were a contributing cause to the thrift
insolvency crisis. However, as explained infra in Part V(A), there is no substantial evi-
dence to date indicating that the state-authorized powers of state banks pose an undue
risk to the FDIC's insurance fund.
378. In this regard, the Court of Appeals noted in Lincoln, 856 F.2d at 1559, that the
applicability of the direct investment rule to "a particular [thrift] association depend[ed]
on its financial strength." The District Court also quoted a House committee report
praising the rule "[b]ecause it [did] not set a restrictive rule in concrete." Lincoln, 670 F.
Supp. at 453 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 358, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985)).
379. The District Court in Lincoln, 670 F. Supp. at 451 n. 3, found that the direct
investment rule "provide[d] a comprehensive and fair process that consider[ed] both the
individual thrift's and chartering state's interests in balance with the statutory objectives
of the [FHLBB]." The District Court therefore concluded that the rule was consistent
with the statutory policy of according "proper respect for state regulatory autonomy."
Id. at 454.
380. See Act of Oct. 16, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 202, 80 Stat. 1046. Section 8(b)
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demonstrates that the provision was intended to provide federal banking
agencies with "additional flexible and effective supervisory powers...
within carefully guarded limits."' 381 In adopting Section 8(b), Congress
attempted to balance the public interest in protecting the soundness of
banks and the federal deposit insurance fund against the interest of banks
and their officials "in receiving a reasonable degree of protection from...
arbitrary, capricious, and overbearing [government] tactics."3 82
To protect against arbitrary action by the federal banking agencies,
Congress provided procedural safeguards in the form of prior notice, ad-
judicatory hearings, and judicial review.38 3 In addition, Congress
adopted Section 8(m) to require the FDIC and the FRB to provide state
supervisory authorities with prior notice and opportunity for corrective
action before cease and desist proceedings could be brought against state
banks. The purpose of Section 8(m) was to give additional protection to
the rights of state banks384 and to ensure that the "supervisory powers of
the State agencies [would] not be circumvented or diminished. 385
Finally, the legislative history indicates the clear understanding of
Congress that Section 8(b) would provide authority for enforcement ac-
tions against individual banks based upon particular unsafe or unsound
practices or violations of law.386 Congress recognized that the finding of
an unsafe or unsound banking practice would usually depend upon the
individual bank's special circumstances, because a particular banking ac-
tivity would
has been subsequently amended, inter alia, by Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,
§§ 107(a)(1) & (b), 92 Stat. 3649, 3653, and by FIRREA, supra note 8, § 902(a)(1), 103
Stat. 450-51.
381. S. Rep. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3532, 3538. Prior to 1966, the FDIC and other federal banking agencies
could prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices only by taking custody of a bank
under a conservatorship or receivership or by terminating its deposit insurance. These
remedies proved in many cases to be too "drastic" and "cumbersome" to be effective. See
id. at 3536-37 (quotes at 3537).
382. Id. at 3535 (quoting statement by Senator Robertson, Chairman of Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency).
383. See id. at 3533, 3552-53; 112 Cong. Rec. 24,984 (1966) (remarks of Representa-
tive Patman, House floor manager for 1966 legislation).
384. See 112 Cong. Rec. 20,081 (1966) (remarks of Senator Proxmire, Senate floor
manager for 1966 legislation).
385. Id. at 20,234-35 (statement of Senator Bennett, ranking minority member of Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking and Currency). For further discussion of the purpose and impor-
tance of Section 8(m), see S. Rep. No. 1482, supra note 381, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News at 3538-39, 3557-58; 112 Cong. Rec. 20,081, 20,244 (1966) (re-
marks of Senator Proxmire); id. at 20,245 (colloquy between Senators Talmadge and
Proxmire); id. at 20,246 (remarks of Senator Cooper).
386. See, e.g., 112 Cong. Rec. 20,079 (1966) (remarks of Senator Proxmire, quoting
letter from Secretary of the Treasury and chairmen of federal banking agencies) ("the
[1966 legislation] would authorize cease-and-desist proceedings in any case where an in-
stitution has violated law or regulation or has engaged in unsafe or unsound practices")
(emphasis added); id. at 20,080 (remarks of Senator Proxmire, indicating that 1966 legis-
lation would authorize a cease and desist order against "a bank" that engaged in a viola-
tion of law or "an unsafe or unsound practice") (emphasis added).
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not necessarily [be] unsafe or unsound in every instance[;] ... what
may be an acceptable practice for an institution with a strong reserve
position, such as concentration in higher risk lending, may well be un-
safe or unsound for a marginal operation.38 7
In sum, the relevant legislative history confirms that the FDIC's and
the FRB's authority under Section 8(b) is to be implemented in the con-
text of "specific enforcement actions brought against individual
banks, ' 38 in which the agencies comply with the "procedural safeguards
of the banks' rights. 38 9 Section 8(b) generally "does not contemplate
across-the-board regulations. ' 390 As discussed above, therefore, Section
8(b) does not authorize the FDIC or the FRB to adopt rules imposing
blanket prohibitions on the activities of state banks, unless there is sub-
stantial evidence demonstrating a serious risk to the safety of most banks
involved in those activities.3 91
5. The FRB's Authority to Regulate Bank Transactions
with Affiliates
The FRB has authority to regulate transactions between national
banks or state member banks and their affiliates under Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act.392 The FRB's regulations under these
statutes apply to state nonmember banks and their affiliates under Sec-
tion 180)(1) of the FDI Act.393 The term "affiliate" is defined in Sections
23A and 23B to include, in general, any company that controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with, the bank.394 Thus, a hold-
ing company-owned bank would be deemed to be an affiliate of its parent
company and of each nonbank subsidiary of the parent company. 395
387. Id. at 26,474 (remarks of Senator Robertson, quoting memorandum from
FHLBB chairman). As noted by Senator Robertson, id., and by Representative Patman,
id. at 24,984, Congress relied upon the description of "unsafe or unsound practice" con-
tained in the FHLBB memorandum. For further discussion of this reliance, MCorp Fi-
nancial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1990); Gulf Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1981) (identifying FHLBB chairman
as John Home), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982).
388. FAIC Securities, 595 F. Supp. at 78 n.7.
389. Boston Five Cents, 728 F.2d at 524.
390. FAIC Securities, 595 F. Supp. at 78 n.7.
391. For further discussion of the interpretation of Section 8(b) advocated in this Arti-
cle, see supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text. As discussed supra at notes 167, 175
& 242 and accompanying text, the FDIC has stated that it does not perceive any systemic
risk to have resulted from the expansion of state bank securities, insurance, and real
estate powers. However, as indicated supra at note 226 and accompanying text, and infra
at note 484 and accompanying text, the FRB has argued that the involvement of banks in
nontraditional activities such as real estate investment or development could pose signifi-
cant risks and conflict of interest problems for participating banks.
392. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c & 371c-1 (1988). The FRB is authorized to adopt rules to
implement these statutes. See id. §§ 371c(e) & 371c-1(e).
393. See id. § 18280)(1).
394. See id. §§ 371c(b)(1) & 371c-1(d)(1).
395. A bank that is a subsidiary of a bank holding company is generally not treated as
an "affiliate" of any other bank controlled by the same holding company for purposes of
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Under Section 23A, a bank may not engage in a "covered transaction"
(such as an extension of credit or purchase of assets) with an affiliate
unless the total amount of covered transactions involving the bank or its
subsidiaries does not exceed ten percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus as to any single affiliate and twenty percent of its capital stock
and surplus as to all affiliates.3 96 In addition, Section 23A requires that
all extensions of credit by a bank or its subsidiary to an affiliate must be
secured by qualified collateral.3 97 Section 23B provides that all covered
transactions and certain other dealings (such as sales of assets and con-
tracts for services) between either a bank or its subsidiary and an affiliate
of the bank must be on terms equivalent to those found in an arms'
length transaction.398
Thus, Sections 23A and 23B place significant restrictions on dealings
between banks and their nonbank affiliates. However, Sections 23A and
23B have a much narrower application to transactions between a bank
and its own subsidiaries. Section 23A provides that a subsidiary of a
bank is not an "affiliate" of the bank unless the FRB determines, by order
or regulation, that covered transactions between the bank and its subsidi-
ary may be "affected by [their] relationship to the detriment" of the
bank.39 9 Section 23B includes the same general exclusion of subsidiaries
of banks from treatment as affiliates in the absence of a contrary FRB
determination.'
As previously noted, the FRB has proposed to subject transactions be-
tween a bank and a subsidiary of the bank engaged in real estate invest-
ment or development to the requirements of Sections 23A and 23B.4 1
To adopt such a blanket rule, the FRB would be required to make a
generalized determination that the relationship between any bank and its
real estate subsidiaries may affect transactions between them to the detri-
ment of the bank.4" The FRB's determination would be subject to judi-
cial invalidation if it were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
'
,1 3
In applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, a reviewing court
would assess whether the FRB had considered the relevant facts in light
of the applicable statutory factors (for example, whether real estate ven-
tures generally are so inherently risky that the relationship of virtually
any bank with its real estate subsidiaries could be expected to affect
Section 23A. Similarly, such "sister banks" are not treated as "affiliates" of each other
under Section 23B. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c(d)(1)(C) & 371c-l(d)(1) (1988).
396. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1) (1988).
397. See id. § 371c(c).
398. See id. § 371c-l(a)(1).
399. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c(b)(1)(E) & (2)(A) (1988).
400. See id. § 371c-l(d)(1).
401. For a discussion of this proposal, see supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
402. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c(b)(1)(E) & (2)(A) (1988); id. § 371c-l(d)(1).
403. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988), quoted in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
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transactions between them to the detriment of the bank).' In addition,
the court would evaluate whether the FRB had "articulate[d] a satisfac-
tory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.' ,o
The burden on the FRB to justify its application of Sections 23A and
23B to real estate subsidiaries of banks would be greater in the case of
operations subsidiaries." 6 Such an application of the affiliate transaction
restrictions would reverse a 1970 FRB ruling which states that Section
23A does not apply to transactions between a bank and its operations
subsidiaries.'4° In issuing the 1970 ruling, the FRB found "no reason to
limit transactions between the bank and [its operations] subsidiary any
more than transactions between [unincorporated] departments of a
bank." 8  Congress agreed with this assessment in 1982, when it
amended Section 23A to provide generally (subject to a contrary FRB
determination) that subsidiaries of banks would not be treated as
affLliates. 409
To justify an application of Sections 23A and 23B to real estate opera-
tions subsidiaries, the FRB would be "obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis" for its decision to depart from its 1970 ruling,410 especially in
view of Congress' apparent endorsement of that ruling in 1982. In
presenting such an analysis, the FRB would be required to "cogently
explain" why special risk factors relating to bank ownership of real estate
operations subsidiaries warranted the FRB's departure from its previous
position.4"1 The FRB has not yet provided such an analysis.
6. The Authority of the FRB and the FDIC to Adopt Capital
Adequacy Requirements
The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 ("ILSA")41 2 em-
powers the federal banking agencies to establish minimum capital re-
quirements for banks and bank holding companies.41 3 The FRB has
authority under ILSA to establish capital adequacy standards for state
404. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The statutory factor mentioned in the parentheti-
cal clause is based on 12 U.S.C. §§ 371e(b)(1)(E) & (2)(A).
405. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
406. As described supra at note 10, an operations subsidiary is a subsidiary of a bank
that is engaged in activities authorized for the parent bank at locations permitted to the
parent bank.
407. See 12 C.F.R. § 250.240 (1989) (originally issued at 35 Fed. Reg. 19291 (1970)).
408. Id.
409. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note 159, 96 Stat. 1516-17 (amending 12 U.S.C.
§§ 371c(b)(1)(E) & (2)(A) (1988); see also S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 30, at 31, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3085 ("[a] majority-owned subsidiary [of a
bank] should be regarded as part of its parent bank and therefore, transactions between
the two should be unrestricted").
410. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42.
411. Id. at 48.
412. See Act of Nov. 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, §§ 901-13, 97 Stat. 1278-85 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (1988)).
413. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a) (1988).
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member banks and for bank holding companies and "any nonbank sub-
sidiary thereof," while the FDIC has authority to set capital standards
for state nonmember banks.414 The failure of a banking institution to
meet the required capital standards may be deemed an unsafe or unsound
banking practice within the meaning of Section 8 of the FDI Act,415 and
the capital standards may be enforced under Section 8 by the federal
banking agency having jurisdiction over the institution with deficient
capital.416
ILSA expressly provides that the FRB has no authority to establish
capital adequacy requirements for state nonmember banks, even if such
banks are owned by bank holding companies.417 In addition, it appears
that the FRB lacks authority to regulate the capital of any operations
subsidiary of a state nonmember bank. As already noted, the capital
standards adopted in the ILSA are to be enforced under Section 8 of the
FDI Act.418 Under the BSC Act, a BSC that is principally owned by a
state nonmember bank is subject to the enforcement authority of the
FDIC under Section 8 as if the BSC were itself a state nonmember
bank.4" 9 Because an operations subsidiary of a bank is identical to a
wholly-owned BSC, such a subsidiary should be treated as a "bank"
under Section 8 of the FDI Act and not as a "nonbank subsidiary" of any
holding company that controls the parent bank.420 Moveover, ILSA pro-
vides that a federal banking agency may not apply capital standards to an
affiliate of a bank unless the agency has been granted responsibility for
regulating that affiliate.421 The BSC Act plainly indicates that the FDIC,
and not the FRB, is the agency responsible for regulating BSCs (and thus
operations subsidiaries) of state nonmember banks.422
In sum, ILSA and related statutes demonstrate a lack of FRB author-
ity to mandate capital standards for state nonmember banks or their op-
414. Id. § 1813(q) (emphasis added), as amended by FIRREA, § 204(f)(4), 103 Stat.
192; id. § 3902(1) (1988). The OCC has authority to establish capital adequacy require-
ments for national banks. See id.
415. See 12 U.S.C. § 3907(b)(1) (1988). For discussion of the FDIC's and the FRB's
enforcement powers with regard to unsafe and unsound banking practices, see supra
Parts IV(B)(3) and (4).
416. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3907(b) & 3908(c) & (d) (1988).
417. As described supra at note 414 and accompanying text, the ILSA provides that
FRB shall have authority to regulate the capital of state member banks and bank holding
companies and their nonbank subsidiaries, while the FDIC is granted such authority over
state nonmember banks.
418. For a discussion of the enforcement of capital standards under Section 8, see
supra notes 415-416 and accompanying text.
419. For explanation of the status of a BSC under Section 8 of the FDI Act, see supra
notes 342-343 and accompanying text.
420. For further discussion of the view that, in light of the BSC Act, operations subsid-
iaries should be treated in the same manner as their parent banks under Section 8 of the
FDI Act, see supra notes 342-344 and accompanying text.
421. See 12 U.S.C. § 3909(a)(2) (1988).
422. For a discussion of the supervisory authority of the FDIC and the FRB with
respect to BSCs, see supra notes 342-344 and accompanying text.
1212 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
erations subsidiaries. The FRB's real estate proposals, if adopted, would
appear to exceed the FRB's capital-setting authority in two respects.
First, the FRB has proposed to exclude part or all of any real estate
investments made by holding company-owned banks (including state
nonmember banks) from the capital of their parent holding compa-
nies.423 This proposal would effectively impose an indirect penalty on
holding company-owned state nonmember banks to the extent of their
real estate investments and would thus appear to interfere with the
FDIC's exclusive capital-setting authority with regard to such banks. 24
Second, the FRB has proposed to impose a capital requirement di-
rectly on subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks if such subsidiar-
ies engage in real estate investment or development. 425 This proposal, if
applied to operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned state non-
member banks, would infringe upon the apparently exclusive authority
of the FDIC to establish capital requirements for such subsidiaries.426
C. The Absence of Authority Under the BHC Act for FRB Regulation
of the Activities of Holding Company-Owned State Banks and
Their Operations Subsidiaries
In recent years, considerable controversy has focused on the issue of
whether the FRB has authority under the BHC Act to regulate the activ-
ities of either holding company-owned state banks or their operations
subsidiaries. The FRB has acknowledged that it does not have authority
under the BHC Act to regulate the powers of holding company-owned
state banks. However, the FRB has claimed authority to regulate the
activities of operations subsidiaries of such banks.
An examination of the language and legislative history of the BHC Act
423. See FRB Real Estate Proposal I, supra note 226, 52 Fed. Reg. at 546-47. For
further discussion of this proposal, see supra notes 226 & 230-232 and accompanying
text.
424. The FRB's current capital standards (12 C.F.R. Part 225, Appendix A (1989))
and its recently-adopted risk-based capital requirements (1 Fed. Res. Regulatory Service
4-797) each evaluate the capital adequacy of bank holding companies on a consolidated
basis, le., by comparing the total capital and the total assets of all of the holding com-
pany's bank and nonbank subsidiaries. See 12 C.F.R. Part 225, Appendix A, at 97
(1989); 1 Fed. Res. Regulatory Service 4-797, at 4-187. To the extent that the FRB
proposal would reduce the capital of a bank holding company by the amount of any real
estate investments made by a subsidiary state nonmember bank, that proposal would
impose a new financial cost on the holding company by requiring it to raise additional
capital elsewhere to maintain its consolidated capital position. The proposal would have,
at least potentially, an adverse impact on the subsidiary state nonmember bank, since the
parent holding company, in view of its additional capital costs, would have relatively
fewer financial resources available to assist the bank in expanding or in meeting financial
difficulties.
425. See FRB Real Estate Proposal II, supra note 234, 52 Fed. Reg. at 42,302. For
further discussion of this proposal, see supra note 237 and accompanying text.
426. For discussion of the FDIC's apparently exclusive authority to regulate the capi-
tal of operations subsidiaries of state nonmember banks, see supra notes 417-422 and
accompanying text.
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establishes that the FRB has no authority thereunder to prohibit or re-
strict the activities of either holding company-owned state banks or their
operations subsidiaries. While Congress has empowered the FRB to reg-
ulate the activities of bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidi-
aries, Congress has not granted to the FRB a general regulatory power
over holding company-owned state banks or their operations
subsidiaries.
The scope of authority of the FRB over holding company-owned state
banks was examined in a recent article by Keith Fisher.427 Mr. Fisher's
article reaches conclusions similar to those stated in this Article, and his
analysis of the BHC Act is based in part on an appellate brief prepared in
1987 by the author of this Article.42 Because a detailed review of the
legislative history of the BHC Act appears in Mr. Fisher's article429 and
in a recent article by Professor Aman,43° only the highlights of that his-
tory will be reviewed here.
1. The Statutory Provisions
a. Section 3 of the BHC Act
Section 3(a) of the BHC Act requires prior FRB approval for any ac-
quisition of a bank by an existing bank holding company or by a com-
pany that is to become a bank holding company.431 Section 3(c) requires
427. See Fisher, Federalism Contra Federal Reservism: Bank Holding Companies and
State Bank Powers, 23 U.S.F. L. Rev. 317 (1989). For another recent analysis concluding
that the FRB lacks authority under the BHC Act to regulate the activities of holding
company-owned banks or their operations subsidiaries, see Broeckel, Regulation of Bank
Holding Companies' State Bank Subsidiaries That Engage in Nonbanking Activities: An
Unjustified Extension of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulatory Power, 4 Ad. L.J. 169,
185-95 (1990).
428. In August 1987, the author of this Article was the principal drafter of a brief fied
by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (hereinafter CSBSBrie) in Independent Ins.
Agents of America, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 835 F.2d 1452, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The analysis set forth in Fisher, supra note 427, of the legislative history of the BHC Act
closely parallels the discussion of that history in the CSBS Brief. Compare Fisher, supra
note 427, at 353-62 (analyzing legislative history of BHC Act) with CSBS Brief, supra, at
15-31 (same). The editors of the University of San Francisco Law Review have recently
acknowledged the CSBS Brief as a source for Mr. Fisher's article. See 24 U.S.F. L. Rev.
No. 2 (Winter 1990) (unnumbered page entitled "Correction" appearing before the "Con-
tents" page). A copy of the CSBS Brief is on file with Fordham Law Review.
429. See Fisher, supra note 427, at 353-62.
430. See Aman, supra note 430, at 863-69. In addition, the legislative history relating
to Section 3(d) of the BHC Act (the Douglas Amendment) is discussed in Wilmarth,
supra note 38, at 1025-34.
431. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1988). Section 2(a) of the BHC Act defines "bank hold-
ing company" to include, in general, any company that has direct or indirect control over
any bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1988). Section 2(b) defines "company" to include
any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, long-term trust or similar organ-
ization. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988). Section 2(c) defines "bank" to include, in gen-
eral, (i) any FDIC-insured bank, or (ii) any uninsured institution that (A) accepts
demand deposits or deposits that may be withdrawn by check or similar negotiable in-
strument and (B) engages in the business of making commercial loans. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c) (1988).
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the FRB, in deciding whether to approve such an acquisition, to consider
specified competitive factors and also to evaluate "the financial and man-
agerial resources and future prospects of the company or companies and
the banks concerned, and the convenience and needs of the community
to be served." '432
In view of the FRB's mandate under Section 3(c) to consider the finan-
cial resources and prospects of each acquiring bank holding company
and each acquired bank, the FRE has authority to deny any acquisition
that it determines to be financially unsound.43 3 In addition, Section 3(c)
could possibly be read to authorize the FRB, in acting on a proposed
acquisition of a bank by a holding company, to obtain commitments re-
quiring the maintenance of specified capital or the acceptance of restric-
tions on particular business practices of the holding company or bank, if
the FRB reasonably determined that these commitments were necessary
to preserve the financial and managerial soundness of the holding com-
pany and the bank.434
However, Section 3(c) does not grant to the FRB any general author-
ity to regulate or restrict the powers of banks acquired by bank holding
companies. Unlike Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, which autho-
rizes the FRB to consider the powers of every state bank that applies for
membership in the Federal Reserve System,4 35 Section 3(c) of the BHC
432. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988).
433. In Board of Governors v. First Lincoinwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978), the FRB
relied on Section 3(c) in denying an application to form a bank holding company. The
FRB determined that the holding company's initial capital would be inadequate in rela-
tion to its debt and would prevent the holding company from acting as "'a source of
financial.., strength'" for its subsidiary bank. Id. at 241 (quoting First Lincolnwood
Corp., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 153, 153 (1976)). The Supreme Court upheld the FRB's action,
even though the formation of the holding company would not have caused either an-
ticompetitive effects or a weakening of the bank's financial condition. See id. at 242-53.
434. See, eg., MCorp Financial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 862 n.5
(5th Cir. 1990); S. Rep. No. 19, supra note 182, at 36, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News at 526, quoted in Wake Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 925, 926 (1987).
There is a significant question whether the FRB would be authorized to require a hold-
ing company-owned bank (except for a state member bank) to cease and desist from an
unsafe or unsound practice as a condition for the FRB's approval of a holding company
acquisition under Section 3 of the BHC Act. As discussed supra at notes 342-344 and
accompanying text, Section 8(b)(3) of the FDI Act authorizes the FRB to issue cease and
desist orders only with respect to bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries.
However, certain language in Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 248-52, could possibly be read to
support the view that the FRB has independent authority under Section 3(c) of the BHC
Act to require a bank holding company to prevent its subsidiary banks from engaging in
specified banking practices, if that requirement is imposed in connection with the FRB's
approval of an application under Section 3 and is necessary to preserve the financial and
managerial soundness of the holding company and its banks. See also MCorp, 900 F.2d
at 862 n.5 (stating that "[a]s a condition to approving an application [under Section 3],
the [FRB] couldpossibly require the holding company to agree to maintain the subsidiary
banks to some degree of financial soundness") (emphasis added).
435. For discussion of the provision in Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act empower-
ing the FRB to consider the powers of prospective state member banks, see supra Part
IV(3)(1).
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Act confers no general power upon the FRB to consider the powers of
state banks acquired by holding companies.436 Moreover, as the Fifth
Circuit has held, Section 3(c) "does not grant the [FRB] authority to
consider the financial and managerial soundness of the subsidiary banks
after it approves the [holding company's] application."437
Even the broadest possible reading of Section 3(c) would only author-
ize the FRB to consider the safety and soundness of a prospective subsid-
iary bank as of the time it was the subject of a Section 3 acquisition.4 38
Thus, the FRB's arguable power to impose conditions under Section 3(c)
in connection with the approval of a holding company's acquisition of a
bank does not represent "an all-purpose tool" enabling the FRB to regu-
late the "day-to-day operations" of holding company-owned banks.43 9
Nevertheless, the FRB has proposed, in apparent reliance on its au-
thority under Section 3(c), to adopt a general rule requiring all state
banks acquired by holding companies to transfer their real estate invest-
ment and development activities to a nonbank subsidiary of the holding
company and to refrain thereafter from engaging directly in such activi-
ties.' 4 In order to justify this proposed rule under Section 3(c), the FRB
436. In light of the contrast with Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act, the omission of
any reference to FRB consideration of bank powers in Section 3(c) indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to confer upon the FRB any general authority to regulate the powers
of holding company-owned banks under the latter section. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
437. See MCorp, 900 F.2d at 861 (holding that Section 3(c) did not authorize the FRB
to require a bank holding company to transfer its own funds to replenish the capital of
failing subsidiary banks).
438. As discussed supra at note 435 and accompanying text, the broadest reading of
the FRB's authority under Section 3(c), as construed in Lincolnwood, would recognize
the FRB's power to require a bank holding company to place restrictions on the activities
of a particular bank that was being acquired by the holding company; see also Aman,
supra note 115, at 890 (noting that Section 3(c) "seems to mandate an individual determi-
nation of the financial and managerial factors of each [holding company] applicant and its
proposed subsidiary bank") (emphasis added). Moreover, as stated supra in note 437 and
accompanying text, the FRB's power under Section 3(c) would not extend to subsequent
bank activities that were not addressed in the FRB's order approving the acquisition.
439. See Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 254 (Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (contend-
ing that Section 3(c) is not "an all-purpose tool"); MCorp, 900 F.2d at 861-62 (declaring
that Section 3(c) does not authorize the FRB to regulate the "day-to-day operations" of
holding company-owned banks). The majority opinion in Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 248-
52, does not suggest that Section 3(c) would authorize the FRB to impose generalized
restrictions on the activities of all banks that are the subject of holding company acquisi-
tions. See MCorp, 900 F.2d at 861 (contending that Lincolnwood "did not read the [BHC
Act] to grant the [FRB] authority to regulate the day-to-day financial soundness of the
subsidiary banks"); see also Aman, supra note 115, at 890 (questioning the FRB's author-
ity under Section 3 to adopt any "per se rule" banning real estate activities by banks
acquired by holding companies).
440. See FRB Real Estate Proposal II, supra note 234, 52 Fed. Reg. at 42,302. In
Wake Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 925, 927 (1987), the FRB approved the formation of a
holding company to acquire a state savings bank that was authorized under state law to
engage through subsidiaries in real estate investment and development. The state savings
bank's real estate activities were specially authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1842(f)(1) (1988).
However, as a condition of the FRB's approval, the holding company agreed to alter the
1216 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
would be required to show that real estate investment and development
activities are so inherently risky as to threaten the soundness of virtually
every bank holding company that acquired a bank that engages in these
activities." In the absence of such a showing, the FRB does not have
authority under Section 3(c) to impose such a generalized condition on
banks acquired by holding companies.' 2
b. Section 4 of the BHC Act
Section 4(a) of the BHC Act contains two broad prohibitions on the
involvement of bank holding companies in nonbanking activities. Sec-
tion 4(a)(2) provides, in what has been described as an "ownership
clause," 443 that no bank holding company may "retain direct or indirect
ownership or control of... any company which is not a bank." 4 " Sec-
tion 4(a)(2) further provides, in what has been called an "activities
clause," 445 that no bank holding company may
engage in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing
or controlling banks and other subsidiaries authorized under [the BHC
Act] or of furnishing services to or performing services for its subsidi-
aries, and (B) those permitted under [Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC
Act].446
Thus, Section 4(a) generally prohibits bank holding companies from
owning nonbank companies or engaging in activities other than banking.
These prohibitions are qualified by several exemptions contained in Sec-
tion 4(c). The most important of these exemptions is set forth in Section
4(c)(8), which permits a bank holding company to engage in any non-
bank's real estate activities to conform with any future regulation issued by the FRB with
regard to real estate activities.
441. As discussed supra at notes 67-68 & 226 and accompanying text, the FRB and
some analysts have contended that real estate investment and development activities pose
significant generalized risks to banks. However, as pointed out supra at notes 66, 175 &
242 and accompanying text, and infra at note 569 and accompanying text, the FDIC and
other analysts and officials have stated that real estate activities do not present any sys-
temic risk to the banking system if prudently managed by individual banks.
442. As Professor Aman has pointed out, the FRB has often imposed regulatory con-
ditions on approvals of holding company acquisitions as a means to expand its effectivejurisdiction into areas in which it has doubtful authority to act. See Aman, supra note
115, at 889-91. The FRB's use of such conditions has been sharply criticized by Profes-
sor Aman, id. at 889-99, and by Justices Stevens and Rehnquist in their dissenting opin-
ion in Lincolnwood, 439 U.S. at 254-58.
443. Merchants National, 890 F.2d 1275, 1277 (2d Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58
U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. April 18, 1990) (No. 89-1620).
444. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1988). Section 4(a)(1) of the BHC Act contains a parallel
"ownership clause," which provides that an existing bank holding company may not "ac-
quire direct or indirect ownership or control of any company which is not a bank." 12
U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (1988). Thus, Section 4(a)(1) deals with the acquisition of direct or
indirect control of a nonbanking company by an existing bank holding company, while
Section 4(a)(2) deals with the retention of direct or indirect control of a nonbanking com-
pany by a company which becomes a bank holding company (e.g., by acquiring a bank).
445. Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1278.
446. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1988).
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banking activity that the FRB has determined, by order or regulation,
"to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as
to be a proper incident thereto."" 7
i. Application of Section 4(a) to Holding Company-Owned Banks
The express terms of Section 4(a) strongly indicate that the prohibi-
tions contained therein do not apply to holding company-owned banks.
The prohibitions contained in the "ownership clauses" of Sections 4(a)(1)
and (2) and the "activities clause" of Section 4(a)(2) do not apply to a
bank holding company to the extent that it owns or controls banks and
engages in activities that constitute banking."s The term "banking" is
not defined by the BHC Act, and it would therefore be appropriate to
give the term its "ordinary" and "natural" meaning.' 9 An ordinary and
natural definition of the term "banking," as used in Section 4(a)(2),
would include each type of business that a subsidiary bank of the particu-
lar bank holding company in question is authorized to conduct under the
laws governing the bank's operations.450
This common-sense approach to the meaning of "banking" in Section
4(a)(2) is consistent with the broad definitions of "bank" contained in
Section 2(c) of the BHC Act as originally enacted in 1956 and as most
recently amended in 1987. The original definition of "bank" included
any national bank or state-chartered bank.45 1 The 1987 amendment to
the definition of "bank" includes, in general, any FDIC-insured bank.452
Thus, based on the statutory definition of "bank" in Section 2(c), it ap-
pears that the term "banking" in Section 4(a)(2) should reasonably be
interpreted to include any activity authorized for an FDIC-insured sub-
447. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). A list of the "closely related" nonbanking activi-
ties that the FRB has generally approved for nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies is contained in 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1989). A bank holding company must obtain
FRB approval to engage in these activities, or to conduct other nonbanking activities that
the FRB may approve by order, by making application pursuant to id. § 225.23.
448. For the terms of the "ownership clauses" of Sections 4(a)(1) and (2), see supra
notes 443-444 and accompanying text. For the terms of the "activities clause" of Section
4(a)(2), see supra notes 445-446 and accompanying text.
449. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)
("[s]tatutory] construction must begin with.., the assumption that the ordinary meaning
of [the statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative purpose"); Philko Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 411 (1983) (stating that, in the absence of a control-
ling statutory definition, a term should be given its "natural" meaning).
450. See, e.g., The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1987)
(defining "banking" as "the business carried on by a bank or banker").
451. See BHC Act, supra note 118, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133.
452. See CEBA, supra note 183, § 101(a), 101 Stat. 554 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c)(1) (1988)). The 1987 definition also includes uninsured institutions that both
accept demand deposits (or deposits that can be withdrawn by check or similar means for
payment to third persons) and engage in the business of making commercial loans. This
alternative definition of "bank" sets forth the minimum number of functions needed
before an uninsured institution will be considered a "bank," but it does not purport to
prescribe the maximum number of functions that would be permissible for a "bank."
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sidiary bank of the particular bank holding company in question.45 3
Such a common-sense definition is further supported by case law con-
struing the general meaning of the "business of banking. 4 4
In short, a reasonable construction of the plain language of Section
4(a) leads to the conclusion that the prohibitions contained in Section
4(a) do not apply to the lawful activities of a holding company-owned
bank. Moreover, as discussed below, the relevant legislative history con-
firms that Section 4(a) was not intended to restrict the activities of hold-
ing company-owned banks.455
ii. Application of Section 4(a) to Operations Subsidiaries of Holding
Company-Owned Banks
The FRB agrees that Section 4(a) does not restrict to the activities of
holding company-owned banks.456 However, the FRB contends that the
prohibition in Section 4(a) on ownership of nonbank companies does ap-
453. It might be argued that the application of an expansive definition of "banking" to
the "activities clause" of Section 4(a)(2) would be overbroad because it would allow the
bank holding company to engage, through any of its nonbank subsidiaries, in any non-
traditional function authorized for any of the holding company's bank subsidiaries. This
argument, however, would overlook the separate impact of the "ownership clauses" of
Sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2). Those clauses prohibit a bank holding company from ac-
quiring or retaining control of "any company which is not a bank." 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1842(a)(1) & (2) (1988). Thus, the "activities clause" in Section 4(a)(2) would not
provide any authority for a bank holding company to acquire a nonbank subsidiary for
the purpose of engaging in nontraditional activities, even if such activities were author-
ized for one of the holding company's subsidiary banks.
454. For example, several courts have held that the term "business of banking," as it
appears in the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988)), includes all of the
activities that (i) are authorized to national banks under an express statutory power, or
(ii) are "convenient" or "useful" in carrying out an express power and, therefore, are
"incidental" to the "business of banking." Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d
1034, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990); M & M Leasing Corp.
v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
956 (1978); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972); AMBAC,, 656 F.
Supp. at 407-08. These decisions indicate that the "business of banking" with regard to a
particular class of banks (such as national or state banks) includes all of the activities
which that type of bank is authorized to conduct under the laws applicable to its opera-
tion. For a discussion of the historical development of the term "business of banking,"
see Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
676 (1983).
455. See infra Part IV(C)(2).
456. See Merchants National, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391-92. The FRB did apply the
prohibitions of Section 4 to a holding company-owned bank in Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res.
Bull. 789 (1985). In that case Citicorp proposed to acquire a bank in South Dakota for
the purpose of engaging in a nationwide insurance business. South Dakota law signifi-
cantly restricted the ability of the bank to offer banking or insurance services to South
Dakota residents. The FRB therefore found that the primary purpose of the bank was to
engage in insurance activities that were not permitted under the BHC Act for nonbank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies, and that the bank would conduct only insignifi-
cant banking operations. The FRB claimed authority to deny Citicorp's application
under Section 5(b) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b), in order to prevent an "evasion"
of the terms and intent of Section 4. See id. at 790 & n.3, 791. The FRB has subse-
quently explained that its decision in Citicorp was based upon its finding that the South
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ply to operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks.4 57 In
drawing this distinction between holding company-owned banks and
their operations subsidiaries, the FRB relies primarily on the "ownership
clauses" of Sections 4(a)(1) and (2). As explained above, the "ownership
clauses" prohibit a bank holding company from acquiring direct or indi-
Dakota bank was "a bank in name only" and would operate in fact as "a nationwide
insurance franchise." BankAmerica Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 244, 246 (1990).
As discussed supra at notes 213-215 and accompanying text, insurance industry groups
have recently petitioned the FRB to apply its Citicorp decision to prevent Citicorp and
other large bank holding companies from engaging in nationwide insurance activities
through Delaware banks. The new Delaware statute authorizing such activities bears
some resemblance to the South Dakota statute in Citicorp, since the Delaware law ap-
pears to prohibit Delaware banks owned by out-of-state bank holding companies from
offering insurance products except for credit-related insurance to Delaware residents.
However, unlike the South Dakota statute, Delaware law on July 1, 1990 will permit
bank holding companies from any state to acquire Delaware banks that can offer a full
range of banking services (except insurance services) to Delaware residents. See State of
the State Banking System 1989, supra note 38, at 11. Accordingly, there appears to be a
strong argument that the reasoning in Citicorp is not applicable to the new Delaware law,
because Delaware permits out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire Delaware
banks that offer a full range of domestic services as well as interstate insurance services.
See, e.g., Insurance Groups Urge Fed, supra note 213, at 946-47; BankAmerica, 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 246 (approving bank holding company's acquisition of California state bank
that is authorized to provide insurance agency services under California law, and distin-
guishing Citicorp, because bank "will, in fact, conduct banking activities in California").
In addition, there is a serious question whether the FRB's broad assertion in Citicorp,
71 Fed. Res. Bull. at 790 n.3, of authority to "prevent evasion" of the BHC ACt is still
viable. In Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that Section 5(b) of the BHC Act, on which the FRB relied in Cit-
icorp, "only permits the [FRB] to police within the boundaries of the [BHC] Act." Thus,
under Dimension, it appears that the FRB can no longer rely on Section 5(b) to expand its
authority over the activities of holding company-owned banks. See MCorp, 900 F.2d at
861; Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1279 n.2.
[Editors' Note: On September 5, 1990, the FRB issued its order in Citicorp, 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. - (1990), in which it required the life insurance subsidiary of Citibank
(Delaware), Citicorp's subsidiary state bank in Delaware, to cease offering the expanded
insurance services authorized by the new Delaware statute. The FRB concluded that
these expanded insurance services were not exempt from the general prohibitions in Sec-
tions 4(a) and 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act against the offering of insurance services by bank
holding companies. Citicorp relied on the FRB's regulation exempting activities of oper-
ations subsidiaries that are authorized under state law for holding company-owned state
banks (12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989)), discussed supra at note 238-41 and accompa-
nying text, and infra at notes 481-84 and accompanying text. Citicorp pointed out that
the Delaware statute permits Delaware state banks to offer expanded insurance services
directly through a department or division of the bank. Therefore, Citicorp argued, the
life insurance subsidiary of Citibank (Delaware) was an operations subsidiary engaged in
activities that its parent state bank could offer directly, as required by Section
225.22(d)(2)(ii) of the FRB's regulations. The FRB, however, rejected this argument. In
the FRB's opinion, the stringent restrictions imposed by the Delaware statute on an in-
surance department or division of a Delaware state bank amounted to an effective corpo-
rate separation of the bank from its insurance department or division. The FRB
concluded, therefore, that a Delaware state bank could not engage directly in the ex-
panded insurance activities, and that the activities of the life insurance subsidiary were
not exempted from the prohibitions contained in Sections 4(a) and 4(c) (8).]
457. See FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,917, 48,921-24.
1220 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
rect control of "any company which is not a bank. '458 Because opera-
tions subsidiaries are "companies" within the meaning of Section 2(b),4 59
and do not fit within the literal definition of "bank" under Section
2(c), 460 the FRB contends that operations subsidiaries are nonbank com-
panies subject to the prohibitions in Section 4(a).46 1
The FRB finds further support for its position in Section 2(g)(1) of the
BHC Act, which provides that any company "owned or controlled by
any subsidiary of a bank holding company shall be deemed to be indi-
rectly owned or controlled by such bank holding company."462 Based on
Section 2(g)(1), the FRB contends that an operations subsidiary owned
directly by a holding company-owned bank would be a nonbank com-
pany that is "indirectly" owned by the parent bank holding company.
Accordingly, the FRB maintains, the parent holding company's indirect
control of the operations subsidiary would subject that subsidiary to the
ownership prohibitions in Sections 4(a).463
The FRB's contention that Section 4(a) applies to operations subsidi-
aries of holding company-owned banks is arguably supported by a
mechanical application of the literal terms of Sections 2(g)(1), 4(a)(1)
and 4(a)(2). 46 Accordingly, it might be argued that Chevron mandates
deference to the FRB's interpretation, since the FRB is the agency re-
sponsible for administering the BHC Act.465 However, there are three
significant factors that militate against such deference. First, other pro-
visions of the BHC Act and related statutes indicate that an operations
458. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1988), discussed supra at notes 443-444 and accompany-
ing text.
459. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1988) (defining "company").
460. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988) (defining "bank"), discussed supra at notes 451-
452 and accompanying text.
461. See FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,917, 48,921.
462. Id. at 48,921 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1) (1988)) (emphasis in FRB
quotation).
463. See id. However, as discussed infra in Part IV(C)(2)(b), the legislative history of
the enactment of Section 2(g)(1) in 1966 does not confirm the FRB's interpretation of
that provision.
464. The FRB claims that Sections 4(c)(2) and (4) provide further support for its posi-
tion with respect to the application of Section 4(a) to operations subsidiaries of holding
company-owned banks. See FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at
48,921-22. However, these sections have no relevance to operations subsidiaries. Section
4(c)(2) exempts shares of any nonbank company acquired by a bank holding company or
any of its subsidiaries in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted in good faith. See 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1988). Section 4(c)(4) exempts shares of any nonbank company held
or acquired by a bank in good faith in a fiduciary (L., trust) capacity. See id.
§ 1843(c)(4). Both provisions are designed to deal with ownership interests in companies
that are engaged in activities not permissible for banks. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th
Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2482, 2493. Neither
provision would be relevant to an operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned
bank that is conducting activities that are authorized for its parent bank.
465. For a discussion of the general principles of deference set forth in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and other
Supreme Court decisions with respect to agency interpretations of statutes, see supra Part
IV(A).
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subsidiary of a holding company-owned bank is not intended to be
treated as a "company which is not a bank" for purposes of Section 4(a).
Second, the legislative history of the BHC Act persuasively demonstrates
that Congress intended to exempt both holding company-owned banks
and their operations subsidiaries from the prohibitions contained in Sec-
tion 4(a). Third, the FRB's current position represents a sharp departure
from its long-established practice of treating operations subsidiaries as
equivalent to incorporated departments of their parent banks.
The overall terms, structure and intent of the BHC Act and related
statutes strongly suggest that an operations subsidiary of a holding com-
pany-owned bank should be treated as a "bank" for purposes of Section
4(a), because an operations subsidiary engages in banking activities that
are authorized for its parent bank. The plain language of the "activities
clause" in Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act indicates that Congress did not
intend to prohibit bank holding companies from engaging, through their
subsidiary banks and operations subsidiaries of those banks, in activities
that constitute "banking. ' 466 Section 5(e)(1) of the BHC Act provides
further evidence that the FRB's regulatory jurisdiction under the BHC
Act is not intended to reach operations subsidiaries of holding company-
owned banks.467
The FRB claims that the "activities clause" of Section 4(a)(2) does not
apply to any subsidiaries of bank holding companies and instead applies
only to the direct activities of bank holding companies which are them-
selves banks.46' Thus, in the FRB's view, the "activities clause" does not
validate the banking activities of an operations subsidiary of a holding
company-owned bank. In support of this narrow construction of the
"activities clause," the FRB points out that the "ownership clauses" of
Sections 4(a)(1) and (2) refer to "direct or indirect" control of nonbank
companies, while the "activities clause" does not contain the words "di-
rectly or indirectly" before the phrase "engage in any activities other
than... banking., 469
The absence of the words "directly or indirectly" in the "activities
clause" lends a surface plausibility to the FRB's position that the clause
466. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1988) (stating that a bank holding company may en-
gage in activities which constitute "banking"). For a proposed definition of "banking,"
see supra notes 449-454 and accompanying text.
467. Under Section 5(e)(1), the FRB may order a bank holding company to divest
itself of ownership or control "of any of its nonbank subsidiaries, other than a nonbank
subsidiary of a bank," if the nonbank subsidiary poses a "serious risk to the safety, sound-
ness, or stability" of a bank subsidiary of that holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1)
(1988) (emphasis added). The legislative history of Section 5(e)(1) confirms that Con-
gress did not intend to confer upon the FRB any divestiture authority over holding com-
pany-owned banks or their nonbank subsidiaries. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 39 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 9273, 9311; S.
Rep. No. 323, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 619-20, 624 (1977)
(remarks of Senator Proxmire).
468. Merchants National, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 391-92.
469. See id. at 391-92 & n.18.
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authorizes only the direct activities of bank holding companies which are
themselves banks.470 However, on closer inspection, the FRB's interpre-
tation is clearly contrary to both the language and legislative history of
the BHC Act. One significant problem with the FRB's interpretation is
that, in practical effect, it requires the term "bank holding company" to
be read one way (as including every company that controls a bank) for
purposes of the "ownership clauses" of Sections 4(a)(1) and (2), and to be
read another way (as including only a bank holding company that is itself
a bank) for purposes of the "activities clause" of Section 4(a)(2). Such a
double reading runs counter to the general presumption that a term is
used with the same intended meaning when it appears in different por-
tions of the same statute.47 Moreover, the legislative history of Sections
470. In Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1281, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
the absence in the "activities clause" of the words "directly or indirectly" was "support-
ive of the [FRB's] position." However, the court cautioned that such omission "might
also [have] result[ed] from drafting different clauses at different times and assembling
them without intending differences in phrasing to have significance." Id.; see also Cass v.
United States, 417 U.S. 72, 83 (1974) (quoting Schmid v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 780,
789, 436 F.2d 987, 992 (Nichols, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971)) ("In
resolving [statutory] ambiguity, we must allow ourselves some recognition of the exist-
ence of sheer inadvertence in the legislative process").
471. See Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986); Patagonia
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 517 F.2d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 1975). This presumption car-
ries even greater weight where, as in the case of "bank holding company," the term has
been expressly defined in the statute (viz., in Section 2(a)(1) of the BHC Act) and the term
is used repeatedly in the same section (viz., in the "ownership clauses" and "activities
clause" of Section 4(a)). See Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860.
The FRB argues that the "activities clause" of Section 4(a)(2) must be read to include
only the direct activities of bank holding companies that are themselves banks because
otherwise the "ownership clauses" of Section 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2) would be "superfluous."
Merchants National, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 392. The FRB reasons that if the "activities
clause" is applied to subsidiaries of bank holding companies, it would accomplish the
same result (viz., prohibiting the direct or indirect ownership of nonbank companies) as
the "ownership clauses." The FRB overlooks, however, another likely purpose for the
"activities clause." That clause might well have been intended to prevent holding compa-
nies from engaging in unlawful nonbanking activities by causing their bank subsidiaries
to conduct operations that were not authorized by their bank charters. The "ownership
clauses" would not reach this manipulation of holding company-owned banks, because
those clauses only prohibit the direct or indirect ownership of nonbank companies. In
fact, when Congress adopted the BHC Act in 1956, there were numerous statements of
congressional concern about the ability of bank holding companies to manipulate the
operation of their subsidiary banks in ways that violated the letter or spirit of federal and
state banking laws. See, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1955); 101
Cong. Rec. 8021 (1955) (remarks of Representative Spence, House floor manager for the
original BHC Act); id. at 8032 (remarks of Representative Rains); id. at 8034 (remarks of
Representative Marshall).
The FRB has also suggested that the application of the "activities clause" to subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies would create internal inconsistencies in Section 4, because
Section 4(a)(2)(B) exempts from the "activities clause" only such "closely related" non-
banking activities as are authorized by the FRB under Section 4(c)(8). See Merchants
National, 890 F.2d at 1281 (discussing FRB's argument). The FRB, however, overlooks
Section 4(a)(2)(A), which exempts from the "activities clause" the business of "managing
or controlling [nonbank] subsidiaries authorized under [the BHC Act]." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(a)(2)(A) (1988). Thus, in light of Section 4(a)(2)(A), the application of the "activ-
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4(a)(1) and (2), as originally enacted in 1956, reflects a clear congres-
sional understanding that both provisions, including the "activities
clause," would apply to all bank holding companies.472
The "most perplexing aspect" of the FRB's narrow interpretation of
the "activities clause" is that it exempts the direct activities of holding
company-owned banks from Section 4(a) and yet imposes the restrictions
of Section 4(a) on the same activities when conducted indirectly by opera-
tions subsidiaries of those banks.47 3 The Second Circuit has noted the
"awkwardness and perhaps illogic of the [FRB's] generation-skipping
approach.
474
The FRB's attempt to impose the prohibitions of Section 4(a) on oper-
ations subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks also runs counter to
statutes other than the BHC Act. These statutes confirm that the re-
sponsibility for regulating operations subsidiaries is vested in the primary
federal regulators of the parent banks, not the FRB under the BHC Act.
For example, the BSC Act provides that a BSC established by a state
bank may offer, in the parent bank's home state, all nondeposit services
that the parent bank is authorized to offer at the same locations.475 The
BSC Act does not give to the FRB enforcement authority over BSCs
established by holding company-owned banks (except for BSCs estab-
lished by state member banks, as to which the FRB is the primary federal
regulator). The BSC Act instead provides that BSCs-which are func-
tionally equivalent to operations subsidiaries-are subject to the supervi-
sory and enforcement authority of the primary federal regulator for the
principal bank owner of the BSC.4 76 Similarly, the FRB has not been
given authority under ILSA to establish capital adequacy requirements
ities clause" to subsidiaries of bank holding companies would not prevent bank holding
companies from owning or acquiring any nonbank subsidiaries that are authorized under
the BHC Act, such as those permitted under the grandfather proviso of Section 4(a)(2)
and the exemptions contained in Section 4(c).
472. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 609, supra note 471, at 24 (Section 4(a) "makes it unlaw-
ful ... for a bank holding company to own.., any company other than a bank or to
engage in any business other than... banking"); S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st. Sess.
(1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2482, 2493, 2502 (Section
4(a) "prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring or retaining voting shares of any
nonbank company or engaging in a business other than... banking"); 101 Cong. Rec.
8037 (1955) (remarks of Representative Jonas) (Section 4(a) makes it "unlawful for any
bank holding company.., to own.., any company other than a bank or to engage in any
business other than that of banking").
473. See Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1282.
474. Id. The Second Circuit explained its "generation-skipping" analogy as follows:
"[T]he [FRD] adopts a generation-skipping approach: It may prohibit nonbank activities
by bank holding companies and by their 'grandchildren,' Le., the subsidiaries of their
bank subsidiaries, but not by their bank 'children,' i.e., the holding companies' immediate
bank subsidiaries." Id.
475. For discussion of the operating powers of BSCs, see supra notes 252-56 and ac-
companying text.
476. For discussion of the allocation of supervisory and enforcement authority with
respect to BSCs, see supra notes 342-344 and accompanying text.
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for BSCs.4 7 Moreover, for purposes of Section 23A and 23B of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, an operations subsidiary is generally treated as part of
its parent bank.47 8
Thus, the structure of the BHC Act and related statutes provide evi-
dence of a clear congressional intent to regulate operations subsidiaries of
holding company-owned banks as part of their parent banks, not as non-
bank companies subject to the prohibitions imposed by Section 4(a) of
the BHC Act. Moreover, as discussed below, the legislative history of
the BHC Act reveals that Congress has followed a deliberate policy of
exempting the activities of holding company-owned banks and their op-
erations subsidiaries from the restrictions contained in Section 4(a).47 9 In
these circumstances, the actual intent of Congress should be followed
notwithstanding the arguable literal meaning of the "ownership clauses"
in Section 4(a).480
Moreover, the FRB's position that Section 4(a) applies to operations
subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks is less entitled to deference
because it represents a reversal of the FRB's long-established practice
regarding such subsidiaries. Since 1971, an FRB regulation has provided
that any operations subsidiary that is wholly owned by a national bank
or state bank may engage in activities authorized for its parent bank, at
locations permitted to its parent bank, without regard to the fact that its
parent bank is controlled by a bank holding company.481 In exempting
operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks from the
prohibitions contained in Section 4(a) of the BHC Act, this regulation
has provided essentially the same authority as that granted by the 1982
amendments to the BSC Act.482 The one exception is that the FRB has
refused to extend the scope of the regulation's exemption to include oper-
ations subsidiaries that are not wholly-owned by a single bank, a position
477. For discussion of the allocation of authority with respect to capital requirements
for BSCs, see supra notes 418-422 and accompanying text.
478. As discussed supra in Part IV(B)(5), Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act do not treat operations subsidiaries as "affiliates" of their parent banks in the absence
of a contrary determination by the FRB.
479. See infra Part IV(C)(2).
480. For discussion of cases holding that the meaning of a statutory provision should
be construed in light of the entire statute and related laws, see supra notes 278 and ac-
companying text. For discussion of additional cases holding that the clear intent of Con-
gress, as revealed in the legislative history of the entire statute, should be followed where
that intent conflicts with the apparent literal meaning of an isolated provision, see supra
notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
481. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d) (1989). This regulation was first adopted in 1971. See
36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971). The exemption for operations subsidiaries of state banks is set
forth at 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989). This exemption has been applied to activities
conducted by operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned state banks in, e.g.,
American Bancorp, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,468 (1974); Piedmont Carolina Financial Serv's,
Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 766 (1973).
482. For discussion of the authority granted to BSCs under the BSC Act as amended
in 1982, see supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
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which appears to be inconsistent with BSC Act.48 3
The FRB has recently proposed to rescind its regulation exempting the
activities of operations subsidiaries, based on what the FRB sees as po-
tential threats to the safety of bank holding companies resulting from the
expansion of state banking powers.484 The FRB, however, would be obli-
gated to satisfy an enhanced standard of reasoned analysis in order to
justify its reversal of position.485 In view of the reduced degree of defer-
ence to which the FRB would be entitled in such circumstances, it would
be particularly inappropriate to allow the FRB to extend its jurisdiction
483. The FRB has refused to grant an exemption under 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii)
(1989) to an operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned bank unless the subsidi-
ary is wholly owned (except for directors' qualifying shares) by the bank. See Security
Pac. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 800, 802 (1986).
As discussed supra at notes 252-56 and accompanying text, the BSC Act authorizes
two or more state or national banks to establish a jointly-owned BSC. Thus, there is no
requirement that a BSC be wholly owned by a single bank.
In addition, as explained supra at note 258 and accompanying text, the authorized
activities of a BSC are not subject to the restrictions contained in Section 4(a) of the BHC
Act, even if the BSC is established by one or more holding company-owned banks. Ac-
cordingly, the FRB's refusal to recognize the activities of a holding company-owned
bank's operations subsidiary as exempt from Section 4 of the BHC Act, unless the subsid-
iary is wholly owned by the bank, appears contrary to the BSC Act.
484. In 1971, when the FRB adopted its regulation concerning operations subsidiaries
of holding company-owned banks, the FRB stated that the regulation was based in part
on an "absence of evidence [indicating] that acquisitions by holding company banks are
resulting in evasions of the purposes of the [BHC] Act." 36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971). The
FRB further stated that "[t]he merits of this decision will be reviewed by the [FRB] from
time to time in the light of its experience in administering the [BHC Act]." Id. The FRB
now contends that a rescission of its 1971 regulation would be justifiable in light of the
recent expansion of state banking powers and the resulting potential for "the conduct of
high risk nonbanking activities in subsidiaries of banks outside the framework and safe-
guards Congress established in the BHC Act." FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239,
53 Fed. Reg. at 48916. For additional discussion of the FRB's rescission proposal, see
supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
485. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42
(1983). In the past, the courts have imposed a higher burden of persuasion on the FRB
when it sought to depart from a long-established position, even in response to changed
circumstances. See Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402, 1405-
09 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 361 (1986); Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors,
517 F.2d 803, 810-13 (9th Cir. 1975).
The FRB has contended that, since enactment of the BHC Act in 1956, it has "consist-
ently held that the nonbanking provisions of section 4(a) of the [BHC] Act apply to the
acquisition and retention of the voting shares of nonbank companies by holding company
banks." FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,917. In support of
this contention, the FRB cites two of its rulings codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.101 &
225.102 (1989). However, those rulings dealt with (i) a passive minority investment by a
holding company-owned bank in a nonbanking company, and (ii) control by holding
company-owned banks over an investment company whose investments consisted exclu-
sively of passive minority investments in other companies. Thus, the rulings cited by the
FRB did not deal with the case of an operations subsidiary engaged in activities author-
ized for its parent holding company-owned bank. In the case of operations subsidiaries,
the FRB's consistent practice since 1971 (as discussed supra at notes 481-83 and accom-
panying text) has been to exempt such subsidiaries from the prohibitions contained in
section 4(a).
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over operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned banks contrary
to the intent of Congress.486
2. The Legislative History of the BHC Act
The legislative history of the BHC Act demonstrates a consistent in-
tent by Congress not to exempt holding company-owned state banks and
their operations subsidiaries from the nonbanking prohibitions contained
in Section 4(a). In 1956, and again in 1970 and 1982, Congress made
clear that it was not seeking to bar holding company-owned state banks
from engaging, either directly or through operations subsidiaries, in ac-
tivities authorized under state law.
a. The Original BHC Act of 1956
One of the major purposes of the original BHC Act of 1956 ("1956
Act"), which applied to all companies owning two or more banks, was to
prevent such companies from "engag[ing] in businesses wholly unrelated
to banking. '48 7 Section 4 of the 1956 Act was thus designed, in general,
to require "the divestment by bank holding companies of investments in
businesses extraneous to banking., 4 8 However, Congress expressed no
desire to force holding company-owned state banks or their subsidiaries
to terminate activities that were authorized for banks under state law.4 89
For example, Representative Multer, a senior majority member of the
House Banking and Currency Committee, stated that Section 4 would
not require a bank holding company to divest itself of any subsidiary that
"engages only in the business of banking."490
During hearings on proposed bank holding company legislation in
1955, three witnesses advised the House Banking and Currency Commit-
tee that state banks and their subsidiaries were engaged in activities that
were authorized by state law but not permitted to national banks under
federal law. These witnesses further stated that the nonbanking prohibi-
tions contained in Section 4 would not apply to the authorized activities
of state banks or their subsidiaries. Governor J. L. Robertson of the
FRB explained to the Committee that a commercial or consumer loan
486. See, eg., Dimension, 744 F.2d at 1405-09; Patagonia, 517 F.2d at 810-13.
487. S. Rep. No. 1095, supra note 464, reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 2483 (quoting testimony of William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the
FRB).
For further discussions of the legislative history of the 1956 Act, see Aman, supra note
115, at 863-65; Fisher, supra note 427, at 353-55 (covering much of the same material
presented herein); CSBS Brief, supra note 428, at 15-19 (same).
488. H.R. Rep. No. 609, supra note 471, at 16; see also 101 Cong. Rec. 8020 (1955)
(remarks of Representative Spence, House floor manager for the 1956 Act) (Section 4
"merely attempts to divorce from [bank] holding companies the power.., to engage in
unrelated businesses").
489. See Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1283 ("The legislative history.., is remark-
ably free of clear statements indicating disapproval of nonbanking activities engaged in
directly by bank subsidiaries").
490. 101 Cong. Rec. 8036 (1955) (remarks of Representative Multer).
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company that was owned by a state bank would not be subject to the
prohibition on nonbanking activities if the company was "merely an arm
of the bank itself."4 9 A second witness advised that the nonbanking
prohibitions would not apply to the activities of bank holding companies
"insofar as [such activities] might be engaged in by bank subsidiaries." '492
A third witness explained that state-chartered savings banks were per-
mitted by state law in at least three states to engage directly, or indirectly
through subsidiaries, in the selling of life insurance, the operation of a
registered investment company or the making of equity investments.493
In response to this testimony, Representative Spence, the committee
chairman and later the House floor manager for the 1956 Act, stated that
he did not agree with the broad scope of these state powers. Neverthe-
less, he and Representative Brown made clear in the following colloquy
that the 1956 Act would not interfere with the authorized functions of
state banks or their subsidiaries:
MR. BROWN: We are not trying to change the State laws, are we?
THE CHAIRMAN (Rep. Spence): We are not changing the State
laws at all .... This bill doesn't affect State laws. And we don't
intend to usurp any of the functions of the States, or change the atti-
tudes of the States in reference to these matters.494
These discussions during the House committee hearings, which were
noted by the Second Circuit in Merchants National,49 provide strong
evidence that the 1956 Act was not intended to affect the powers of state
banks or their operations subsidiaries. Further confirmation of this con-
gressional intent appears in Section 7 of the 1956 Act. Section 7 was
enacted to preserve the existing jurisdiction of the states over banks and
bank holding companies.49 6 It was expressly understood that Section 7
would "reserve[ ] to the States the full and complete authority over State
banks and State banking. 4
9 7
The Senate Banking and Currency Committee drew an important dis-
491. Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674
before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1955)
[hereinafter 1955 House Hearings]. By referring to a subsidiary that was "merely an arm
of the bank itself," Governor Robertson was evidently referring to an operations subsidi-
ary. See id.
492. Id. at 231 (testimony of James S. Bush, Vice President of General Contract
Corp.).
493. See id. at 552-53, 569 (testimony of Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., President of the
Morris Plan Corp. of America).
494. Id. at 553.
495. 890 F.2d at 1283.
496. See BHC Act, supra note 118, § 7, 70 Stat. 138 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846 (1988)). For further discussion of Section 7, see supra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
497. 1955 House Hearings, supra note 491, at 367 (remarks of Representative Multer);
see also 101 Cong. Rec. 8021 (1955) (remarks of Representative Spence, stating that
under Section 7 "the States retain every right they have now"); id. at 8182 (remarks of
Representative Multer).
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tinction between the powers reserved and not reserved to the states under
Section 7 of the 1956 Act. The committee explained that the states
would have authority under Section 7 "to be more restrictive regarding
the formation or operation of bank holding companies within their re-
spective borders than the Federal authorities can be or are under [the
1956 Act]."'4 98 The committee cautioned, however, that Section 7 would
not authorize states to regulate bank holding companies in a manner so
"inconsistent" with the 1956 Act as to "nullify its effect."499 Notwith-
standing this limitation on state authority over bank holding companies
under Section 7, the committee reaffirmed that Section 7 would "preserve
to the States those powers which they now have in our dual banking
system." 5 0
Thus, the evident purpose of Section 7 was to afford the states an op-
tion to be more restrictive but not more liberal than the BHC Act with
respect to bank holding companies.50 1 However, with regard to state
banks and their subsidiaries, whose powers were not to be affected by the
BHC Act, the states were to retain their full regulatory jurisdiction and
discretion under the dual banking system." 2 This distinction accords
with the general understanding of Congress in 1956 that the operations
of state banks were already subject to adequate supervisory protection
under state banking laws, but that a new federal statute was needed to
control the previously unregulated activities of bank holding
companies.50 3
b. The 1966 Amendments
The 1966 amendments to the BHC retained the basic structure of the
1956 Act but removed certain exemptions granted by the original Act.5"
498. S. Rep. No. 1095, supra note 464, reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 2492 (emphasis added).
499. S. Rep. No. 1095 (pt. 2), 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956).
500. Id.
501. For court decisions upholding the authority of the states under Section 7 to place
nondiscriminatory restrictions on bank holding companies, see supra note 120 and ac-
companying text.
502. See S. Rep. No. 1095 (pt. 2), supra note 499, at 5 ("It is always of uppermost
importance in legislation of this nature to preserve the dual system of National and State
banks, and Section 7 must be viewed in that light").
503. See, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 609, supra note 471, at 4, 16; 101 Cong. Rec. 8030-31(1955) (remarks of Representative Rains); id. at 8037-38 (remarks of Representative
Brown); 102 Cong. Rec. 6755 (1956) (remarks of Senator Robertson); see also 1955 House
Hearings, supra note 491, at 14 (testimony of Chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr.
of the FRB) (bank holding companies should not be permitted to make use of the assets
of their subsidiary banks "for the purpose of engaging in [nonbanking] businesses which
are not subject to the safeguards imposed by the banking laws").
504. For discussions of the 1966 amendments to the BHC Act, see Fisher, supra note
427, at 342-43, 365-66 (covering much of the same material presented herein); CSBS
Brief, supra note 428, at 19-20 (same). The primary purpose of the 1966 amendments
was to remove the exemptions granted by the 1956 Act for long-term trusts, registered
investment companies and their affiliates, and charitable organizations. See S. Rep. No.
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In addition, the 1966 amendments amended the definition of "subsidi-
ary" in Section 2(d) and added a new definition of "indirectly owned or
controlled" in Section 2(g)(1) of the BHC Act.5 05 Sections 2(d) and
2(g)(1) together provide that any shares or companies owned or con-
trolled by a subsidiary (including a bank subsidiary) of a bank holding
company are deemed to be indirectly owned or controlled by the holding
company itself.
50 6
The FRB has contended that the 1966 amendments were intended to
make clear that all investments or subsidiaries of holding company-
owned banks, including operations subsidiaries, would be subject to Sec-
tion 4(a) of the BHC Act.5 07 In fact, however, the amendments to Sec-
tions 2(d) and 2(g)(1) were primarily designed to prevent holding
companies from evading regulation under the BHC Act by establishing a
series of intermediate "shell" holding companies that would each own
one bank and, thereby, maintain exempt status under the Act.508 Noth-
ing in the legislative history of these amendments suggests that Congress
intended to reverse its original decision in 1956 that Section 4(a) would
not apply to activities conducted by subsidiaries of state banks as long as
those activities were authorized under state banking laws.50 9
In the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, a funda-
mental reversal of the position Congress took in 1956 should not be in-
ferred from the literal terms of the 1966 amendments. 10 Moreover, as
1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2385, 2387-91.
505. See Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, §§ 4-6, 80 Stat. 237 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841(d) & (g)(1) (1988)).
506. See id. For further discussion of Section 2(g)(1), see supra notes 462-64 and ac-
companying text.
507. See FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,921.
508. See 112 Cong. Rec. 11,815 (1966) (remarks of Senator Proxmire); id. at 11,823
(remarks of Senator Douglas); id. at 11,824 (remarks of Senator Morse); Amendments to
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Analyses of S. 2353, S. 2418, and H.R. 7371
and Comparative Print Showing Changes in Existing Law, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8
(Comm. Print 1965). Like the 1956 Act, the 1966 amendments applied only to holding
companies controlling two or more banks. See S. Rep. No. 1179, supra note 504, reprinted
in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2387, 2389.
509. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1956 Act, see supra Part
IV(C)(2)(a). The FRB points to comments in the 1966 Senate committee report indicat-
ing that Congress passed the 1966 amendments to Sections 2(d) and 2(g)(1) to codify
previous FRB interpretations of the 1956 Act. See FRB Rescission Proposal, supra note
239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,921 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1179, supra note 504, at 8, reprinted in
1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2392). However, as discussed supra at note
485, the rulings cited by the FRB do not deal with operations subsidiaries conducting
activities authorized by state law for their parent state banks. Instead, those rulings deal
with passive minority investments held directly or indirectly by holding company-owned
banks.
510. See FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 431-39 (1986) (declining, in
the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, to construe an amendment to
the definition of "deposit" in the FDI Act in a manner that would significantly alter the
Act's jurisdictional scope); Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72 (1974) (declining, without a
clear statement of congressional purpose, to interpret an amendment to the definition of
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explained below, Congress reiterated a clear understanding in 1970 that
holding company-owned banks and their operations subsidiaries would
be exempt from Section 4(a).511 In light of this later confirmation of
Congress' original position in 1956, the ambiguous history of the 1966
amendments substantially undermines the FRB's attempt to rely on
those amendments.5 1 2
c. The 1970 Amendments
The 1970 amendments to the BHC Act represented a fundamental re-
working of the Act, especially in extending the Act's coverage to holding
companies controlling only one bank.513 It is therefore particularly sig-
nificant that Congress in 1970 reaffirmed its original determination in
1956 that Section 4(a) of the BHC Act would not apply to holding com-
pany-owned banks or their operations subsidiaries.
Throughout the deliberations on the 1970 amendments, there were re-
peated expressions of the intent of Congress not to regulate the activities
of holding company-owned banks.5 4 For example, although the House
adopted a "negative laundry list" prohibiting any bank holding company
or its subsidiary banks from engaging in insurance, securities, travel
agency, accounting, data processing or leasing activities,51 5 that provision
was rejected by the Senate and the conference committee on the 1970
amendments.5 6 The decision of Congress not to adopt restrictions on
the activities of holding company-owned banks is particularly striking in
"year" in 10 U.S.C. § 687(a) in a way that would substantially change the eligibility
standard for veterans' readjustment pay). The absence of any congressional intent to
remove the general exemption for bank operations subsidiaries can also be inferred from
the fact that (as discussed supra in note 504) Congress took care in 1966 to specify the
various exemptions that would be removed by the 1966 amendments.
511. See infra Part IV(C)(2)(c).
512. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (in
construing a statute, "while the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the un-
mistakable intent of the enacting one,... such views are entitled to significant weight,....
and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure") (cita-
tions omitted).
513. See, eg., S. Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin News 5519, 5520-22. For additional discussions of the legislative history
of the 1970 amendments, see Aman, supra note 115, at 866-68; Fisher, supra note 427, at
356-58 (discussing many of the matters presented herein); CSBS Brief, supra note 428, at
21-24 (same).
514. See, eg., H.R. Rep. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969) (prevailing views);
116 Cong. Rec. 32,107 (1970) (remarks of Senator Packwood); id. at 32,130 (remarks of
Senator Bennett); id. at 32,131 (remarks of Senator Goodell).
515. For explanation of the intent of the House-adopted "negative laundry list," see
115 Cong. Rec. 33,133-34, 33,138 (1969) (remarks of Representative Blackburn, sponsor
of provision); id. at 33,134-35 (remarks of Representative Patman, chairman of the House
Banking and Currency Comm.); id. at 33,136 (remarks of Representative St Germain);
id. at 33,138 (remarks of Representative Matsunaga).
516. For discussion of the actions of the Senate and the conference committee in re-
jecting the House "negative laundry list," see 116 Cong. Rec. 42,422-23 (remarks of Sena-
tor Sparkman, Senate floor manager for the 1970 amendments); id. at 42,427-48 (remarks
of Senator Proxmire); id. at 42,428-29 (remarks of Senator Goodell); id. at 41,953-54
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view of the information given to Congress concerning the involvement of
state banks in securities, insurance and other activities.517
During consideration of the 1970 amendments, Chairman Arthur
Burns of the FRB specifically advised Congress that the FRB's jurisdic-
tion under both the existing BHC Act and the 1970 amendments would
not extend to the activities of holding company-owned banks or their
operations subsidiaries. Chairman Burns advised that the BHC Act au-
thorized the FRB to "regulat[e] the bank holding companies, not the
[subsidiary] banks themselves," and that the subsidiary banks would
"continue to function under their present supervisory authorities."518
This statement was quoted in the Senate committee report on the 1970
amendments.5 19 Moreover, Chairman Burns stated that a "wholly
owned operations subsidiary" of a holding company-owned bank would
be exempt from the prohibitions of Section 4(a), because such a subsidi-
ary would "serve in effect, as a separately incorporated department of the
bank." 2 0 Thus, in adopting the 1970 amendments, Congress plainly un-
derstood that Section 4(a) would not apply to the activities authorized by
state law for holding company-owned state banks and their operations
subsidiaries. 521
(remarks of Representative Widnall, ranking minority member of House Banking and
Currency Comm.); id. at 41,961 (remarks of Representative Reuss).
The decision of Congress to reject the House "negative laundry list" provides compel-
ling evidence that Congress did not intend to regulate the activities of holding company-
owned banks. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441-43 (rejection of pro-
posed legislation by Congress provides persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend
to adopt legal position embodied in rejected legislation); National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458-61 (1974) (same).
517. See, e.g., One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S. 1052,
S. 1211, S. 1664, S. 3823, and H.R. 6778 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Senate Hearings] at 216, 229, 232-34
(testimony of Dr. Harry P. Guenther of CSBS, and attached survey of state laws indicat-
ing that state banks in various states were authorized to engage in securities, insurance,
travel agency, auditing, data processing and leasing activities).
518. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 517, at 157.
519. See S. Rep. No. 1084, supra note 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 5548 (supplementary views of Senators Bennett, Tower, Percy, and Packwood).
520. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 517, at 141. As Chairman Burns explained in
his testimony (id.), the FRB had adopted a ruling in 1968 permitting state member banks
to establish wholly-owned operations subsidiaries. The 1968 ruling recognized that a
bank's use of an operations subsidiary to carry on activities authorized for the bank was
"simply a convenient alternative organizational arrangement" in place of conducting the
same activities directly in a department of the bank. See 33 Fed. Reg. 11,813 (1968)
(codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. § 250.141 (1989)).
Notwithstanding this explicit statement by Chairman Bums with respect to operations
subsidiaries, the FRB has asserted (without referring to that statement) that Chairman
Bums' testimony at the 1970 Senate hearings "says nothing about nonbank subsidiaries
of holding company banks and in no way indicates that section 4(a) does not apply to the
acquisition of shares or subsidiaries by holding company banks." See FRB Rescission
Proposal, supra note 239, 53 Fed. Reg. at 48,924. The FRB's assertion is clearly
mistaken.
521. Since the FRB is the agency responsible for administering the BHC Act, see Lin-
colnwood, 439 U.S. at 248, Chairman Bums' representations to Congress in 1970 are
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d. The 1982 Amendments
In 1982, Congress passed Section 601 of the Gan-St Germain Act to
restrict the permissible insurance activities of bank holding companies.12 2
Section 601 accomplished this purpose by limiting the FRB's authority
to approve insurance activities under Section 4(c)(8).123 Since Section
4(c)(8) provides an exception from the general prohibitions contained in
Section 4(a),524 Section 4(c)(8), as amended in 1982, has no application
to holding company-owned banks or their operations subsidiaries, which
are exempt from Section 4(a).
The legislative history of Section 601 confirms that Congress did not
intend to restrict the direct or indirect insurance activities of holding
company-owned state banks. During the House debates on a predecessor
bill to Section 601, Representative Hanley, chief House sponsor of the
bill, declared that the bill "covers only the large bank holding companies
... [and] is not intended to apply directly or indirectly to any type of
lending institution other than a bank holding company."52 Similarly,
Governor Partee of the FRB testified during a Senate hearing that the
same House bill would not prevent a holding company-owned state bank
from engaging in insurance activities to the extent permitted by state
law. 26 The Senate committee report on the Garn-St Germain Act stated
that Section 601 would apply only to bank holding companies and their
nonbank subsidiaries,527 and would not affect the jurisdiction reserved to
entitled to substantial weight in evaluating the intent of Congress regarding the activities
of holding company-owned banks and their operations subsidaries. See, ag., Lindahl v.
OBM, 470 U.S. 768, 788 (1985). Moreover, Chairman Bums' representations in 1970
were identical in substance to the advice given by Governor Robertson of the FRB to
Congress prior to enactment of the original BHC Act of 1956. See supra note 491 and
accompanying text. These statements of FRB officials are especially significant because
Congress, after hearing them, took no action to apply the nonbanking prohibitions in
Section 4(a) to holding company-owned banks or their operation subsidiaries. See Lin-
colnwood, 439 U.S. at 248, 251-52.
522. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note 30, § 601, 96 Stat. 1536 (amending 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988)).
523. See id. For further discussion of Section 601, see supra note 159-161 and accom-
panying text. For discussion of the legislative history of the 1982 amendments, see
Fisher, supra note 427, at 359-60 (covering much of the same material presented herein);
CSBS Brief, supra note 428, at 26-28 (same).
524. For discussion of the relationship between Sections 4(a) and 4(c)(8), see supra
notes 445-47 and accompanying text.
525. 126 Cong. Rec. 14,538-39 (1980) (colloquy between Representatives Hanley and
Spellman on H.R. 2255, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), a predecessor bill of Section 601,
confirming that H.R. 2255 would not prevent state savings banks from offering insurance
services in accordance with state law); accord id. at 14,536 (remarks of Representative
Vento, stating that H.R. 2255 "does not address itself to any other types of financial
institutions").
526. See Competition in Banking Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 39, S. 380 and H.R. 2255
before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Seas.
22 (1980) (colloquy between Governor J. Charles Partee of the FRB and Senator
Morgan).
527. See S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 30, at 36, 37, 38, 39 & 40, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3090, 3091, 3092, 3093-94 (each reference indicating that
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the states under Section 7 of the BHC Act.52 8
Other provisions of the Garn-St Germain Act, which amended the
BSC Act and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, provide further
evidence that Congress did not intend to restrict the authorized powers of
holding company-owned state banks or their operations subsidiaries. As
discussed above, Section 709 of the Garn-St Germain Act amended the
BSC Act to authorize one or more state banks to establish a BSC that
could provide all of the nondeposit services that its parent bank or banks
could provide under state law.529 There is no reference in the amended
BSC Act to any limitation on insurance activities of BSCs established by
holding company-owned state banks. Indeed, the BSC Act provides that
the authority of BSCs owned by state banks to engage in banking activi-
ties authorized by state law is a power that is independent of the author-
ity of BSCs to offer services permitted under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC
Act.53 ° Thus, the simultaneous enactment of Sections 601 and 709 of the
Garn-St Germain Act indicates that the limitations on insurance activi-
ties inserted by Section 601 into Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act were not
intended to apply to BSCs (i.e., operations subsidiaries) established by
holding company-owned banks.5 3 1
Similarly, the amendments made by Section 410 of the Garn-St
Germain Act to Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act show that Con-
gress generally viewed operations subsidiaries as part of their parent
banks.5 32 As already discussed, one of the modifications made by Section
410 was to provide, in general, that majority-owned subsidiaries of banks
would not be treated as "affiliates" of the bank for purposes of Section
Section 601 would apply only to bank holding companies and their "nonbank"
subsidiaries).
528. See id. at 41, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3095. For a
discussion of the intent of Section 7 of the BHC Act to preserve the regulatory authority
of the states over state-chartered banks,-see supra notes 496-503 and accompanying text.
529. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note 30, § 709, 96 Stat. 1540. For further dis-
cussion of the 1982 amendments to the BSC Act, see supra notes 252-61 and accompany-
ing text.
It is noteworthy that the 1982 amendments to the BSC Act were drafted by the leader-
ship of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in consultation
with the FRB. See 128 Cong. Rec. 25,131 (1982) (remarks of Senator Garn, quoting
letter from himself and Senator Riegle to Mr. L. Jenkins, President of the American
Bankers Ass'n). Thus, the FRB evidently had no objection to the new powers granted by
the 1982 amendments to BSCs owned by state banks.
530. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864(c) & (f) (1988).
531. Congress is presumed to enact statutes with knowledge of other legislation on the
same subject. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972). Accordingly,
the decision of Congress in 1982 to adopt language limiting the insurance activities of
bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, but not to include similar
language in the BSC Act, creates a presumption that Congress did not intend to restrict
any insurance activities of BSCs that are authorized for their parent banks. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987).
532. See Garn-St Germain Act, supra note 30, § 410, 96 Stat. 1469, 1515 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)).
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23A.5 33 In adopting this exemption, Congress determined that a major-
ity-owned subsidiary "should be regarded as part of its parent bank. '534
This determination provides further persuasive evidence that Congress
did not consider operations subsidiaries of holding company-owned
banks to be subject to the restrictions on insurance activities contained in
the 1982 amendments to Section 4(c)(8), because those restrictions were
applied only to bank holding companies and their nonbank
subsidiaries. 535
e. Unsuccessful Efforts Since 1982 to Restrict the Powers of Holding
Company-Owned State Banks and Their Subsidiaries
As described above, Congress has failed since 1982 to take definitive
action on proposals to amend federal laws relating to banking powers.
During that period, Congress has failed to adopt several proposals that
would have imposed permanent restrictions on the powers of holding
company-owned state banks and their subsidiaries.53 6 Congress was only
able to adopt, as part of CEBA, a temporary moratorium on federal
agency actions that would expand the securities, insurance or real estate
powers of bank holding companies or banks. This moratorium expired
on March 1, 1988, and Congress clearly stated that the moratorium
would have no effect thereafter on the preexisting powers of banking
organizations. 37
Congress' failure to act on proposals to restrict state bank powers is
particularly significant in light of the extensive attention given by Con-
533. For further discussion of the 1982 amendments to Section 23A, and the authority
reserved to the FRB to determine that a majority-owned subsidiary should be treated
under certain circumstances as an "affiliate" of its parent bank, see supra notes 392-400
and accompanying text.
534. S. Rep. No. 536, supra note 30, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News at 3085. As discussed supra at notes 407-408 and accompanying text, the
FRB ruled in 1970 that wholly-owned operations subsidiaries are not "affiliates" of their
parent bank for purposes of Section 23A, because these subsidiaries are equivalent to
"separately incorporated departments of the bank." 12 C.F.R. § 250.240 (1989).
In addition, when Congress amended Section 23A in 1982 to provide a general exemp-
tion for majority-owned subsidiaries of banks, Congress did so in accordance with recom-
mended legislation submitted by the FRB in October 1981. As part of this proposed
legislation, the FRB recommended that Congress generally exempt majority-owned sub-
sidiaries of banks from treatment as "affiliates" under Section 23A. The FRB advised
that such subsidiaries "should be considered part of the bank, much like departments
within the bank," and that transactions between a bank and its majority-owned subsidiar-
ies "should be viewed as essentially internal bank operations." Letter dated Oct. 2, 1981,
from Chairman Paul A. Volcker of the FRB to Senator Garn (on file at Fordham Law
Review).
535. For discussion of the intent of Congress to apply the 1982 amendments to Section
4(c)(8) only to bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries, see supra notes
525-528 and accompanying text.
536. See supra Parts II(C) & III(B).
537. For discussion of the temporary moratorium imposed under CEBA and its lack of
any long-term effect on the powers of banks and bank holding companies, see supra notes
182-184 and accompanying text.
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gress to the activities, especially in the area of insurance, conducted by
holding company-owned state banks and their subsidiaries. In 1984 and
again in 1988, Congress considered but failed to enact proposals that
would have imposed, at least to some degree, the restrictions contained in
Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act on the insurance activities of holding
company-owned banks and their subsidiaries. In each case, Congress
was informed of legal rulings by the FRB to the effect that holding com-
pany-owned state banks and their operations subsidiaries were not sub-
ject to Section 4(c)(8).538 The repeated failure of Congress to act in the
face of these FRB rulings provides compelling evidence that Congress
did not wish to subject such banks or subsidiaries to the prohibitions
contained in Section 4(a).5 39
A question remains whether activities of holding company-owned state
banks are exempt from Section 4 to the extent that a state law authorizes
a state bank to engage in a designated activity only through a subsidiary
and not directly.5" The FRB's regulation does not exempt a subsidiary
of a holding company-owned state bank from Section 4 unless the subsid-
iary is engaged in activities that the parent bank is authorized to conduct
directly and at the same locations.541
It could be argued that Section 4 was not intended to prohibit holding
company-owned state banks or their subsidiaries from engaging in bank-
ing activities authorized by state law, and that an activity specifically
authorized for a state bank still constitutes "banking" even if it must be
conducted through a subsidiary. Certain aspects of the legislative history
of the 1956 Act and the 1982 amendments might be read to support this
argument,542 while other aspects of the history of the 1970 and 1982
538. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 560, supra note 180, at 25-26, 59 (1984 committee report
noting, inter alia, that FRB regulation exempted operations subsidiaries of holding com-
pany-owned state banks from restrictions of Section 4); S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 23, at
35-37, 104-05 (1988 committee report noting, inter alia, 1987 FRB order holding that
Section 4 does not apply to holding company-owned banks); H.R. Rep. No. 822 (pt.1),
supra note 187, at 122-23, 164 (same).
In addition, Congress was fully informed of the controversy concerning the applicabil-
ity of Section 4 to holding company-owned banks when it decided in 1987 to impose only
a temporary moratorium under CEBA. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 19, supra note 182, at 16,
44, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 506, 534.
539. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 598-602 (1983) (inferring
congressional approval of agency ruling from congressional inaction in the face of sub-
stantial controversy over the ruling and repeated legislative proposals to reverse the rul-
ing); see also Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1283-84 (noting the significance of
Congress' failure to act with regard to the powers of holding company-owned state banks
following expiration of the CEBA moratorium).
540. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-193 (1989) (requiring bank underwriting of
securities to be conducted through a subsidiary); Ind. Code Ann. § 28-1-11-4(g) (West
Supp. 1989) (same).
541. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii) (1989).
542. As discussed supra at notes 491-495 and accompanying text, Congress was aware
in 1956 that state banks were engaged in various activities indirectly through subsidiaries,
and Congress indicated a general intent not to apply Section 4 to such subsidiaries. Also,
as discussed supra at notes 532-535 and accompanying text, Congress indicated in 1982
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amendments might be read to support the FRB's current regulation. 43
It would appear difficult, therefore, to establish that the FRB's current
regulation is contrary to clear congressional intent in exempting only
those subsidiary activities that can be conducted directly by the parent
bank under state law."4
3. Judicial Constructions of Section 4
In three cases, the courts have indicated approval of the FRB's posi-
tion that Section 4 of the BHC Act does not apply to the activities of
holding company-owned banks. The first two of these decisions ex-
pressed that approval only in dicta.4 More recently, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Merchants National specifically upheld an FRB order
permitting two holding company-owned state banks to engage in state-
authorized insurance activities that were not permitted to bank holding
companies. While the Second Circuit did not find that the language or
history of Section 4 expressed a clear congressional intent on the question
that a majority-owned subsidiary should generally be treated as a department of the par-
ent bank under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, and Congress did not limit such
treatment to only those subsidiaries carrying on activities that could be conducted di-
rectly by their parent banks.
543. As discussed supra at note 520 and accompanying text, Chairman Arthur Bums
of the FRB advised Congress in 1970 that Section 4 of the BHC Act did not apply to a
wholly-owned operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned bank. Chairman
Bums' statement did not make entirely clear that the FRB's 1968 ruling concerning oper-
ations subsidiaries applied only to activities that could be conducted directly by the parent
banks, although that condition might have been inferred from Chairman Bums' descrip-
tion of an operations subsidiary as a "separately incorporated department of the bank."
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 515, at 141. Also, as discussed supra at notes 254-258
and accompanying text, it appears that the 1982 amendments to the BSC Act authorize
BSCs owned by state banks to engage only in activities authorized by state law for the
parent banks themselves.
544. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984) (agency interpretation of its statutory mandate must be upheld unless
it is contrary to the clear intent of Congress).
545. In Cameron Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 497 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1974), the
Fourth Circuit upheld the FRB's determination that a holding company-owned bank was
not a "subsidiary" of the parent bank holding company for purposes of the "grandfather
proviso" of Section 4(a)(2). In the course of its decision, the court discussed, with evident
approval, the FRB's contention that the BHC Act "grant[ed] to the [FRB] authority to
regulate only the previously unregulated nonbanking subsidiaries" and, therefore, did not
affect the activities of "banking subsidiaries [that] were already regulated by [federal and
state] agencies other than the [FRB]." Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, in Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981), the
Supreme Court upheld an FRB ruling permitting bank holding companies and their non-
bank subsidiaries to act as investment advisers to closed-end investment companies. In
rejecting the ICI's argument that the ruling sought to confer unlawful powers upon hold-
ing company-owned banks, the Supreme Court declared that "the [FRB] does not have
the power to confer such authorization on banks." Id. at 59 n.25. The Court then quoted
with approval the FRB's statement that the operating authority of a holding company-
owned bank "would exist independently of the [FRB's] regulation and its scope is to be
determined by a particular bank's primary supervisory agency." Id.
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of whether Section 4 applies to holding company-owned banks, the court
determined that the FRB
has made a reasonable interpretation of section 4(a)(2), one that con-
fides decisions concerning the scope of insurance and other nonbank
activities of bank subsidiaries to their national and state chartering au-
thorities. If that interpretation is to be altered, Congress will have to
enact suitable legislation.
546
Having found that the FRB's construction of Section 4 was reasonable,
the Second Circuit considered itself obliged under Chevron to uphold the
FRB's decision." 7
While Merchants National affirmed the FRB's ruling that Section 4
does not apply to holding company-owned banks, there has been no de-
finitive judicial determination concerning the application of Section 4 to
operations subsidiaries of such banks. Two courts of appeal have ad-
dressed this issue, but neither court has resolved the question.
In AMBAC, the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed an OCC ruling
that allowed an operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned na-
tional bank to offer municipal bond insurance. The OCC ruled that mu-
nicipal bond insurance was an activity authorized for national banks and
therefore could be offered by an operations subsidiary without regard to
the insurance prohibitions contained in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC
Act.548 In its initial decision, the court agreed that municipal bond in-
surance was authorized for national banks.5 49 However, the court held
that this activity was subject to Section 4(c)(8) when conducted by an
operations subsidiary of a holding company-owned bank. In reaching
this conclusion, the court reasoned that an operations subsidiary of a
holding company-owned bank would be a nonbank subsidiary indirectly
owned by the parent bank holding company within the meaning of Sec-
tion 4(a). 550
The initial decision in AMBA C triggered considerable controversy
within the banking industry and led to petitions for rehearing by the
OCC and a coalition of banking industry groups.55 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit granted rehearing and vacated its initial holding concern-
546. Merchants National 890 F.2d at 1284.
547. See id. at 1280, 1284.
548. See AMBAC, 865 F.2d at 282-83, 285 (initial decision) (explaining OCC ruling).
549. See id. at 281-84.
550. See id. at 285-87. In concluding that an operations subsidiary of a holding com-
pany-owned national bank would be subject to Sections 4(a) and 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act,
the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the district court's holding that the operations
subsidiary was exempted under Section 4(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5), and the FRB's
regulations thereunder. See id. at 286-87.
551. See, e.g., id. at 279, 280 (noting briefs on rehearing fied on behalf of the OCC, the
American Bankers Ass'n, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the Independent
Bankers Ass'n of America); Fisher, supra note 427, at 318-22 (describing the controversy
created by the initial decision in AMBAC and noting (id. at 321-22 n.26) that the Ass'n of
Bank Holding Companies and the Consumer Bankers Ass'n joined the brief on rehearing
filed by the American Bankers Ass'n, et aL).
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ing the application of Section 4(c)(8) to operations subsidiaries of holding
company-owned national banks. The court concluded that it should not
have reached this issue in its review of the OCC's ruling, because the
OCC had no jurisdiction to determine the scope of the BHC Act and,
therefore, the issue should have been presented in the first instance to the
FRB.152 Thus, AMBAC did not resolve the operations subsidiary
question.
The Second Circuit considered the operations subsidiary issue in
Merchants National, with similarly inconclusive results, but with lan-
guage suggesting that the Second Circuit might not have agreed with the
District of Columbia Circuit's initial decision. In Merchants National
the Second Circuit took note of the FRB's argument that Section 4(a)
applies to the activities of operations subsidiaries of holding company-
owned state banks even though Section 4(a) does not apply to the same
activities when conducted by the banks themselves. As discussed above,
the Second Circuit found this "generation-skipping approach" to be
"perplexing" and "perhaps illogic[al]." 553 However, the Second Circuit
chose not to resolve the operations subsidiary question because it was not
directly presented by the FRB's order under review.55 4 Thus, resolution
of the operations subsidiary controversy awaits further action by Con-
gress or the courts.
V. CRITIQUES OF STATE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE POWERS
OF STATE BANKS UNDER THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
As shown above in Part IV, neither the FDIC nor the FRB has any
generalized authority to impose blanket prohibitions with regard to the
activities of state banks or their operations subsidiaries. Although Con-
gress could change this situation with preemptive legislation regarding
state bank powers, it has not chosen to do So.555
This Article has suggested that the~absence of general preemption with
respect to the powers of state banks provides significant benefits to our
banking system. As shown above, the competition among federal and
state regulators within the dual banking system has resulted in a substan-
tial degree of regulatory innovation and responsiveness to the needs of
the banking industry and consumers. 56 In addition, continued regula-
tory flexibility and experimentation at the state level is needed to provide
empirical evidence that could help resolve the current debate over the
552. AMBAC, 865 F.2d at 287-88 (decision on rehearing).
553. Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1282. For further discussion of the Second Cir-
cuit's comments on this issue, see supra notes 473-474 and accompanying text.
554. See Merchants National, 890 F.2d at 1282-83.
555. For a discussion of the failure of Congress to act on proposals to preempt state
law with respect to the securities, insurance, and real estate powers of state banks, see
supra Part III(B) and Part IV(C)(2)(e).
556. For a discussion of the benefits resulting from regulatory competition within the
dual banking system, see supra Part II(A)(2).
1990] 1239
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
desirability of expanded bank powers at the federal level." 7
The competitive dynamic inherent in the dual banking system would
probably be lost if Congress preempted the ability of states to confer
powers on state banks that are different from those permitted to national
banks under federal law. It is highly doubtful whether an effective dual
banking system could survive (at least with respect to large interstate
banking organizations) if states could no longer offer a chartering option
with favorable powers to offset the advantages of national uniformity in
supervision offered by the OCC.558 Therefore, this Article opposes any
broad-scale federal preemption with respect to state bank powers.
On the other hand, a number of commentators have criticized the cur-
rent state of the dual banking system, and most of them have called for
federal legislation removing the authority of states to grant broader pow-
ers to state banks than those available to national banks and bank hold-
ing companies. As discussed in Part V(A), the dominant theme of these
critics is that the dual banking system creates a dangerous "competition
in laxity" between federal and state regulators. In addition, as described
in Part V(B), Professors Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey have argued
that the current structure of the dual banking system should be discarded
because its alleged benefits in creating a competition between federal and
state regulators are illusory.5"9
In response to the first critique, Part V(A) demonstrates that the em-
pirical evidence does not support the existence of a "competition in lax-
ity" between federal and state banking regulators. In recent years, state
banks have consistently outperformed national banks in terms of average
capital ratios and average returns on assets and equity. In addition, the
recent bank failure rate has been lower for state banks than for national
banks. There has been no evidence to date of generalized safety and
soundness problems resulting from the exercise of expanded securities,
insurance or real estate powers by state banks. These facts suggest that
the states have not abandoned traditional concerns of safety and sound-
ness in regulating banks. Moreover, because of significant differences in
the federal and state regulatory systems for banks and thrifts, the wide-
spread abuses of liberal powers by state-chartered thrifts in certain states,
particularly Texas and California, are not comparable to the more con-
trolled exercise of state powers by state banks.
557. For further discussion of the suggestion that state experimentation with bank
powers is likely to provide helpful experimental models for federal reform of bank regula-
tion, see supra text accompanying notes 73-78 & 97-104; State Regulation of Banks, supra
note 90, at 5-6, 26.
558. See State Regulation of Banks, supra note 90, at 6, 27; cf. Bell & Wilmarth, supra
note 87, at 732-33 (contending that federal repeal of the McFadden Act and permission
of unlimited interstate branching of banks would effectively destroy the dual banking
system, because large multistate banks would prefer "unitary supervision under national
charter" over "fragmented supervision under state charter," and only "smaller, localized
banks" would choose state charters).
559. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, passim.
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Part V(A) also reviews the literature which has rejected the "competi-
tion in laxity" argument as applied to state chartering of corporations.
While there are significant differences between the chartering and regula-
tory systems applicable to corporations and banks, there are also impor-
tant similarities that have become more prominent in recent years. The
analogy to corporate chartering suggests that the ability of states to de-
termine the powers of state banks should not result in a destructive
"competition in laxity" so long as state banks are required to maintain
substantial levels of capital.
Part V(B) shows that the critique of the dual banking system by
Professors Butler and Macey overlooks the significant competition that
has occurred between federal and state banking agencies and has resulted
in substantial and beneficial innovations in our banking system. More-
over, the most practicable alternative suggested by Butler and Macey is a
unitary system of federal regulation, which would remove all supervisory
competition from our banking system.
A. The "Competition in Laxity" Critique
Several commentators have asserted that the dual banking system cre-
ates a destructive "competition in laxity" between federal and state regu-
lators that encourages regulators to neglect safety and soundness
concerns in order to build their regulated constituencies." 6 Recently,
three members of the law and economics movement have modified the
"competition in laxity" critique by contending that the dual banking sys-
tem creates "moral hazard" with regard to the states. According to these
critics, "moral hazard" in state banking regulation results from the in-
surance of state bank deposits by the FDIC. These critics point out that
losses from state bank failures caused by high-risk activities are borne by
the entire nation through the federal deposit insurance system, while any
benefits of such activities (such as through the creation of additional jobs
and business revenue) generally accrue to the particular states that au-
thorize the activities in order to encourage the chartering or expansion of
state banks. Thus, it is contended, the ability of states to impose the cost
of bank failures on the federal deposit insurance system creates a per-
verse incentive for the states to approve unsafe and unsound banking
powers.5 6
1
560. See, e.g., Address of Oct. 21, 1974 by Chairman Arthur Burns of the FRB, quoted
in Scott, supra note 8, at 13; see also Fein, The Fragmented Depository Institutions System:
A Case for Unification, 29 Am. U.L. Rev. 633, 675-76, 698-700 (1980) (restating competi-
tion in laxity argument and calling for an end to the dual banking system); Scott, supra
note 8, at 12 (quoting 1963 congressional testimony by Governor J. L. Robertson of the
FRB, stating that the dual banking system creates "a dangerous tendency toward a 'race
of laxity' in bank supervision").
561. For criticism of the dual banking system based on "moral hazard" concerns, see
Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 680, 696, 712-13; Miller, supra note 19, at 18-19. As
explained in Miller, supra note 19, at 18-19, "moral hazard" is a concept used by econo-
mists to describe a situation in which a person fails to take adequate precautions against
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Other commentators have rejected the contention that the dual bank-
ing system results in a competition among regulators to provide lenient
and negligent supervision.56 2 Indeed, the "competition in laxity" argu-
ment overlooks the strong incentive of both elected public officials and
appointed bank regulators to avoid bank failures. Bank failures cause
considerable market disruption and public inconvenience in the affected
communities, and such failures can injure the entire financial system if
they evolve into a generalized run on banks.563 Therefore, elected offi-
cials and bank regulators understandably have a strong desire to avoid
bank failures and to refrain from regulatory measures that would sub-
stantially increase the risk of such failures. 5" Moreover, because elected
officials and even appointed bank regulators are subject to political pres-
sures, they have a significant personal stake in avoiding the political con-
sequences that are likely to flow from a public perception that their
negligence or poor judgment contributed to a series of bank failures. 6 5
The empirical evidence on state bank performance supports the view
that the states have generally maintained good regulatory standards with
regard to banks. Over the past six years, the capital ratios, financial re-
sults, and failure rates have been significantly more favorable for state
banks than for national banks. For example, during the six-year period
ended December 31, 1989, the average capital ratio was consistently
higher for state banks than for national banks, and the average annual
the threat of injury resulting from his or her actions, because that person knows that
another person will bear all or most of the cost of the potential injury if it occurs.
562. For commentaries rejecting the "competition in laxity" argument with respect to
the dual banking system, see Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 276-78; Fischel,
Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 16, at 335-36; Frankel, supra note 90, at 258-61.
563. For discussions of the costs of bank failures and bank runs, see Fischel, Rosenfield
& Stillman, supra note 15, at 310-12; Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Deposi-
tors to Control Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. Reg. 129, 160-63 (1986); Murton, Bank Intermedia-
tion, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance, 2 FDIC Banking Rev. No. 1, Spring/Summer
1989, at 1, 3-4, 7.
564. For discussions of the desire of bank regulators to avoid bank failures, see 1989
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 213, 214 (testimony on behalf of CSBS by Jill M. Consi-
dine, Superintendent of Banks for New York); W. Brown, supra note 90, at 38, 40; Gar-
ten, supra note 5, at 519-21.
565. For example, the collapse in 1985 of the private insurance system for state-
chartered thrifts in Maryland, and the resulting state-imposed freeze on the deposits of
failed institutions for up to four years, effectively destroyed the political career of then-
Governor Harry Hughes. See Walsh, Maryland Near End of Chapter in S&L Crisis,
Wash. Post, Wash. Bus. section, June 26, 1989, at 1, 32. Similarly, Richard Doby, the
state banking commissioner for Colorado, was pressured into resigning in 1988 following
an outside audit of the state banking department. This audit was triggered by the col-
lapse of the private insurance system for state-chartered industrial banks in Colorado.
The audit concluded that the failure of Mr. Doby's department "to take timely corrective
action" contributed to the failure of several industrial banks and the resulting insolvency
of the insurance fund. See 50 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 950, 950-51 (June 6, 1988).
At the federal level, intense congressional pressure, based on allegations of mismanage-
ment arising out of the FSLIC crisis, led to the resignation of M. Danny Wall as Director
of the Office of Thrift Supervision on December 4, 1989. See 53 Banking Rep. (BNA)
885 (Dec. 11, 1989).
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returns on assets and equity were generally higher for state banks.166
During the same period, the rate of state bank failures as a percentage of
state banks was higher than the comparable rate for national banks in
1984 and 1985, about the same in 1986, slightly less in 1987 and substan-
tially less in 1988 and 1989.567
Even in Texas, where a majority of the nation's bank failures occurred
in 1988 and 1989, the failure rate for state banks has been lower than that
of national banks, the average capital ratio for state banks is higher than
that for national banks, and the percentage of nonperforming loans for
state banks is lower than that for national banks. 68
The foregoing data would suggest that the state banking system is, if
anything, less risky than the national banking system. In addition, the
evidence to date has not identified any general threat to bank safety or
soundness resulting from the use by state banks of expanded powers
under state law. 69 It is noteworthy that the high rate of bank failures in
Texas has not resulted from the exercise by Texas banks of insurance
underwriting or real estate investment or development powers, because
566. From 1984 through 1989, the average capital ratio for state banks exceeded that
for national banks in every year, the return on assets for state banks exceeded that for
national banks in every year except 1989, and the return on equity for state banks ex-
ceeded that for national banks in every year except 1988 and 1989. See State of the State
Banking System 1989, supra note 39, at 6-7; State of the State Banking System 1988, at 5-
6, reprinted in 1989 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 301, 306-07.
567. See State of the State Banking System 1988, supra note 566, at 6, reprinted in 1989
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 307; State of the State Banking System 1989, supra note
39, at 8.
568. As of June 30, 1989, there were 656 state banks and 754 national banks in Texas.
From January 1, 1988 through August 31, 1989, 82 state banks failed compared to 140
national banks. During the same period, the number of failed banks in Texas (222) repre-
sented more than 60 percent of the total number of failed banks in the United States
(351). As of June 30, 1989, the average capital ratio (Le., total equity divided by total
assets) was 7.3 percent for Texas state banks compared to 4.2 percent for Texas national
banks, and the average ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans was 4.7 percent for
Texas state banks compared to 7.4 percent for Texas national banks. See Oversight Hear-
ings on the Condition of the Banking System: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter 1989
Senate Hearings] at 261, 262 (Exhibits II and III to testimony of Kenneth W. Littlefield,
Texas Banking Commissioner).
569. For discussion of the FDIC's view that expanded powers of state banks in the
securities, insurance and real estate areas have not led to generalized safety and sound-
ness problems, see supra notes 167, 175 & 242 and accompanying text; see also 135 Cong.
Rec. S 4120 (daily ed. April 18, 1989) (remarks of Senator Cranston, reporting absence of
any problems resulting from use by California state banks of limited real estate invest-
ment powers under state law); id. at S 4294 (daily ed. April 19, 1989) (remarks of Senator
Robb, reporting profitable and safe exercise of real estate investment powers by state-
chartered savings banks in several Northeastern states); 1987 House Hearings, supra note
17, at 64, 552 (testimony of George D. Gould, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Fi-
nance, noting absence of any safety and soundness concerns resulting from the exercise of
state-authorized securities powers by state nonmember banks); id. at 420 (reprinting arti-
cle from California Banker newsletter of Oct. 1987, reporting lack of problems resulting
from exercise by California 'state banks of limited real estate investment powers).
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Texas does not authorize such powers for banks.57 0 Instead, bank fail-
ures in Texas have been caused primarily by an excessive concentration
of bank assets in commercial loans related to real estate and energy ven-
tures. This lack of diversification in bank assets left Texas banks heavily
exposed to losses when the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s led to a
prolonged slump in the overbuilt residential and commercial real estate
markets.571
A possible explanation for the absence of serious problems resulting
from involvement of state banks in expanded powers is that many states
have imposed prudential limits on the exercise of these powers. For ex-
ample, some states have required such activities to be conducted through
a subsidiary of the bank, and many states have limited bank involvement
in such activities to a specified percentage of a participating bank's assets,
deposits or capital. 572 These prudential restraints on state bank powers
stand in sharp contrast to the situation with state-chartered thrifts in
California and Texas, where those states failed to impose meaningful re-
strictions on commercial real estate loans or real estate development ac-
tivities by thrifts.573  Texas and California accounted for fifty-four
570. See CSBS Detailed Survey, supra note 203, Appendices 2-4 (indicating that Texas
state banks do not have authority to engage in insurance underwriting or real estate in-
vestment or development); CSBS Summary Survey, supra note 203 (same); Saulsbury,
supra note 204, at 6 (Table 1) (same).
571. Between 1982 and 1987, Texas banks increased the percentage of real estate-re-
lated loans in their portfolios from 23 percent to 40 percent. Two-thirds of these real
estate-related loans were commercial real estate loans. Nonperforming real estate loans
and real estate held under foreclosure accounted for three-fourths of the nonperforming
assets of Texas banks in September 1989. Texas banks also held high concentrations of
energy-related loans. See 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 568, at 9-10 (testimony of
Texas Banking Commissioner Kenneth W. Littlefield). Other factors contributing to
Texas bank failures were (i) the rapid increase in the number of chartered banks in Texas
from 1,336 in 1975 to 1,936 in 1985, which resulted in a larger number of banks that had
at best only marginal profitability; (ii) excessive borrowing by bank holding companies
and individuals in order to purchase bank stock, thereby leaving bank owners unable to
infuse additional capital to assist their banks in times of crisis; (iii) fraud and mismanage-
ment by bank insiders; (iv) inadequate discipline of bank management by shareholders
and outside auditors; and (v) inadequate supervision by federal and state banking authori-
ties. See id. at 8-14.
572. For discussion of the restraints imposed by a number of states or state bank in-
volvement in securities, insurance and real estate activities, see supra notes 206-08, 211-12
& 218-19 and accompanying text.
573. See, e.g., N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong: A Look at the
Causes Behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s, at 58-64 (1988) (describing liberal
state laws in California and Texas which placed no effective limits on the involvement of
state-chartered thrifts in commercial real estate lending or real estate development); 135
Cong. Rec. H 2558 (daily ed. June 14, 1989) (remarks of Representative Wolpe, declaring
that no effective limitations were placed on the activities of Texas state-chartered thrifts);
1987 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 420 (reprint of article from California Banker
newsletter of Oct. 1987, contrasting California state law limiting real estate investments
by state banks to 10 percent of assets or 100 percent of equity, with California regulatory
practice allowing state-chartered thrifts to invest up to 100 percent of their assets in real
estate projects).
For example, during 1988 and 1989, only one small California state bank failed, and
1244 [Vol. 58
1990] STATE BANK POWERS 1245
percent of the resolution costs for failed thrifts in 1987 and nearly eighty
percent of such costs in 1988, and these states are expected to be respon-
sible for at least a majority of the future thrift resolution costs to be in-
curred by the RTC. 74
There are at least three other significant reasons explaining why the
massive wave of failures that swept over the thrift industry has not been
experienced by state banks engaged in securities, insurance or real estate
activities. First, as noted above, state banks have consistently maintained
a higher average capital ratio than national banks and a much higher
average capital ratio than thrifts. 75 It is generally agreed that bank capi-
tal plays a crucial role in providing a "cushion" to absorb operating
losses and in disciplining the conduct of bank managers and owners who
realize that funds of their own are at risk. 76 In the case of most state
banks, there has been a significant amount of capital representing share-
251 out of 267 state banks in California were profitable in 1989. California only permits
state banks that are rated in the top two categories of the FDIC's five-tier bank safety
rating (CAMEL) system to invest in real estate, and the state banking department closely
monitors these investments. See Statement of James E. Gilleran, California Superinten-
dent of Banks, before the House Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regu-
lation and Insurance on April 4, 1990, at 1-2, 6 (on file at Fordham Law Review); 1989
Senate Hearings, supra note 568, at 131-33 (testimony of Mr. Gilleran). In contrast, 18
thrift institutions failed in California in 1988 alone, in part because of the state's failure to
restrict and prudently supervise thrift real estate investment activities. See 135 Cong.
Rec. S 4298, S 4300 (daily ed. April 19, 1989) (remarks of Senator Moynihan); 1989
Senate Hearings, supra note 568, at 133 (colloquy between Senator Riegle and Mr.
Gilleran).
574. See H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 297, 518 (additional views of
Representative Kanjorski, et al.), reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
93, 312; 135 Cong. Rec. S 4298 (daily ed. April 19, 1989) (remarks of Senator Moyni-
han); id. at H 2557-58 (daily ed. June 14, 1989) (remarks of Representative Wolpe).
575. During the years 1984 to 1989, state banks maintained an average capital ratio
ranging between 6.39 percent (in 1984) and 6.99 percent (in 1989). In each year, as
indicated supra in note 566, the state banks' average ratio was higher than that of na-
tional banks. See State of the State Banking System 1989, supra note 39, at 6; State of the
State Banking System 1988, supra note 566, at 5, reprinted in 1989 House Hearings, supra
note 5, at 306.
In contrast, as of September 30, 1988, the average net worth for all FSLIC-insured
thrifts was only 3.1 percent. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (H.R. 1278), Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 1) 224 (1989) (testimony of M. Danny Wall,
Chairman of the FHLBB) (Table 2). The thrift industry's capital was further depleted by
an aggregate net loss of $19.2 billion during 1989. See Thrift Industry Posts Record Loss
of $19.2 Billion for 1989, OTS Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) 575 (Apr. 2, 1990).
576. For discussion of the importance of bank capital in providing a "cushion" against
losses and in restraining bank managers and owners from engaging in unduly risky be-
havior, see Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 177; R. Litan, supra note 15, at
156-57; H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 541-43 (supplemental views on capi-
tal standards), reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 337-39; 135 Cong.
Rec. S 3999 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989) (remarks of Senator Garn); id. at H 2559 (daily ed.
June 14, 1989) (remarks of Representative Wylie); id. at H 2561 (remarks of Representa-
tive Roukema).
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holder investment risk and, therefore, substantial incentive for share-
holder discipline of bank managers.
In contrast, the FHLBB and FSLIC permitted hundreds of insolvent
or undercapitalized thrifts to remain in operation by adopting lenient
capital standards, regulatory accounting principles and capital forbear-
ance programs.5 77 In fact, the thrift industry as a whole was already
insolvent on a market value basis in 1981, before Congress and the states
liberalized thrift powers. This insolvency resulted from the thrift indus-
try's historic concentration of assets in fixed-rate home mortgages and
the resulting mismatch between the industry's long-term mortgage assets
and short-term deposit liabilities. When inflation and deposit interest
rates increased substantially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the cost of
thrift liabilities soared but most thrift institutions were unable to rede-
ploy their assets in higher-yielding investments. Consequently, the thrift
industry's total capital was exhausted by 1981. The banking industry, by
comparison, had a shorter-term and more diversified asset portfolio and
therefore did not suffer the tremendous losses and capital drain incurred
by the thrifts.578
Rather than facing the thrift problem squarely, Congress (in response
to political pressures from the thrift industry) decided to let the industry
try to "grow out of [its] problems" 579 by granting broader (and more
risky) powers under the Garn-St Germain Act. The states soon followed
suit with their own expanded powers.5 8° The problem was that many of
the thrifts exercising these increased powers had little or no capital at
risk. These insolvent or undercapitalized thrifts had no incentive to re-
frain from excessively risky activities because their owners stood to reap
all gains and knew that the FSLIC insurance fund would bear any
losses.581
Second, Congress failed until 1989 to provide funds sufficient to enable
the federal regulators to close down more than a small percentage of the
insolvent thrifts. A $15 billion recapitalization plan for the FSLIC was
577. For discussion of the adverse impact of lax capital standards and regulatory leni-
ency by the FHLBB and FSLIC, see H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 297-98,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 93-94; 135 Cong. Rec. H 2561-62
(June 14, 1989) (remarks of Representative Roukema); id. at H 2588 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Cooper); N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 573, at 14-16, 30-33, 37-38, 147-51;
Scott, Never Again: The S & L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. Law. 1883, 1888-89 (1990).
578. See Scott, supra note 577, at 1885-87.
579. N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 573, at 31.
580. See Scott, supra note 577, at 1888-90; N. Strunk & F. Case, supra note 573, at 30-
38, 54-66.
581. For discussion of the perverse incentives faced by owners and managers of insol-
vent or undercapitalized thrifts, see R. Litan, supra note 15, at 111 (stating that "the
moral hazard features of deposit insurance act most perversely for institutions that are
near failure"); H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 541 (supplemental views on
capital standards, quoting testimony by Comptroller General Bowsher), reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 337; 135 Cong. Rec. S 3999 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989)
(remarks of Senator Garn).
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defeated by the House in 1986, and only $10.8 billion was approved
under CEBA in 1987, largely because of political pressure brought by
members of the thrift industry to forestall receivership and liquidation
proceedings by the FSLIC.58 In contrast, the FDIC's deposit insurance
fund for banks, while strained by the large number of recent bank fail-
ures, has remained sufficient to allow the FDIC generally to take timely
action with respect to failing or failed banks.583 The ability of the
FHLBB and FSLIC to respond to the thrift crisis was further hampered
when several members of Congress intervened to stop FHLBB or FSLIC
enforcement proceedings against large failing thrifts.584
582. For information relating to the failure of Congress to provide adequate funds to
the FSLIC in 1986 and 1987, see 47 Wash. Financial Rep. (BNA) 531, 575, 659 (1986)
(reporting that 1986 bill to recapitalize FSLIC failed to pass House, and that House
action was delayed by House Speaker Jim Wright until FHLBB provided assurances that
new funds would not be used by FSLIC to close down Texas thrifts); H.R. Rep. No. 261,
supra note 184, at 155, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 624 (recapi-
talization of FSLIC under CEBA limited to $10.825 billion, with not more than $3.75
billion to be authorized in any one year); 135 Cong. Rec. S 3998 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989)
(remarks of Senator Garn); id. at S 4003 (remarks of Senator Wirth); id. at S 4105 (daily
ed. Apr. 18, 1989) (remarks of Senator Garn); id. at S 4289 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989)
(remarks of Senator Dole); id. at H 2588 (daily ed. June 14, 1989) (remarks of Represen-
tative Cooper).
583. In 1988 and 1989, the FDIC's insurance fund for bank deposits suffered losses of
$4.3 billion and $851 million, respectively. As a result, the size of the fund decreased
from $18.4 billion as of the end of 1987 to $13.2 billion as of the end of 1989. The FDIC
has indicated that the fund will not experience further losses in 1990 unless there are
unexpected failures involving large banks. See BIF's Reserves Drop to $13.2 Billion, Fund
Experiences Second Operating Loss, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 899 (May 28,
1990).
For recent statements confirming the adequacy of the FDIC's deposit insurance fund
to meet the current and anticipated future costs of bank failures, see 1989 House Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 7, 153 (testimony of Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC);
id. at 178-79 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency); id. at 45-46,
224-30 (testimony of Robert W. Gramling of the General Accounting Office).
Three economists have recently contended that the FDIC's fund is inadequate, and
that the FDIC is deliberately permitting insolvent or failing banks to continue in opera-
tion. See id. at 236-42 (testimony of R. Dan Brumbaugh and Robert Litan); id. at 315-17
(letter to Representative Annunzio from Messrs. Brumbaugh & Litan); Brumbaugh,
Carron & Litan, Cleaning Up the Depository Institutions Mess, reprinted in 1989 House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 247, 254-61. For a subsequent critique of the analysis of these
economists, arguing that they have overstated the FDIC's current exposure to failing
banks and ignored the FDIC's ability to restore its fund based on the increase in bank
deposit insurance premiums mandated by FIRREA, see Isaac & Marino, The FDIC's
Bank Insurance Fund: Its Future Prospects, 8 Banking Expansion Rep. No. 22 at 1, 8-12
(Nov. 20, 1989).
[Editors' Note: On July 31, 1990, Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC pre-
dicted that BIF, the FDIC's insurance fund for bank deposits, would decline by as much
as $2 billion during 1990. Seidman Predicts $2 Billion Loss for BIF, Recommends Insur-
ance Reforms, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 211 (Aug. 6, 1990). On August 14,
1990, the FDIC proposed to increase deposit insurance premiums for BIF-insured banks
from the current rate of 12 cents to 19.5 cents per $100 of deposits, effective January 1,
1991, in order to replenish the BIF. FDIC Cites Economic Stress in Proposel to Raise
Bank Deposit Insurance Premiums, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 285 (Aug. 20,
1990).
584. For newspaper articles discussing alleged examples of interference by members of
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Third, it was widely perceived that the management authority of the
FHLBB over the FSLIC created an inherent conflict of interest between
the FHLBB's dual roles as chartering and insuring authority for the
thrift industry. As a result, the FHLBB was biased by a desire to pro-
mote the thrift industry and, therefore, was reluctant to allow the FSLIC
to close down failing thrifts. 85 In contrast, the FDIC has maintained a
separate and independent status and has not been subject to undue influ-
ence from the federal or state bank chartering agencies. 86
Thus, there are significant differences between the regulatory systems
for thrifts and banks which caution against any automatic assumption
that the involvement of state banks in securities, insurance or real estate
powers will lead to a repetition of the thrift debacle. In the absence of
substantial evidence indicating that the safety or soundness of state banks
has actually been threatened by expanded powers or regulatory laxity,587
it would be unfortunate if Congress reacted to the thrift crisis by fore-
closing promising innovations by the states with respect to bank powers.
It is also noteworthy that a similar "competition in laxity" argument
has been advanced and substantially discredited with regard to state
competition in the chartering of corporations.588 The most persuasive
Congress in FHLBB and FSLIC enforcement proceedings, see Atkinson & Maraniss,
Wright Locks Horns with "Gray the Re-Regulator", Wash. Post, June 17, 1989, at A16,
col. 1 (describing alleged pressure by House Speaker Jim Wright to persuade the FHLBB
to halt enforcement efforts against Texas thrifts); Atkinson & Maraniss, Putting the Ham-
mer to Lone Star Thrifts, Wash. Post, June 15, 1989, at Al, col. I (describing alleged
enlistment by Texas thrifts of Speaker Wright to resist FHLBB enforcement efforts); Bab-
cock, 5 Senators and a Failed S & L, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 2 (describing
alleged pressure by Senators Cranston, DeConcini, Glenn, McCain, and Riegle to per-
suade the FHLBB to relax supervisory measures against Charles H. Keating Jr. and Lin-
coln Savings and Loan Ass'n); Jackson, Sleeping Watchdog: How Regulatory Error Led
to the Disaster at Lincoln Savings, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (same).
585. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 54 (pt. 1), supra note 190, at 302, 310, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 98, 106; 135 Cong. Rec. S 3995 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1989) (remarks of Senator Riegle); id. at S 4113 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1989) (remarks of
Senator Sasser); id. at S 4240 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (remarks of Senator Graham); see
also Day, Is Tangled System Part of S & L Woes?, Wash. Post, Sept. 25, 1988, at HI, col.
4 (contending that structure of FHLBB and Federal Home Loan Bank System created
inherent conflicts of interest and made possible undue influence on regulators by the thrift
industry).
586. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Ree. S 4240 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (remarks of Senator
Graham); 1989 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 186-87 (testimony of Robert L. Clarke,
Comptroller of the Currency); id. at 215-16 (testimony on behalf of CSBS by Jill M.
Considine, New York Superintendent of Banks).
587. A further indication that the states have not been guilty of regulatory laxity with
respect to banks is that the FDIC, in its regulation of state nonmember banks, is increas-
ing its reliance on examination reports prepared by the state supervisory agencies. See
1989 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 160-62, 164 (testimony of Chairman L. William
Seidman of the FDIC); id. at 216 (testimony on behalf of CSBS by Jill M. Considine,
New York Superintendent of Banks).
588. The classic "race for the bottom" argument with respect to state competition in
corporate chartering was made in Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 705 (1974). For critical responses to Cary's argument, see,
e.g., Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
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response to the argument in the corporate chartering context is that the
securities markets discourage states from authorizing excessively risky
powers for corporations. If State A permits its corporations to engage in
high-risk activities, corporations that do so imprudently are likely to fail.
Over time the markets will recognize the higher failure rate of corpora-
tions incorporated in State A, and investors will demand higher returns
before investing in corporations chartered by State A. This investor re-
sponse will place corporations chartered in State A at a competitive dis-
advantage in competing for capital investment with corporations
chartered in a state with a lower risk profile in relation to corporate earn-
ings. In an extreme case, corporations chartered in State A will
reincorporate to a more favorable state unless State A changes its corpo-
rate laws.589
Thus, investor discipline places a significant restraint on the desire of
states to compete for corporate charters by granting risky new powers.
Of course, the analogy between state chartering of corporations and state
chartering of banks is only an approximate one. The granting of bank
charters is restricted by several criteria (such as safety and soundness,
and the convenience and needs of the community to be served) that do
not apply to corporate charters. In addition, a bank can generally carry
on a deposit-taking business in only one state because of federal and state
prohibitions against interstate branching.590
However, as discussed above, nearly all states allow acquisitions of lo-
cal banks by out-of-state bank holding companies under certain condi-
tions, and individuals can also own banks in different states. 591
Accordingly, multistate bank holding companies and individuals do have
a wide range of choices in deciding where to acquire a subsidiary bank.
Moreover, the states are increasingly competing with one another in at-
tracting entry by out-of-state bank holding companies, and the granting
of expanded powers to state banks is an important part of this competi-
Legal Stud. 251 (1977); Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 709, 752-53 (1987) (taking a position between Cary and Winter but "closer"
to Winter in view of "the important advantages derived from having a federal system");
see also Fisehel, Rosenfeld & Stillman, supra note 16, at 335 n.99 (contending that Cary's
argument "has now been discredited both theoretically and empirically").
589. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp., v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496,
507-08 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989); Fisehel, From
MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, The Williams Act, The Commerce Clause,
and Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 84-85; Romano, supra note 588, at 711-12,
717-20, 752-53 (acknowledging merit in Winter's argument, but noting that Winter relies
on debatable theory that markets are efficient in pricing shares and understates transac-
tion costs involved in reincorporation); Winter, supra note 588, passim.
590. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 686-88; Miller, supra note 19, at 15.
591. For a discussion of state laws permitting acquisitions of local banks by out-of-
state bank holding companies, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Individuals
or groups of individuals may own a "chain" of banks located in more than one state
without regard to the BHC Act's restrictions on interstate ownership of banks by bank
holding companies, as long as the individual owners are not deemed to be a "company"
as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b). E. Symons & J. White, supra note 79, at 44.
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tion.59 2 Thus, it appears that a meaningful competition between states in
bank chartering is already occurring.
As in the case of corporate chartering, investor discipline could play a
substantial role in restraining state competition in bank chartering, pro-
vided that state banks are required to maintain substantial amounts of
equity capital. When a bank fails, the FDIC rescues the depositors but
generally the shareholders lose most or all of their investment. There-
fore, the securities markets should have an incentive to identify those
states that create a greater probability of bank failure by granting exces-
sively risky powers to state banks. Shareholders should refrain from in-
vesting in banks chartered in those states unless premium returns are
offered. And if the risks of failure exceed the likely returns from the
expanded activities, banks chartered in a state with high-risk powers
should be placed at a competitive disadvantage in competing for capital
with banks chartered in lower-risk states.593
In sum, over the longer term, investor discipline should help to re-
strain the states in granting higher-risk powers to state banks. Of course,
the presence of federal deposit insurance requires appropriate supervi-
sory vigilance, at both the federal and state levels, to ensure that under-
capitalized state banks are not tempted to gamble with risky powers over
the short term at the expense of the FDIC's fund. But corporate theory,
like the available evidence, suggests that state experimentation with ex-
panded bank powers is not likely to result in a competition in laxity,
provided that prudent capital standards and regulatory oversight are
maintained.
B. The "Myth of Competition" Critique
Professors Butler and Macey have denied the existence of any mean-
ingful regulatory competition within the dual banking system. They con-
tend that federal preemption and the competitive equality doctrine 94
592. See, e.g., State Regulation of Banks, supra note 90, at 17-18; Delaware Passes Bill
to Let Banks Sell, Underwrite Insurance Nationwide, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at
905 (May 28, 1990) (new Delaware law allowing banks to engage in nationwide insur-
ance business was promoted as "an economic development measure" that would en-
courage out-of-state bank holding companies to establish new banks in Delaware, thereby
increasing state jobs and tax revenues).
593. For discussion of the substantial or complete investment loss generally exper-
ienced by bank shareholders when the FDIC rescues a failing bank, see, for example 1987
Senate Hearings, supra note 63, at 316 (testimony of Chairman L. William Seidman of
the FDIC); Corrigan, A Perspective on Recent Financial Disruptions, Q. Rev., Fed. Res.
Bank of N.Y., Winter 1989-90, at 8, 12-13. For a discussion of empirical studies indicat-
ing that securities analysts and bank shareholders do exert market discipline on bank
managers based on publicly-available information, see Garten, Banking On the Market:
Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. Reg. 129, 143-45 (1988).
594. As explained supra in note 110, and infra at notes 613-20 and accompanying text,
the Supreme Court and other courts have applied the principle of "competitive equality"
between national banks and state banks in determining the extent to which national
banks may branch under the McFadden Act.
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stifle any possibility for regulatory innovation by the states. In addition,
they maintain that the federal and state banking regulators have actually
cooperated in maintaining anticompetitive barriers to bank entry and ge-
ographic expansion.5 95 They therefore dismiss, as a "myth," the argu-
ment that "effective competition exists in the dual banking system., 596
The "myth of competition" critique is contrary to much of the histori-
cal and current evidence discussed above. Butler and Macey consistently
understate the amount of regulatory innovation that has occurred in the
dual banking system. They acknowledge, for example, that the success-
ful introduction of NOW accounts by several states led to federal author-
ization of these accounts for all depository institutions,5 97 but they
overlook many other banking innovations that have been pioneered by
the states. 98
Moreover, Butler and Macey make little or no reference to the fact
that the states have taken significant initiatives in permitting interstate
acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies and in authorizing new
powers for state banks.5 9 9 As described above, these state initiatives have
been especially noteworthy in comparison to the relative inaction by
Congress.' In addition, as shown above, state adoption of laws permit-
ting interstate acquisitions and expanded powers has created a substan-
tial competition among states in granting bank charters to multistate
bank holding companies." °
Butler and Macey also overstate the degree of federal preemption in
banking regulation. To be sure, federal preemption has increased in re-
cent years, most notably in 1980 when Congress extended reserve re-
quirements to all depository institutions. 2 However, Butler and Macey
exaggerate the amount of preemption accomplished by other federal stat-
595. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 678-80, 683-710.
596. Id. at 712.
597. See id. at 688 n.49. For discussion of the federal response to the state introduc-
tion of NOW accounts, see supra notes 99 & 101 and accompanying text.
598. For numerous examples of new banking products or regulatory approaches that
the states have introduced, see supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
599. For discussion of state laws permitting interstate acquisitions of banks by bank
holding companies, see supra notes 38-40, 100 & 102 and accompanying text. For discus-
sion of state laws authorizing state banks to engage in securities, insurance and real estate
activities, see supra Part II(D).
600. For discussion of the failure of Congress to allow new geographic expansion op-
portunities for banking organizations, see supra notes 87 & 102 and accompanying text.
For discussion of the failure of Congress to authorize new bank powers, see supra Part
II(C).
601. For a discussion of the growing competition among states in attracting entry by
out-of-state bank holding companies, see supra notes 591-92 and accompanying text.
Butler and Macey reject any analogy between state competition in corporate chartering
and the dual banking system. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 686-89. Yet they
admit that Delaware and South Dakota have successfully attracted entry by out-of-state
bank holding companies for the purpose of establishing credit card banks. Butler and
Macey further concede that the actions of states like Delaware and South Dakota are
likely to exert competitive pressure on other states. See id. at 689 n.52.
602. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 693-96 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1988)).
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utes. For example, they point out that Section 103 of CEBA for the first
time applied Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act to state non-
member banks.60 3 They neglect to add, however, that these provisions
enacted only a temporary moratorium that expired on March 1, 1988.6'
Similarly, Butler and Macey claim that the BHC Act "grants the
[FRB] complete control over the definition of the activities that a bank
holding company's subsidiaries may conduct."6 "5 They specifically as-
sert that the BHC Act "impos[es] activity restrictions on state banks"
that are owned by bank holding companies.60 6 As demonstrated above,
however, the FRB does not have general authority under the BHC Act to
restrict the activities of holding company-owned state banks.6 "7
Butler and Macey also point to regulatory controls placed by the
FDIC on FDIC-insured state banks.6"8 As shown above, however, the
FDIC (like the FRB) cannot deny to state banks, as a general matter,
powers that have been authorized by state law.60 9
In addition, Butler and Macey exaggerate the impact of the competi-
tive equality doctrine in homogenizing the powers of national and state
banks and limiting competition between them.610 The courts have ap-
plied the principle of competitive equality only in cases in which the fed-
eral statute governing national banks has expressly incorporated state
banking law as the applicable standard.61 1 In other situations, where the
federal statute does not make state banking law the governing rule, the
courts have not protected state banks under the competitive equality
doctrine.612
Moreover, even in the area of national bank branching under the Mc-
Fadden Act, where the competitive equality doctrine has received its ful-
lest elaboration,613 that doctrine has been significantly restricted in two
603. See id. at 697 (citing CEBA, supra note 183, § 103, 101 Stat. 566-67). For discus-
sion of the prohibitions contained in Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, see
supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
604. See CEBA, supra note 183, § 103, 101 Stat. 567. For a discussion of the limited
effect of the temporary moratorium enacted by CEBA, see supra notes 182-84 and ac-
companying text.
605. Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 698.
606. Id. at 710.
607. See supra Part IV(C).
608. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 699-700.
609. See supra Part IV(B)(2)-(4).
610. See Butler & Macey supra note 11, at 701-05.
611. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1969)
(applying 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)); Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 564-65
(1934) (applying 12 U.S.C. § 90 (1988)); St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Trust
Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 548 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977)
(applying 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1988)).
612. See, e.g., Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
313-14 (1978) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988)); Conference of State Bank Supervisors
v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 884-85 (1983) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1988)).
613. See, e.g., Plant City, 396 U.S. at 131-33 (applying 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)); In-
dependent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 930-37 (D.C. Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
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recent decisions. First, the Supreme Court limited the doctrine in Clarke
v. SIA by holding that the McFadden Act "requir[es] 'competitive equal-
ity' only in core banking functions." '614 Thus, the Court held, the Mc-
Fadden Act's branching restrictions do not reach "all activities in which
national banks are specifically authorized to engage."61
Second, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Deposit Guaranty
that state-chartered thrifts are "State banks" for purposes of the McFad-
den Act.616 This decision has enabled national banks to branch to the
same extent that state-chartered thrifts may branch under state law, even
if state commercial banks are more limited in their branching rights.
617
As Professor Butler has pointed out in another article, Deposit Guaranty
has already pressured several states to grant statewide branching powers
to commercial banks and, therefore, may well destroy "the last vestiges
of intrastate restrictions . . . on geographic expansion by national
banks. 618
Thus, the competitive equality doctrine no longer plays a major role in
restraining the intrastate expansion or product development opportuni-
ties of national banks. Moreover, the doctrine never eliminated rivalry
between the state banking regulators and the OCC. Contrary to the sug-
gestion of Butler and Macey that the federal regulators welcomed the
McFadden Act,619 in fact the OCC consistently tried to find loopholes in
the McFadden Act that would enable national banks to escape intrastate
restrictions on branching. While several of the OCC's earlier attempts
were unsuccessful, 6u0 the decisions in Clarke v. SIA and Deposit Guaranty
have largely fulfilled the OCC's strategy.
In sum, Butler and Macey's contention that the dual banking system
stifles competition between federal and state bank regulators does not
accord with the historical record. Of course, such competition could be
ended by the enactment of a federal law preempting the authority of the
states to determine the scope of state bank powers. Indeed, that is one of
the proposals made by Butler and Macey, based on their fear that the
states will authorize excessively risky powers at the expense of the federal
deposit insurance fund.62 1 As explained above, there is no substantial
614. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 409 (1987). Butler and Macey
note Clarke but do not take fully into account its significant impact in limiting the com-
petitive equality doctrine. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 701 n.103, 705 n.l 17.
615. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 406. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that national
banks could open offices providing discount brokerage services (an authorized banking
activity) without reference to the McFadden Act. See id. at 408-09.
616. See Deposit Guaranty, 809 F.2d 266, 269-71 (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 36(h)
(1988)), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987).
617. See id. at 268 (noting that state-chartered thrifts in Mississippi were given greater
branching rights than state commercial banks).
618. Butler, supra note 113, at 704 (quote), 724-28.
619. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 702-03, 707-08.
620. For examples of earlier unsuccessful attempts by the OCC to evade state restric-
tions on branching, see supra note 110.
621. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 712-13.
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evidence to date indicating that the states have permitted state banks to
engage in excessive risk-taking.6 22  Moreover, Butler and Macey ac-
knowledge that federal preemption would transform the current dual
regulatory system into a centralized federal regulatory "monopoly" that
would have "no incentive to liberalize the restrictions on entry into the
banking industry, to develop innovative ways to solve contracting
problems banks face, or to respond rationally to technological
changes. "623
As an alternative to federal preemption, Butler and Macey suggest that
the current system of federal deposit insurance and federal regulation of
banks could be replaced by a free bank chartering system under which
banks could obtain charters in any state and would operate without any
substantial regulation except for that imposed by the banks' contracts
with private deposit insurers.624 This proposal seems unworkable given
the collapse of private deposit insurance plans in recent years and the
unlikelihood (especially in view of the FSLIC crisis) that the public
would have confidence in any deposit insurance system not backed by the
federal government.625
As an intermediate proposal, Butler and Macey suggest that a free
bank chartering system under state law could operate under federal de-
posit insurance if appropriate risk-based deposit insurance premiums
were introduced. However, they do not explain how the degree of federal
regulation required to protect the federal deposit insurance fund could
coexist in harmony with a free (and thus largely unregulated) bank char-
tering system at the state level. In addition, Butler and Macey admit that
federal risk-based deposit insurance would involve problems of pricing by
the federal government as the monopoly provider of such insurance.626
622. See supra Part V(A).
623. Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 713. For commentaries opposing centralized
federal control over bank regulation, see Frankel, supra note 90, at 58, 61; Scott, supra
note 8, at 34-35.
624. See Butler & Macey, supra note 11, at 714-17.
625. For authorities discussing the collapse in 1985 of private insurance systems for
state-chartered thrifts in Ohio and Maryland, and concluding that a federal guarantee of
deposit insurance is required to provide sufficient public credibility, see Scott, Deposit
Insurance-The Appropriate Roles for State and Federal Governments, 53 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 27, 28, 42-43 (1987); Lapidus, State and Federal Deposit Insurance Schemes, 53
Brooklyn L. Rev. 45, 48-52 (1987) (agreeing that only a federal deposit insurance system
would be credible as a sole or primary insurer of bank deposits, but suggesting that a state
insurance fund could play a useful role in providing excess coverage for large deposits
that are not federally insured); Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 191.
[Editor's Note: A recent survey indicates that nine out of the 12 members of the Euro-
pean Community ("EC") have adopted government-sponsored deposit insurance pro-
grams, and the remaining three countries will soon do so under pressure from the
European Commission. The general adoption of government deposit insurance in the EC
is a significant departure from past banking practices in most EC countries and appears
to be a response to international competitive pressures and consumer concerns about
bank safety. Sibley, How The Europeans Do It, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1990, at AI0, col. 4.]
626. Other commentators have pointed out that federal risk-based deposit insurance
would give the FDIC great power to influence the composition of bank assets and would
1254 [Vol. 58
STATE BANK POWERS
In sum, it appears that federal deposit insurance and federal regulation
of banks are likely to remain features of our banking system for the indef-
inite future.627 As long as this is the case, the existence of a state charter-
ing and regulatory option for banks will provide important benefits in
bringing a significant degree of competition and innovation into a highly
regulated industry.62"
CONCLUSION
The dual banking system has fostered a significant degree of competi-
tion between the federal and state banking regulators in providing re-
sponsive and innovative supervision. Although this regulatory
competition is restrained by considerations of bank safety and soundness,
the dual regulatory system for banks stands in marked contrast to other
regulated industries where the federal government has exercised a mo-
nopoly of supervision. The recent state initiatives in expanding state
bank powers are promising developments, especially when viewed in
comparison with the inability of Congress to act on the question of bank-
ing powers. Accordingly, these state experiments should not be pre-
empted by federal legislation in the absence of substantial evidence
indicating that expanded state powers involve excessive risks of bank
failure.
There is a further reason for allowing state experimentation with bank
powers to continue. At present, there is substantial debate over the ques-
tion of whether expanded securities, insurance or real estate activities
present unreasonable risks for banks.629 In addition, there are arguments
about the degree to which banks can be insulated from the risks inherent
also require the FDIC to perform the difficult task of assessing the risks inherent in bank
loans before repayment problems are experienced. See, e.g., 1989 House Hearings, supra
note 5, at 25 (testimony of Chairman L. William Seidman of the FDIC, indicating the
considerable power that risk-based deposit insurance would confer upon the FDIC, and
noting the difficulty in predicting bank risks, since the large Texas banks that failed in the
late 1980s because of loan problems had been highly profitable only a few years before);
R. Litan, supra note 15, at 153-56 (explaining the difficulty of assessing the risks inherent
in a bank's loan portfolio, before loan problems occur, in order to establish risk-based
deposit insurance premiums); Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15, at 235-38 (recog-
nizing same difficulty but suggesting that risk-related premiums might be workable).
627. There is a general consensus that the existence of federal deposit insurance re-
quires a system of federal regulation designed to protect the insurance fund against the
costs of bank failures. See, e.g., Garten, supra note 5, at 504 & n. 11; Safe Banking Per-
spectives, supra note 15, at 246.
628. For a discussion of the benefits provided by the dual banking system, see supra
Part II(A)(2). Professor Scott has pointed out that, while federal and state banking regu-
lators have not allowed free entry into the banking industry, their record is far different
from that of the former Civil Aeronautics Board, which enjoyed a regulatory monopoly
over air passenger carriers, and did not authorize a single new trunkline air carrier during
the four decades that followed the agency's creation. See Scott, supra note 8, at 34-35.
629. For authorities expressing differing views on the desirability and safety of bank
involvement in expanded securities, insurance or real estate activities, see supra notes 63-
77 and accompanying text.
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in nontraditional activities if the activities are conducted through sepa-
rate subsidiaries or affiliates.63° State experiments with new bank powers
should provide helpful evidence in addressing these issues, because, as
described above, the states have taken differing approaches in authoriz-
ing new activities, in placing limitations on the amount of bank resources
that can be devoted to them, and, in some cases, by requiring such activi-
ties to be conducted through subsidiaries or affiliates.631 Thus, as has
often been true during the history of our dual banking system, state inno-
vation may provide the basis for a new federal approach to bank regula-
tion and the appropriate scope of bank powers.
630. For differing views on the extent to which banks can be protected from the risks
of activities conducted through separate subsidiaries or affiliates, see Mandate for Change,
supra note 17, at 65-75, 86-96, reprinted in 1987 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 206-
16, 227-37 (expressing the FDIC's view that banks can be adequately insulated from risk
if nontraditional activities are placed in a subsidiary of the bank); S. Rep. No. 305, supra
note 23, at 130 (additional views of Senators Garn and Bond, taking same position); id. at
16-17 (majority views, maintaining that the placing of securities activities in a separate
nonbank subsidiary of the parent bank holding company would be "a much sounder
alternative" (id. at 16) than allowing direct subsidiaries of banks to conduct securities
activities); 1987 Senate Hearings, supra note 63, at 93-95 (testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan of the FRB, taking same position); Safe Banking Perspectives, supra note 15,
at 146-58, 305-06 (contending that banks cannot be adequately insulated from the risks of
nontraditional activities conducted by nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates; regulation there-
fore must address the consolidated risk of the entire banking organization); Garten, supra
note 5, at 553-58, 568-69 (taking similar position).
631. See supra Part II(D).
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